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ABSTRACT 
The EU is no longer an organisation that merely pursues economic objectives, 
but it also evolves towards a more political and constitutionalised Union. The 
thesis supports that the political integration in the field of EU fundamental rights, 
is primarily evolving through a ‘triangular’, inter-connected system of protection, 
including the constructivist transformation of EU citizenship, the institutionalised 
developments, such as the EU Charter, and the protection of fundamental rights 
as general principles of EU law. Yet major components of a flawless fundamental 
rights policy as a whole, are still absent and this is even more perceptible during 
periods of crises, such as the recent financial crisis, where a lack in citizens’ rights 
protection is evident, especially in effective judicial protection, due to the difficulty 
in challenging the consequences of the conditionality imposed. The deficient 
protection largely derived from the restricted scope of application of fundamental 
rights under the Charter, its unstable judicial interpretation, and in turn from the 
unwillingness of the Court to rule on complex financial cases. The financial crisis 
and its mechanisms, therefore, constitute a useful case-study to assess the 
modern ‘triangular’ protection of rights and stimulate the interest in assessing new 
legal paths to reinforce it, by broadening fundamental rights’ scope of application. 
Although EU citizenship has not played any substantial role in the financial crisis, 
it is believed that is not constrained to its current, ‘confined’ form, due to its 
evolving character, designed to encounter constant evolution and progress. The 
constructivist nature of EU citizenship has culminated with the judicially 
developed ‘substance of the rights’ doctrine, initiated with Rottmann, according 
to which an internal fundamental rights violation, can possibly fall within the scope 
of EU law, if it amounts to detaching Union citizenship rights of their substantive 
meaning. The doctrine has not only largely overcome the limits faced by the 
cross-border requirement and created an EU self-standing test towards wholly 
internal situations, but has importantly prompted the inclusion of new, unwritten 
rights in the concept of EU citizenship, such as the ability to benefit from equality 
in purely internal situations. This new jurisdictional test, can be effectively 
compared to the approach adopted in the financial crisis ruling of Associação 
Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, where through the exercise of judicial activism, 
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the ECJ managed to overcome the legal barriers of the Charter and rely on 
effective judicial protection under Art. 19(1) TEU, in a wholly internal situation. 
Through this comparison, the thesis aims to bring the doctrine a step further and 
propose an alternative, more effective use of rights, by establishing a link 
between EU fundamental and EU citizenship rights. The proposal consists in a 
three-step jurisdictional test that will allow fundamental rights, beyond the ones 
enshrined in the citizenship rights list, to be used in specific internal situations, 
through a combined dynamic reading of Art. 2 TEU, the general principles of EU 
law and Art. 20 TFEU.   
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1 CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Motivation and objective of the research 
The ancient Greek philosopher Aristotle defined the citizen as he “who has a 
power to take part in the deliberative or judicial administration of any state”.1 In 
modern societies, citizenship is described as a status of membership in a polity, 
which presupposes that there is some unity among the people sharing this 
status.2 This unity of people is not however a clear-cut concept since it can be 
based on a pre-political fact of nationhood, on the territorial legal order created 
by modern states or even on the common membership in a community. The focus 
of the contemporary debate around citizenship has in fact moved from the classic 
form within closed national societies to more advanced models of citizenship that 
combine national and supranational modes of membership and rights.3  
The shift towards alternative models beyond the confines of nation states is 
demonstrated through the creation of the legal concept of EU citizenship, 
advancing the idea that the process of European integration must not only centre 
on the Member States, but must have, at its heart, the citizens of Europe.4 The 
importance of the concept legally, politically and socially is not only evident by 
the position it holds in the Treaties but more so, through its rapid judicial 
development in the case law of the Court of Justice (ECJ). In spite of the fact that 
EU citizenship has been the focus of several scholarly works for years it arguably 
remains an ambiguous notion, with different sides to be considered, analysed 
and developed, such as the structural connection with fundamental rights.5 This 
belief was stimulated further by several occurrences that emerged shortly before 
                                                 
1 Donald Morrison, ‘Aristotle's Definition of Citizenship: A Problem and Some Solutions’ (1999) 16 
History of Philosophy Quarterly 143. 
2 Rainer Bauböck and Virginie Guiraudon, ‘Introduction: realignments of citizenship: reassessing rights in 
the age of plural memberships and multi-level governance’ (2009) 13 Citizenship Studies 439. 
3 ibid 439. 
4 Article 10 TEU. 
5 Dora Kostakopoulou, ‘European Union Citizenship: Writing the Future’ (2007) 13 European Law Journal 
623; Koen Lenaerts, ‘EU citizenship and the European Court of Justice’s ‘stone-by-stone’ approach’ 
(2015) 1 International Comparative Jurisprudence 1; Dimitry Kochenov, ‘The Essence of EU Citizenship 
Emerging from the last ten years of Academic Debate: Beyond the Cherry Blossoms and the Moon?’ 
(2013) 62 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 97. 
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the start of this research, namely the series of cases establishing the so-called 
‘substance of the rights’ doctrine and the legal challenges against austerity 
measures that culminated in 2015. Although these two subject-matters are 
usually not placed in the same boat, from the research’s perspective they have a 
common ground, as illustrated below in the relevant judgments of the ECJ 
analysed.    
The first one, is the landmark case of Ruiz Zambrano which concerned two 
Colombian nationals whose application for asylum in Belgium was rejected but a 
non-refoulement condition was in place.6 Due to their irregular status they had no 
entitlement to work or receive unemployment benefits, after several unsuccessful 
applications made claiming otherwise. In the meantime, the couple had two 
children who acquired Belgian citizenship but had never really exercised their 
freedom of movement. Mr Ruiz Zambrano accordingly sought to rely on a derived 
right of residence as the ascendant of EU national children. The purely internal 
nature of the situation was a central element of the Court’s judgment, since the 
case prima facie lacked any cross-border dimension and/or any other link with 
EU law. The Court however, reformulated the referred questions in a way that 
absorbed the purely internal issue into the broader context, and proceeded to 
base its reasoning on citizenship as a fundamental status of the EU national 
children.7 At the same time, Advocate General (AG) Sharpston closely assessed 
the scope and meaning of EU citizenship and concluded that the situation of the 
Zambrano children was by its nature not purely internal because Article 21 TFEU 
encompasses a free-standing right of residence, regardless of the exercise of 
movement.8 Besides the migration law perspective, what the case is truly 
remarkable for, is the approach of the Court in sidestepping the internal situations 
doctrine leading to profound consequences, especially for the scope of 
application of EU law.9 It is thus necessary to assess the consequences of the 
                                                 
6 Judgment 8 March 2011, Ruiz Zambrano, C-34/09, ECLI:EU:C:2011:124. 
7 Francesca Strumia, ‘Ruiz Zambrano’s Quiet Revolution’ in Fernanda Nicola and Bill Davies (eds), EU Law 
Stories (CUP 2017) 233. 
8 ibid 232. 
9 Dimitry Kochenov, ‘A real European Citizenship: A new jurisdiction test: A novel chapter in the 
development of the Union in Europe’ (2012) 18 Columbia Journal of European Law 56. 
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doctrine and the extent to which this citizenship rights revolution has paved the 
way for more unbounded concepts beyond the sphere of the internal market.10  
The second case of Sindicato dos Bancários comes into play, which challenged 
the salary cuts imposed as conditionality for granting financial assistance to 
Portugal, as being incompatible with the principle of non-discrimination under the 
Charter.11 The Court rejected the reference on the basis that it falls outside the 
scope of the Charter and EU law. Although this case was raised in a totally 
different context, the main problem that emerged can be associated with the 
purely internal nature observed in Ruiz Zambrano. In particular, the invocation of 
the Charter provisions was rendered almost impossible due to its restrictive scope 
of application requiring for an ‘implementation of EU law’, under Article 51(1). The 
vast majority of the cases had hence failed, because of the inadequate link 
between the relevant EU source and the Member State’s action, rendering the 
cases purely internal in nature, despite the involvement of EU institutions in the 
decision-making process and the formation of the relevant mechanisms. The 
thesis’ main consideration boils down to the question of whether it would be 
possible for the ECJ to adopt an analogous approach to Ruiz Zambrano in 
austerity measures challenges, namely to expand the scope of application of EU 
law and bring the cases within its sphere. Even though EU citizenship has never 
been used in a similar context to protect EU citizens’ rights, its flexibility makes it 
attractive for further research around the possible engagement with newly 
developed areas and connectivity with other long-established concepts such as 
EU fundamental rights.  
Much like the EU itself, Union citizenship constitutes a rather unique construction. 
The judicial approach in Ruiz Zambrano highlighted the substance of EU 
citizenship as a legal status that “trails along nationality and fades in purely 
internal situations”, but will be ‘activated’ to mark an “alternative inclusion path in 
                                                 
10 Christoph Strünck, ‘A ‘rights revolution’ in Europe? The ambiguous relation between rights and 
citizenship’ in Sandra Seubert, Oliver Eberl and Frans van Waarden (eds), Reconsidering EU Citizenship: 
Contradictions and Constraints (Elgar 2018) 134. 
11 Judgment of 7 March 2013, Sindicato dos Bancários do Norte and Others, C-128/12, 
ECLI:EU:C:2013:149. 
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cases involving fragile national and vulnerable migrants”.12 The multilevel 
citizenship established in the EU is not simply about passports and the feeling of 
belonging but also about individuals being able to draw on rights at multiple levels 
of the political authority.13 Therefore, EU citizenship must be seen as a living 
instrument whose limits have not been determined yet, but according to the 
arguments that will be extensively discussed in the thesis, goes far beyond the 
list of rights expressly mentioned in Article 20 TFEU.  
In view of this background, the general objective of the research is to reinforce 
the current system of fundamental rights protection within the EU legal order, so 
as to fill the legal gaps substantially revealed during the financial crisis. The thesis 
will achieve this objective by proposing a novel way of linking EU fundamental 
and citizenship rights through a judicial jurisdictional test based on the classic 
‘substance of the rights’ doctrine. In a nutshell, a test will be proposed for claiming 
jurisdiction under EU law to review infringements normally perceived as purely 
internal situations, beyond the areas covered by the Union’s acquis, the so-called 
‘internal applicability of EU law’ test. The proposed test will be formed based on 
the constructivist concept of EU citizenship and more specifically on the rationale 
behind the substance of the rights doctrine, under which the effectiveness of EU 
law will be the priority in order to safeguard the common values and principles 
that unite the Union and its citizens. 
1.2 Research Questions 
The core research objective of the thesis consists in three research questions 
that serve as guidance for developing the conceptual framework of rights 
protection under EU citizenship. The first research question concerns the extent 
to which the current fundamental rights system provides effective protection for 
EU citizens and the way the courts (nationally, supranationally and 
internationally) have applied it in regards to the financial crisis’ infringements 
                                                 
12 Francesca Strumia, ‘Ruiz Zambrano’s Quiet Revolution’ in Fernanda Nicola and Bill Davies (eds), EU 
Law Stories (CUP 2017) 244. 
13 Willem Maas, ‘Equality and Free Movement of People’ in Willem Maas (ed), Democratic Citizenship 
and the Free Movement of People (Martinus Nijhoff 2013); Willem Maas, ‘Varieties of Multilevel 
Citizenship’ in Willem Maas (ed), Multilevel Citizenship (University of Pennsylvania Press 2013). 
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caused by the financial assistance and austerity measures imposed. The current 
EU fundamental rights system is perceived in the research as a ‘triangular’ 
system of protection consisting of the EU Charter provisions, the list of rights 
under EU citizenship and fundamental rights as general principles of EU law.  
Decisive steps have been taken in the field, including the introduction of the 
revolutionary and binding instrument of the EU Charter and the development of 
the case law around the principle of non-discrimination and EU citizenship. 
However, when answering the first research question of effectiveness, 
considerations still arise, regarding the extent to which the current system is in 
fact adequately protecting EU citizens, especially in times of emergency such as 
the recent Eurozone crisis. Although the effectiveness of the current system has 
been previously questioned as will be seen in Chapter 2, the particular research 
question is essential for the research since it serves the purpose of setting the 
background on which the thesis’ proposal will be built, and will do so through a 
practicable assessment as well. 
The second research question examines the extent to which EU citizenship can 
constitute the key to strengthening the protection of citizens’ rights even further 
that would in turn result in the reformed architecture of the system. More 
specifically, the second research question puts forward the argument that the 
weaknesses identified can be confronted through alternative routes without 
necessarily involving complicated legal amendments of the Treaties. The concept 
of EU citizenship constitutes the main alternative route under consideration, 
primarily because of its flexibility, dynamism and its ability to be adjusted in new 
formations. In answering the particular research question, a thorough 
examination of the nature of EU citizenship is necessary including its potentials, 
legal characteristics and constitutional effects within the EU legal order. Providing 
a satisfactory response to the second research question will serve the 
understanding of the unique dynamism of EU citizenship compared to the rest of 
the elements within the ‘triangular’ system. It will also prove the capability of EU 
citizenship to be specifically involved in the financial crisis claims. Although the 
latter prima facie appears to be an unachievable interrelation, arguments will be 
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discussed in the thesis which clearly prove otherwise. Most of the thesis’ 
arguments will be based on the recent judicial developments on EU citizenship 
that arguably open up new prospects for the concept, as well as for the Union’s 
scope of application. For instance, the expansion of the list of rights attached to 
EU citizenship based on the so-called ‘substance of the rights doctrine’, is one of 
the prospects that will be appraised for granting protection to rights violated 
during the financial crisis.14     
Following the assessment of the ‘triangular’ protection system and EU 
citizenship’s suitability, the third research question of the thesis comes into play, 
questioning the exact way in which EU citizenship and the ‘substance of the rights 
doctrine’ will contribute to the strengthening of the system. The main argument 
under this research question will be developed on two main parameters. Firstly, 
the idea that in order to add more value to EU citizenship, a link with EU 
fundamental rights needs to be established, which would also automatically 
expand the rights protected under EU citizenship. The second parameter 
concerns the argument that this link can be achieved through the use of the 
substance of the rights doctrine, which at the same time would expand the 
personal and material scope of fundamental rights application towards internal 
situations.15 It is thus clear that the third research question presupposes the need 
to build a doctrinal approach with great caution, especially in the prospect of 
expanding the list of rights under Article 20(2) TFEU. Previous attempts had also 
been made towards reinforcing the role of EU citizenship within the EU 
fundamental rights policies, which although not effective enough, will constitute 
the foundation to start building on.16  
1.3 The structure of the thesis 
The three research questions discussed above, provide a concise overview of 
the focus of the thesis, as well as a comprehensible direction on how the research 
will be approached in a step-by-step manner. For the purpose of assessing them, 
                                                 
14 Judgment of 8 March 2012, Ruiz Zambrano, Case C‑34/09, ECLI:EU:C:2010:560. 
15 Detailed analysis of the substance of the rights doctrine in Chapter 5. 
16 Detailed analysis of the preceding attempts in Chapter 6, section 6.3. 
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the thesis will adopt a coherent and constructive structure, starting with the 
current chapter, the Introduction. The second chapter of the thesis concerns the 
literature review and methodological approaches of the research. The literature 
review will evaluate the current knowledge on the topics under consideration, 
including substantive findings. In particular, it will appraise the legal framework 
and the scholarly literature of accredited authors, on the three elements of the 
‘triangular’ system and the extent to which they have been understood as closely 
interrelated in scholarly works or in legal jurisprudence. Through this appraisal 
the gaps within the current relevant knowledge will be traced, which the thesis is 
then called upon to fill by the end of the research. The Chapter will further conduct 
a critical analysis on the theoretical background of the research, demonstrating 
the route adopted in the study and the thinking behind the author’s arguments. 
Specifically, a number of theoretical approaches that promote the establishment 
of a link between EU citizenship and fundamental rights will be used, including 
constitutionalism, constructivism, federalism and judicial activism for the ECJ’s 
actions.      
Subsequently, Chapter 3 will set a detailed background of the research. More 
specifically, it will analyse the components consisting the ‘triangular’ system of 
fundamental rights protection within the EU legal order, focusing on their legal 
nature, content and scope of application. Besides identifying the deficiencies and 
weaknesses of the system which is not an unusual scrutinising exercise, Chapter 
3 aims to provide an unconventional analysis, from a new perspective. The 
analysis will thus focus less on the current formation and performance of the 
instruments and to a greater extent on their future potential and prospect. Along 
these lines, a preliminary proposition will be formed, indicating the most effective 
instrument to focus on, in order to achieve enduring improvements for the 
protection system in accordance with future capabilities rather than with the 
current state of the instruments. The Chapter will emphasise the fact that 
although the Charter is clearly a very modern and advanced instrument, its 
unstable scope of application, as well as the inconsistent judicial interpretations 
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constitute a strenuous barrier to overcome.17 On the contrary, EU citizenship is 
perceived as a more flexible instrument which can effectively overcome its 
limitations and expand beyond the expected fields of application.18  
Chapter 4 will be entirely dedicated to the financial crisis case study. In addition 
to the general examination discussed in the preceding Chapter, a more 
practicable assessment will take place, based on the application of fundamental 
rights during the financial crisis. As discussed in the thesis, this practical 
examination could also be undertaken using other case studies, such as the 
current rule of law crisis. Nevertheless, the financial crisis was perceived as the 
most suitable one for two main reasons. Firstly, the austerity measures case law 
before the Court will largely demonstrate the extent to which the limited and 
unstable scope of application of the Charter provisions, is the main cause of the 
lack of effective judicial protection. It is therefore expected to reinforce the need 
for a broadened and fixed scope of application, which is in line with the aim of the 
research, namely to broaden the material scope of the system towards internal 
situations. Secondly, the use of the specific case study will also emphasise the 
absence of EU citizenship provisions from the judicial processes, which again 
reinforces the necessity and importance of the thesis’ argument that it is time for 
EU citizenship to be granted more value to reflect “the fundamental status of EU 
citizens”.19 Therefore, through the analysis of the Court’s decisions regarding 
austerity measures, Chapter 4 aims to assess the demand for a reinforcement 
and emphasise the need for action. It also serves the purpose of practically 
reaffirming the weaknesses of the system and the authenticity of the objectives 
set in the research which are entirely reflecting the needs of the Union at present. 
The corresponding proposal to be made will remain pragmatic and applicable to 
the Union legal system.  
Chapters 5 and 6 are directly related since they both focus on the way forward 
and on how to reinforce the system to overcome the current weaknesses. In 
                                                 
17 Koen Lenaerts, ‘Exploring the Limits of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights’ (2012) 8 EuConst 375, 
402. 
18 Antje Wiener, ‘The Constructive Potential of Citizenship: building European Union’ (1999) 27 Policy & 
Politics 271, 273. 
19 Judgment of 20 September 2011, Grzelczyk, C-184/99, ECLI:EU:C:2001:458, para 31. 
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particular, Chapter 5 will provide an extensive analysis of the judicially developed 
‘substance of the rights’ doctrine including the cases that initially formed it, as well 
as of those that clarified the doctrine further. This will serve the understanding 
around the triggering conditions of the doctrine, its unique formation and far-
reaching consequences for which it has attracted discussion, especially during 
the first two years of the writing process to the current thesis. In essence, the 
doctrine can be seen as a means for acquiring jurisdiction without the presence 
of the traditional linking elements since EU law can now be triggered by EU 
citizenship alone, provided a deprivation of the substance of EU citizenship rights 
occurs.20 Devoting an entire Chapter to the doctrine and its ability to expand the 
scope of EU law, presages the doctrine’s significance as perceived by the thesis 
and the fact that if appropriately exploited it can confront the deficiencies pointed 
out. Arguably, the scope of the substance of the rights doctrine which allows a 
citizen to trigger EU law protection in a purely internal situation, depends upon 
the rights that are regarded as EU citizenship rights under Article 20 TFEU. 
Therefore, one way of broadening the scope of application of the protection 
system further, is to add further rights in the non-exhaustive list of Article 20 TFEU 
that could benefit from the doctrine. A structural connection between EU 
citizenship and fundamental rights (whether these are the Charter provisions or 
as general principles of EU law) will thus be necessary to achieve that end.    
The last Chapter of the main body, will be dedicated to the examination of the 
legal routes available to structurally link EU fundamental with citizenship rights, 
to expand the doctrine’s application. Importantly, during the examination, due 
regard must be given to paramount principles of EU law including the division of 
competences, the principle of subsidiarity and sincere cooperation to prevent any 
conflicts from emerging.21 The first possibility to be examined is the extent to 
which all EU fundamental rights can constitute EU citizenship rights and vice 
versa. The second legal route will question whether the merits of the ‘substance 
of the rights doctrine’ currently applying to EU citizenship rights, could also 
similarly apply to a different group of rights, such as the principle of effective 
                                                 
20 The traditional cross-border element is discussed in detailed in Chapter 3, section 3.4.1. 
21 Article 5 TEU and Article 4 TEU respectively. 
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judicial protection, when the substance of the rights incorporated within the 
principle is infringed in prima facie purely internal situation.  
In order to reflect on the two legal routes to expand the doctrine’s scope, 
emphasis must be placed on the alleged role of the ECJ as a ‘maker’ of EU law 
and the debate on judicial activism. In the course of exercising its constitutional 
responsibility to protect the objectives and values enshrined in the Treaties, the 
Court has achieved a complete transformation of EU citizenship from a mere 
consolidation of existing rights to a dynamic fundamental rights tool. Both its 
personal and material scope expanded with the Court’s direction and its 
importance has increased. The value granted to EU citizenship as well as the 
protection of fundamental rights in general, is largely a judicial achievement of 
the ECJ. Consequently, the thesis will argue in favour of the Court’s activist 
stance, to encourage the broadening of the substance of the rights doctrine even 
further that will ultimately lead to the strengthening of the system as a whole.  
1.4 Contribution – Originality 
The originality of the research lies in three key considerations. Firstly, the thesis 
will conduct an extensively critical analysis of the effectiveness of the ‘triangular’ 
protection system as it currently stands, through a more realistic approach using 
the case study of the recent financial crisis. In addition, it will focus not so much 
on the structural weaknesses of the instruments which has already been 
examined in the scholarly literature, but mostly on their prospective legal nature. 
Secondly, the thesis supports that EU citizenship can constitute the key to change 
the current architecture of the system and allow for further protection of citizens’ 
rights, especially in situations with similar construction and occurrences with the 
financial crisis. Although EU citizenship is not a new concept within the Union and 
it has been the focus of numerous academic works, it has not until today had an 
essential impact within the legal claims challenging the austerity measures, nor 
has any scholarly research connected the financial crisis challenges before the 
Courts with EU citizenship as a legal concept. The thesis thus strongly supports 
that there is still room for original research around it. This belief is not only deriving 
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as an outcome of the gaps in the literature,22 but it is also based on the fact that 
EU citizenship is arguably designed to evolve, which allows for regular 
assessments of new and undiscovered notions of the concept. This is even more 
perceptible considering the on-going developments of the case law of the Court 
of Justice of the EU (CJEU) that frequently switch towards different legal 
directions. Such a development is the ‘substance of the rights’ doctrine which is 
a relatively new formation and is definitely still evolving. It is consequently 
believed that through the new judicial doctrine, the list of rights under Article 20 
TFEU is not limited to its current form, but it can be rather expanded towards 
protecting further rights and principles, primarily because of the constructivist 
nature of Union citizenship.  
Finally, for the purpose of the objective discussed above the research will 
appraise the structural connection between EU citizenship and fundamental 
rights through inter alia, the recent ‘genuine enjoyment of the substance of the 
rights’ doctrine of the CJEU taking it a step further. Although very few attempts 
have been previously made towards establishing this interconnection, the idea of 
doing so through the use of EU citizenship is a newly developed approach. In 
particular, the proposal of the current research will entail an important legal 
development in the form of a new jurisdictional test, the ‘internal applicability of 
EU law test’. A careful doctrinal construction is thus required to prove that the 
proposal made is a feasible and legitimate development for the Court to adopt. 
For this purpose, three previous attempts will be examined as a starting point, 
primarily to avoid approaches that led to a dead-end and to ensure effectiveness. 
  
                                                 
22 The gaps of the existing literature are discussed in Chapter 2, section 2.2. 
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2 CHAPTER 2 – LITERATURE REVIEW AND METHODOLOGIES  
2.1 Introduction 
The principal consideration of the thesis and the research questions, concern the 
extent to which EU citizenship can be considered as the key legal concept to 
strengthen the protection of EU fundamental rights. This question acquired 
urgency in light of the recent EU financial crisis, when the EU fundamental rights 
protection was placed under serious strain. The research objectives discussed 
above, firstly require an in-depth examination of the concepts of EU citizenship 
and EU fundamental rights both as general principles of EU law and as Charter 
provisions, as well as an assessment of the current judicial and scholarly 
analyses surrounding them. The purpose of Chapter 2 is to critically assess the 
legal framework and the existing literature on these three concepts in order to 
firstly, set the foundations and background of the research and secondly, to 
assess the relationship of the current thesis with the existing scholarly work, 
identifying the literature gaps to be filled within the research. Lastly, the chapter 
will consider the theoretical approaches of the research with a view to assess 
how the law is conceptualised throughout the study. The methodological 
statement will specifically discuss the different conceptual structures that support 
the objectives of the research and guide the ideas advanced by the author, as 
well as the methods and research techniques used to answer the research 
questions.  
2.2 Literature Review 
A vast amount of legal literature exists within the field of EU fundamental rights 
protection, with greater visibility being acquired, both from the Courts and from 
the academic literature, during the last decades of the ever-closer Union. 
Arguably the Union itself has evolved into a pluralistic system of fundamental 
rights protection, due to the interdependence and intertwined nature of 
international law, EU law and national law, which has resulted in a significantly 
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complex jurisdictional system.23 The fact that the different generations of 
fundamental rights are at different stages of development and hold a different 
legal stance, complicates the situation even further.24 For the purposes of 
conducting a literature review the foremost judicial rulings, legal frameworks and 
original scholarly works have been selected and will be reviewed in three different 
parts, each dedicated to one of the concepts of the ‘triangular’ system within the 
EU legal order. In particular, the protection of fundamental rights as general 
principles of EU law, the rights attached to EU citizenship and the Charter of 
fundamental rights.  
In light of the above, the aim of the literature review is to critically assess the 
existing scholarly work on fundamental rights and EU citizenship, from a 
theoretical and conceptual perspective, understand the relationship of the thesis 
with the existing knowledge and in turn develop it a step further. Particular focus 
will be accordingly given to the theoretical background of the concepts consisting 
the ‘triangular’ system, as well as to their rationale and legal structure on which 
the research’s proposal will be built. 
2.2.1 Fundamental rights as general principles of EU law  
The classic narrative in the academia and the Court, is that human rights did not 
appear in the original Treaties,25 but only gradually gained significance in the late 
1960s and culminated in recent years in the establishment of a substantial EU 
human rights regime.26 Consequently, during the early years of the Union, the 
intense focus of the legal framework on economic integration, urged the CJEU to 
                                                 
23 Ágoston Mohay and Elisabeth Sándor-Szalay, ‘Hungary’ in Julia Laffranque (ed), REPORTS OF THE XXV 
FIDE CONGRESS, vol 1 (Tartu University Press 2012) 540. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Andrew Williams, ‘Respecting Fundamental Rights in the New Union: A Review’ in Catherine Barnard 
(ed), The Fundamentals of EU Law Revisited: Assessing the Impact of the Constitutional Debate (OUP 
2007); Manfred A Dauses, ‘The Protection of Fundamental Rights in the Community Legal Order’ (1985) 
10 ELRev 398. 
26 For the opposite argument see: Gráinne de Búrca, ‘The Evolution of EU Human Rights Law’ in Paul 
Craig and Gráinne de Búrca (eds), The Evolution of EU Law (OUP 2011); Grainne de Burca, ‘The Road Not 
Taken: The EU as a Global Human Rights Actor’ (2011) 105(4) American Journal of International Law 649; 
de Burca challenged the traditional narrative, arguing that the current EU human rights system is in 
several ways less robust and less ambitious than the long-forgotten plans for EU human rights 
engagements of the 1950s. 
25 
 
fill in the gaps on other legal issues such as fundamental rights. More specifically, 
to provide protection where necessary and generally “breath life to into the bare 
bone of the Treaties”.27 Fundamental rights as general principles, worthily belong 
into the ‘triangular’ protection system, since the Court, through their genesis and 
use, moved from a Union which was merely outsourcing fundamental rights 
protection, to a situation where effective protection is provided within the scope 
of EU law.28 
Accordingly, the jurisprudence of the Court did not make any reference to the 
protection of human rights until 1969 with Stauder v City of Ulm, where the Court 
stated that “the provision at issue contains nothing capable of prejudicing the 
fundamental human rights enshrined in the general principles of Community law 
and protected by the Court”.29 The Court thus recognised ‘fundamental human 
rights’, as general principles of EU law. Soon after Stauder, the Court delivered 
the judgment of Internationale Handelsgesellschaft,30 in which it progressed a 
step further stating that “respect for fundamental rights forms an integral part of 
the general principles of law protected by the Court of Justice”. It further indicated 
that “the protection of such rights, whilst inspired by the constitutional traditions 
common to the Member States, must be ensured within the framework of the 
structure and objectives of the Community”.31 A formula was thus established on 
the basis of which human rights could be protected within the judicial order of the 
(then) European Community, whose missing element was added less than four 
years later in Nold.32 The Court in Nold33 added to the previous rulings that 
“international Treaties for the protection of human rights on which the Member 
                                                 
27 Armin Cuyvers, ‘General Principles of EU law’ in Emmanuel Ugirashebuja, John Eudes Ruhangisa, Tom 
Ottervanger and Armin Cuyvers (eds), East African Community Law: Institutional, Substantive and 
Comparative EU Aspects (Brill 2017) 219. 
28 The EU outsourced human rights protection, to a different organisation, the Council of Europe’s 
European Convention on Human Rights. 
29 Judgment of 12 November 1969, Stauder v City of Ulm, C-29/69, ECLI:EU:C:1969:57, para 7. 
30 Judgment of 17 December 1970, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, C-11/70, ECLI:EU:C:1970:114, 
para 4. 
31 ibid para 4. 
32 George Arestis, ‘Fundamental Rights in the EU: Three years after Lisbon, the Luxembourg Perspective’ 
(2013) College of Europe, Cooperative Research Paper 2/2013, 2 
<https://www.coleurope.eu/system/files_force/research-
paper/researchpaper_2_2013_arestis_lawpol_final.pdf?download=1.> accessed 12 September 2016 
33 Judgment of 14 May 1974, Nold KG v Commission, C-4/73, ECLI:EU:C:1974:51. 
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States have collaborated…can supply guidelines which should be followed within 
the framework of Community law”. Such a Treaty is the ECHR which was taken 
into consideration a year later34 and at the same time the pioneer case law of the 
ECtHR “has encouraged and cajoled the main political actors into accepting 
human rights as a key element of the EU constitutional framework”.35 
Besides the judicial attention, the vast majority of EU law leading and renowned 
academics, have been studying the evolution and development of ‘human rights 
and fundamental freedoms’, especially the importance of their recognition as 
general principles. Gráinne de Búrca,36 Armin von Vogdandy,37 Philip Alston, 
Joseph H. H. Weiler38 and Koen Lenaerts39 are only a few of them. Specifically, 
Alston and Weiler questioned the progress and development of human rights as 
general principles of EU law, by examining the internal and external human rights 
policies, prior to the enforcement of the Treaty of Nice. They emphasised the 
need for a far more developed human rights policy within the EU legal order, 
especially in relation to the role of EU institutions.40 The importance of further EU 
integration in the field of human rights has been supported by the majority of the 
scholarly literature, on grounds including the need to preserve the principles upon 
which the Union is established, the greater commitment of the EU due to its 
increasingly significant role in world politics and to balance its economic 
ambitions, such as the EMU, with human rights policies.41 
                                                 
34 Judgment of 28 October 1975, Rutili v Ministre de l'intérieur, Case C-36/75, ECLI:EU:C:1975:137. 
35 Gráinne de Búrca, ‘The Road Not Taken: The EU as a Global Human Rights Actor’ (2011) 105 American 
Journal of International Law 649, 650. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Armin von Bogdandy, ‘The European Union as a Human Rights Organization? Human Rights and the 
Core of the European Union’ (2000) 37 Common Market Law Review 1307. 
38 Philip Alston and Joseph H H Weiler, ‘An ‘Ever Closer Union’ in Need of a Human Rights Policy: The 
European Union and Human Rights’ in Philip Alston (ed), The EU and Human Rights (OUP 1999). 
39 Koen Lenaerts and Jose A Gutierrez-Fons, ‘The constitutional allocation of powers and general 
principles of EU law' (2010) 47 Common Market Law Review 1629; Koen Lenaerts is the current 
President of the ECJ. He is also a Professor of European Law at the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven and 
has an active role in the academic literature. 
40 Philip Alston and Joseph H H Weiler, ‘An ‘Ever Closer Union’ in Need of a Human Rights Policy: The 
European Union and Human Rights’ in Philip Alston (ed), The EU and Human Rights (OUP 1999). 
41 Madeleine Colvin and Peter Noorlander, ‘Human Rights and Accountability after the Treaty of 
Amsterdam’ (1998) 3 European Human Rights Law Review 191; European Parliament, Annual Report on 
respect for human rights in the European Union in 1994 (Rapporteur: Mrs L .de Esteban Martin), Doc. 
A4-0223/96 (1 July 1996); A G Toth, ‘The European Union and Human Rights: The Way Forward’ (1997) 
34 Common Market Law Review 491; Manfred Nowak, ‘Human Rights “Conditionality” in Relation to 
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In addition, Lenaerts and Gutiérrez-Fons, inter alia, focused their research on 
‘gap-filling’, which arguably constitutes the most important function of general 
principles up until today, as well as a significant aspect of the proposal of the 
thesis. Based on the fact that the Treaties provisions are broadly drafted, the ECJ 
was vested with wide powers to develop a ‘common law’, which effectively 
prevents the impediment of Union objectives caused by constitutional or 
legislative gaps. General principles are undoubtedly the most notable example of 
“federal common law”,42 namely the judge-made legal developments that also 
constitute general obligations for all the Member States. The prevailing view in 
the academia towards the functioning of general principles as ‘gap-fillers’ has 
been generally affirmative, since they address legal problems that are overlooked 
by the Union legislature and aim to create norms that are intrinsically linked to 
the nature, objectives and functioning of the Union.43  
The authority to formulate ‘grounding’ principles, is granted to the Court by 
specific Treaty provisions such as Article 6(3) TEU, which explicitly supports the 
judge-made rules and endorses the ECJ with this task in the field of fundamental 
rights protection.44 Similarly, Article 340 TFEU indicates that the principle of non-
contractual liability of the Union is to be developed “in accordance with the 
general principles common to the laws of the Member States”, which clearly 
demonstrates the intention of the authors, for judge-made laws to be used as 
instruments for ‘gap-filling’.45 More importantly, Article 19 TEU indicates that EU 
Courts “shall ensure that in the interpretation and application of the Treaties the 
                                                 
Entry to, and Full Participation in, the EU’ in Philip Alston (ed), The European Union and Human Rights 
(OUP 1999). 
42 Koen Lenaerts and Kethleen Gutman, ‘“Federal common law” in the European Union: A comparative 
perspective from the United States’, (2006) 54 The American Journal of Comparative Law 1, 7-16. 
43 Koen Lenaerts and Jose A Gutierrez-Fons, ‘The constitutional allocation of powers and general 
principles of EU law' (2010) 47 Common Market Law Review 1629, 1631; Takis Tridimas, The General 
Principles of EU Law (2nd edn, OUP 2006) 18-22; Xavier Groussot, General Principles of Community Law 
(European Law Publishing 2006) 421; Elena Gualco, ‘General principles of EU law as a passe-partout key 
within the constitutional edifice of the European Union: are the benefits worth the side effects?’ (2016) 
Institute of European Law Working Papers 5/2016, 5 <http://epapers.bham.ac.uk/2188/> accessed 28 
September 2018. 
44 Article 6(3) TEU: “[f]undamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and as they result from the constitutional traditions 
common to the Member States, [which] shall constitute general principles of the Union’s law”. 
45 Koen Lenaerts, ‘Interlocking legal orders in the European Union and comparative law’ (2003), 52 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 873, 877-900. 
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law is observed” and constitutes the third provision granting that authority. 
Although no guidance as to the content of the ‘law’ is provided, the incorporation 
of fundamental rights as general principles of EU law, clearly contributed towards 
the observation of EU law as provided under Article 19 TEU, by aligning the new 
EU legal order with the basic constitutional principles common to its Member 
States.46 The gap-filling function of the general principles, undoubtedly concerns 
a beneficial and valuable function for safeguarding the effective application of the 
Union Treaties, which is also considered as an essential component of the rule 
of law under Article 2 TEU by the Court.47  
In the words of Gualco, general principles of EU law constitute “an unlimited 
source of protection of fundamental rights as far as – thanks to their inner 
flexibility – their content and their effects can be easily adapted to any situation 
where the respect of a fundamental right is questioned”.48 The thesis supports 
the argument that fundamental rights as general principles of EU law, especially 
when recognised as foundational values under Article 2 TEU including the 
concept of the rule of law, must demonstrate a supranational context which is 
also reflected in the national legal orders. In this way, general principles as ‘gap-
fillers’ preserve the coherence of the EU legal order, without conflicting with the 
text of the Treaties or the separation of powers principle.49 The first corner of the 
‘triangular’ system, namely fundamental rights as general principles, is thus 
adapted as constituting ‘federal common law’ through the lens of a non-originalist, 
pragmatic interpretation, for the purposes of the current research.50  
                                                 
46 Thumen Koopmans, ‘The birth of European Law at the crossroads of legal traditions’ (1991), 39 
American Journal of Comparative Law 493. 
47 Thomas von Danwitz, ‘Values and the Rule of Law: Foundations of the European Union – An Inside 
Perspective From the ECJ’ (2018) 21 Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal, 11 
<https://doi.org/10.17159/1727-3781/2018/v21i0a4792> accessed 28 September 2018; ‘Order of 20 
November 2017, Commission v Poland, C-441/17 R, EU:C:2017:877, paras 97-100. 
48 Elena Gualco, ‘General principles of EU law as a passe-partout key within the constitutional edifice of 
the European Union: are the benefits worth the side effects?’ (2016) Institute of European Law Working 
Papers 5/2016, 10 <http://epapers.bham.ac.uk/2188/> accessed 1 September 2018. 
49 Koen Lenaerts and Jose A Gutierrez-Fons, ‘The constitutional allocation of powers and general 
principles of EU law' (2010) 47 Common Market Law Review 1629, 1635. 
50 Larry Alexander (ed), Constitutionalism: Philosophical Foundations (CUP 1998) 152; Ronald Dworkin, 
‘The Arduous Virtue of Fidelity: Originalism, Scalia, Tribe, and Nerve’, (2015) 83 Fordham Law Review 
2221; The theoretical background is discussed in detail below, section 2.3.1. 
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The studies on the initial recognition of fundamental rights as general principles 
within the EU legal order and their functions, can greatly contribute to the current 
research, not only by providing comprehension on the ‘diachronic’ position of 
fundamental rights in the EU, but also by serving the understanding of 
subsequent debates in the thesis. Moreover, a broader and deeper analysis of 
the current ‘triangular’ protection system including previous relevant studies 
available, allows for more productive and efficient results in order to reach the 
aims of the research in the most effective way possible. 
2.2.2 The concept of Citizenship and the Union’s replica 
2.2.2.1 Citizenship as A Global Concept 
The second corner of the EU triangular protection system to be examined, is the 
list of rights attached to EU citizenship. Citizenship in general, as a global 
concept, is encountered with different forms and structures, as well as different 
content, depending on the setting in which it is developed. It is generally 
understood as referring to “a status of equal membership within a bounded 
polity”.51 In other words, in contemporary societies it is defined as a 
homogeneous legal and political status within the context of a nation state, while 
in the current dominant meaning, the only form of membership that may be 
termed ‘citizenship’ is the membership in a sovereign country.52 Accordingly, 
there are many scholars ardently defending the state-centric citizenship, 
indicating that sovereignty and citizenship cannot be transferred.53 Holding on to 
this narrow and exclusionary definition of citizenship arguably impedes important 
developments at supranational levels, such as EU citizenship. Despite the 
dominance of a single, homogeneous and state-based citizenship narrative, the 
comparative history of citizenship clearly provides numerous examples of 
multilevel citizenship, proving the arguments in favour of a strictly, state-centric 
                                                 
51 Rainer Bauböck and Virginie Guiraudon, ‘Introduction: realignments of citizenship: reassessing rights 
in the age of plural memberships and multi-level governance’ (2009) 13 Citizenship Studies 439, 439. 
52 Willem Maas, ‘Varieties of Multilevel Citizenship’ in Willem Maas (ed), Multilevel Citizenship 
(University of Pennsylvania Press 2013) 1. 
53 Jeff Weintraub, ‘The Theory and Politics of the Public/Private Distinction’ in Jeff Weintraub and 
Krishan Kumar (eds), Public and Private in Thought and Practice: Perspectives on a Grand Dichotomy 
(Chicago University Press 1997). 
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idea of citizenship, largely incorrect.54 In the words of Maas, citizenship should 
be seen as a construction of political and legal practices and of territorial 
affiliations that are not limited by physical borders.55 New concepts of multilevel 
citizenship have also been presented due to the processes of globalisation. 
According to Maas, multilevel citizenship, which is based on the coexistence of 
distinct polities on the same territory, can be distinguished from federal citizenship 
where divided and overlapping sovereignties exist. The federal form of 
citizenship, largely concerns the administrative decentralisation whereby different 
territorial units are created, but without a differentiation of citizenship or a 
corresponding sense of peoplehood.56 Alternative conceptions of multilevel 
citizenship, beyond the state-centric form include the supranational, local, 
multinational and post national citizenship, as well as multilevel citizenship from 
the perspective of indigeneity.57  
Despite the conceptions and structures of citizenship, further debates occured 
regarding the model and in turn the content of citizenship, whereby the rights-
model of citizenship in its civic, political and social dimensions has generally 
prevailed. At the same time, the idea of citizenship is frequently pertained to 
modernity and evolution which defines the legal position of the individual in a 
modern nation state. Important literature by Marshall reflected these positions 
very early, where he identified three particular sets of rights that have expanded 
over time, as elements of citizenship.58 The first to come were the civil rights in 
the eighteenth century, while political rights (mainly voting rights) emerged in the 
nineteenth century.59 More importantly, inspired by the “modern drive towards 
                                                 
54 Willem Maas, ‘Varieties of Multilevel Citizenship’ in Willem Maas (ed), Multilevel Citizenship 
(University of Pennsylvania Press 2013) 1. 
55 ibid 2. 
56 Willem Maas, ‘Multilevel Citizenship’ in Ayelet Shachar, Rainer Bauböck, Irene Bloemraad and 
Maarten Vink (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Citizenship (OUP 2017) 646; Examples of formal 
federations are: India, the United States and Brazil. 
57 Willem Maas, ‘Varieties of Multilevel Citizenship’ in Willem Maas (ed), Multilevel Citizenship 
(University of Pennsylvania Press 2013). 
58 Ulrike Davy, ‘How Human Rights Shape Social Citizenship: On Citizenship and the Understanding of 
Economic and Social Rights’ (2014) 13 Washington University Global Studies Law Review 201, 207; 
Thomas Humphrey Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class: And Other Essays (The University Press 1950) 
10-11. 
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social equality” during the twentieth century, citizenship included social rights as 
well.60 In particular, according to Marshall’s historical narratives, citizenship 
included “the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to 
share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilised being 
according to the standards prevailing in the society”.61 His model has been 
extended towards a wider conception of rights including economic rights and the 
collective rights of community, such as cultural rights in cases of deeply divided 
societies.62 Consequently, the desire for introducing citizenship in many states 
largely originates from the necessity of inclusion in the polity, by which citizens 
are incorporated into political and socio-economic institutions previously 
excluded and the right to earn a living.63 Human rights therefore, not only 
constitute “a necessary supplement to citizenship”,64 but should also evolve 
within the concept of citizenship to reflect the changes in society. The debates on 
the structure, as well as the content of citizenship were not missing in the case of 
the EU either where the final formation of EU citizenship was inspired by other 
global contexts. 
2.2.2.2 The EU’s Replica 
The EU’s replica of citizenship, legally confirmed in the Maastricht Treaty,65 
represents one of the most important and advanced forms of multilevel citizenship 
in the world.66 Traditionally, citizenship rights are protected within the Member 
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Social Theory (SAGE Publications 1993) ix. 
65 The Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 191) (hereinafter “Maastricht Treaty”); 
Stéphanie Laulhé Shaelou, The EU and Cyprus: Principles and Strategies of Full Integration (Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers 2010) 41. 
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States in a vertical or sometimes horizontal relationship. Within the supranational 
citizenship paradigm, the situation is more complicated. National states occupy 
the ‘lower’ level and a common citizenship is superimposed on them.67 Although 
national citizenship is not replaced by the supranational, EU citizenship evidently 
supersedes the state-centric definition of citizenship by reason of the prohibition 
of discriminatory measures on the grounds of nationality against a citizen of a 
different EU Member State, which constitutes the cornerstone of many of its 
policies, including the internal market. Within the realm of this thesis, EU 
citizenship represents the second corner of the ‘triangular’ protection system and 
the most significant concept under consideration. Due to its unique multilevel 
structure, the most developed literature on multilevel citizenship is globally 
elaborated based on EU citizenship.68 The concept of EU citizenship has also 
been the focus in several EU law studies by influential academics since its 
introduction, including Jo Shaw,69 Joseph H. H. Weiler,70 Dora Kostakopoulou71 
and Niamh Nic Shuibhne.72 The analysis of the relevant literature within the 
context of EU citizenship will mainly cover four aspects of the concept that are 
also notable for the research itself. In particular, the objectives of EU citizenship, 
its evolvement as a constructivist concept, the weaknesses of it such as the 
underdeveloped list of right and finally the literature regarding the recent 
substance of the rights doctrine. 
                                                 
67 Willem Maas, ‘Multilevel Citizenship’ in Ayelet Shachar, Rainer Bauböck, Irene Bloemraad and 
Maarten Vink (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Citizenship (OUP 2017) 657; Sybe de Vries and Frans van 
Waarden, ‘Rivalling and clashing citizenship rights within the EU: problems with the multi-dimensionality 
of rights’ in Sandra Seubert, Marcel Hoogenboom, Trudie Knijn, Sybe de Vries and Frans van Waarden 
(eds), Moving Beyond Barriers Prospects for EU Citizenship (Elgar 2018) 45. 
68 Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe 
(CUP 1996); Hubert Heinelt and Michèle Knodt (eds), Policies Within the EU Multi-Level System: 
Instruments and Strategies of European Governance (Nomos 2011); Jürgen Gerhards, Holger Lengfeld 
and Sophia Schubert, ‘Legitimacy of European Citizenship. Do Europeans believe that all EU Citizens 
should have the Right to Vote in another EU Country?’ (2015) 14 Comparative Sociology 635-661; Jürgen 
Gerhards and Holger Lengfeld, European Citizenship and Social Integration in the European Union 
(Routledge 2015). 
69 Jo Shaw, ‘Citizenship: Contrasting Dynamics at the Interface of Integration and Constitutionalism’ 
(2010) Edinburgh School of Law Working Paper Series No 2010/14 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1585938> accessed 10 May 2017. 
70 Joseph H H Weiler, ‘To be a European Citizen – Eros and Civilization’ (1997) 4 Journal of European 
Public Policy 495. 
71 Dora Kostakopoulou, ‘European Union Citizenship: Writing the Future’ (2007) 13 European Law 
Journal 623. 
72 Nic Shuibhne Niamh, The Coherence of EU Free Movement Law: Constitutional Responsibility and the 
Court of Justice. (Oxford University Press 2013).   
33 
 
One of the main objectives behind the creation of a status of EU citizenship was 
the protection of the rights of individuals, with numerous Member States 
supporting the inclusion of social and economic rights, in order to “provide citizens 
a clear picture of the advantages and added value of European citizenship”.73 
The content of national citizenship, in most states, is generally developed through 
a long process of political contestation between rulers and subjects leading to the 
inclusion of greater rights and equal participation in the political life of the states.74 
However, this is not the case with the list of rights attached to EU citizenship. 
Most scholars viewed EU citizenship as a “purely decorative and symbolic 
institution” and “a minor image of pre-Maastricht ‘market citizenship’”,75 while a 
widespread opinion still exists that as Union citizenship currently stands,76 it falls 
short of social rights and development.77 Particularly, O’Leary offered a reflective 
history of the development of citizenship in numerous books78 and articles, largely 
criticising the new status of EU citizenship and the list of rights attached thereto.79 
She further identified the weaknesses and limitations of EU citizenship, including 
the inability to achieve the objects ascribed to it – “to tackle the EU’s democratic 
deficit and foster the public’s sense of identity with the Union”, inter alia due to 
the limited rights to which it gives access to.80 The ‘new’ citizenship formation in 
the EU was also discussed by Kostakopoulou as repeating the pre-existing rights 
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of free movement and residence within the territory of the Member States, which 
the Treaty of Rome had established.81 
Following the initial disappointment by part of the scholarly literature, EU 
citizenship has also been considered as a ‘constructivist’ instrument that has in 
fact contributed to the development of citizens’ rights protection and has 
deepened European integration even further according to a federal logic. The 
development has substantially occurred as a result of the support by the 
supranational institutions and the consistent encouragement by the ECJ, towards 
a more expanded EU citizenship. The ECJ has continuously been and remains 
being a significant protagonist in the development of fundamental rights 
protection, as well as in the successful transformation of the concept of EU 
citizenship into a prominent building block of the evolving EU legal order.82 After 
the famous Martínez Sala,83 numerous judgments followed which evolved the 
legal thinking on Union citizenship and greatly occupied the scholarly literature. 
Within ten significant years, EU citizenship moved from a mere activator of other 
provisions in the Treaty, such as non-discrimination on the basis of nationality in 
Grzelczyk84 and Trojani,85 to combating non-discriminatory restrictions such as in 
Tas-Hagen and Tas.86 Moreover, the CJEU has extended the ratione materiae of 
EU law through EU citizenship case law, by identifying an increasing number of 
cases as falling within its scope, in which the requirement of a cross-border 
situation was barely visible or even hypothetical.87 In these rulings, known as the 
‘passport migrant’ cases including García Avello, the fact that EU citizens were 
residing lawfully in a Member State other than that of their nationality was 
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sufficient to establish a cross-border link within the meaning of Article 21 TFEU.88 
Finally, in a series of recent cases discussed throughout the research,89 the 
concept of EU citizenship was judicially vested with the possibility of almost 
entirely shaping the personal and material scope of EU law, by compelling the 
states to confer/not to withdraw their nationality in certain cases where EU 
citizenship status was in danger.90 It can thus be argued that the standard formula 
used in citizenship case law observes that “the situation of a Union national who 
has not made use of the right to feedom of movement cannot, for that reason 
alone, be assimilated to a purely internal situation”, which has no factor linking it 
with any of the situations governed by EU law.91 Further developments towards 
a socio-legal concept of citizenship occurred, through subsequent legislative 
initiatives such as the Citizenship Directive 2004/38 that was enacted to enhance 
the Treaty provisions on free movement.92 
Despite the evident development of EU citizenship, its list of rights remained 
limited and its legal scope largely restrained to cases with a cross-border 
element. As a result, although EU citizenship constitutes the ‘fundamental status 
of EU citizens’, it has played a limited role in protecting citizens’ rights beyond the 
internal market thinking, such as in the course of the financial crisis which was 
presumably the most critical multifaceted crisis in the Union since its 
establishment.93 The restrained structure of EU citizenship was largely altered 
through a new wave of literature which was available from 2010 and immediately 
hinted at enhanced protection of rights. In particular, the Court made a clear 
attempt to reset the personal and material scope of EU citizenship in a recent line 
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of cases, which established the so-called ‘substance of the rights’ doctrine. The 
particular group of judicial rulings was initiated with Rottmann94 and subsequently 
Ruiz Zambrano,95 which significantly differ from previous rulings of the ECJ. 
Specifically, in Rottmann a number of governments submitted that the disputed 
matter was a purely internal one, as a result of which EU law was not applicable. 
Conversely, the Court ruled that the deprivation of the status of EU citizenship of 
a person, fell within the scope of Union law and Article 20 TFEU “by reason to its 
nature and its consequences”.96 In the same light, the Court in Ruiz Zambrano 
rendered the case as falling within the scope of EU law without any reference to 
the exercise of a cross-border situation at all. The Court’s ruling was based on 
the fact that EU citizens had been effectively deprived of “the genuine enjoyment 
of the substance of the rights” attached to EU citizenship.97 
A great number of subsequent cases decided around the new judicial doctrine 
had been extensively discussed in scholarly literature, at times embracing the 
new development and others negatively criticising the activism of the Court.98 The 
following case of McCarthy,99 is of more assistance in apprehending the scope 
and limits of Ruiz Zambrano. The Court stated that Mrs McCarthy could not rely 
on the ‘substance of rights doctrine’ as the measures suggested by the UK did 
not have the effect of compelling her to leave the Union territory. Particularly, the 
Court ruled that the disputed matter “has no factor linking it with any of the 
situations governed by European Union law and the situation is confirmed in all 
relevant aspects within a single Member State”.100 Thus, it was clarified that the 
scope of application of Article 20 TFEU is limited to those situations in which 
Union citizenship would be eroded and that the two different legal routes created 
co-exist. In essence, whenever there is an actual cross-border link, Directive 
2004/38 applies to grant the right to reside in other Member States. In cases 
where a cross-border element is entirely lacking but “the fundamental status of 
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EU citizenship is endangered”, Article 20 TFEU applies provided that the EU 
citizen has been precluded from enjoying the status.101 As Kochenov rightly 
argued, without McCarthy’s clarification, the unlimited reading could have 
resulted in an ultra vires application of EU law that could dangerously undermine 
the foundational principle of the conferral of EU competences under Article 5(1) 
TEU.102  
In Yoshikazu Iida, the ECJ had the opportunity to clarify to some extent, the vague 
concept of the ‘genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights’ doctrine and to 
establish a connection with EU fundamental rights.103 The adoption of such an 
enlightening ruling would be of vital importance especially after the preceding 
case of Dereci,104 which showed that a possible breach of the fundamental right 
to family life was not enough to bring the case within the scope of EU law, relying 
on the Union citizenship provisions. However, despite AG Trstenjak’s 
suggestions the Court rejected the application of fundamental rights because it 
failed to establish a link to EU law. Strict findings also followed in Dano105 and 
Alimanovic106 judgments, which dealt with the limits of social assistance in the 
framework of EU citizenship.107 A similar approach was adopted by the Court in 
subsequent cases especially in relation to social assistance by the host State 
from which economically inactive EU citizens were excluded.108 The shift into a 
stricter application of the doctrine was negatively criticised by some as coming 
with a serious human cost,109 while others accepted it as a balancing tool for the 
financial equilibrium of the Member States.110  
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Further elaboration is provided within the thesis’ analysis on the relevant case 
law, yet in essence, the Court has potentially established a new doctrine, which 
according to the thesis is not only a positive development itself but it can also 
serve as an impulse for the development of fundamental rights protection in 
general. As maintained by H. van Eijken and S.A. de Vries, although the Court 
did not rule on the issue of the protection of fundamental rights and the route 
offered is narrow and full of obstacles, the judgment undoubtedly has significant 
consequences for the scope of application of EU law.111 According to Kochenov, 
taken together, the recent line of cases which would be deemed ‘purely internal’ 
under the previous approach, “mark a decisive move towards a significant 
extension of the scope of application of EU law, opening up a new vista for 
drawing the line dividing the two legal orders in the Union”.112 In a nutshell, the 
CJEU for the first time in its jurisprudence has established that the application of 
EU law can be triggered by EU citizenship alone in specific situations. One of the 
main implications of the new approach is the fact that it re-established the 
principle of equality as being an important aspect of citizenship hence reinforcing 
both EU citizenship and Member State nationalities.113 Furthermore, by requiring 
Member States to justify potential infringements against citizens’ rights, 
irrespective of the existence of a cross-border element, a limitation of the Member 
States’ discretion occurs and EU citizens’ rights are protected in a much broader 
array of situations than ever before.114  O’Brien on her part demonstrated that the 
recent series of cases, and particularly Ruiz Zambrano, has “created an EU-
citizenship-based right to reside which necessarily entails equal treatment under 
EU law”.115 
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The indicative scholarly works discussed, along with the Court’s jurisprudence on 
the ‘substance of the rights’ doctrine, will substantially contribute to the current 
research since the said doctrine will form part of its theoretical background and 
will also be used as the starting point for proposing a reformed architecture for 
the fundamental rights protection system. Of particular contribution to the 
research are the works of scholars that support the revolutionary meaning of Ruiz 
Zambrano and encourage its further progress, including numerous ideas put 
forward by Kochenov and von Bogdandy. In fact, one of the key arguments of the 
current research evolves around the idea that the approach of the ECJ’s 
jurisprudence presages an important development and clearly broadens the 
scope of application of EU law.  
2.2.2.3 Conceptualising the EU’s replica of citizenship 
Despite the institutional and judicial contributions towards an enhanced EU 
citizenship concept as discussed above, the role of EU citizenship within the 
evolving EU legal order, its perceptions and implications, largely depend on the 
way it is depicted according to theoretical and interpretative frames put forward 
by the academia. These frames, as will be discussed in the research, include the 
market and social citizenship, the civic republican model of citizenship, the 
political citizenship, as well as the constructivist approach towards citizenship. 
Further theoretical frameworks have been developed in the scholarly literature 
depicting the rationale behind the concept of EU citizenship in more depth, that 
will not be used in the analysis of the thesis. These include the ‘deliberative 
European citizenship’,116 ‘corrective European citizenship’,117 ‘cultural 
citizenship’118 and ‘denationalised citizenship’.119  
The so-called model of market citizenship correlates EU citizenship with the 
facilitation of market integration, based on the generalised belief that the EU is 
primarily a market and “most of its freedoms to move are of interest only to 
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property and commodity owners”.120 This conception however overlooks the fact 
that the Union is no longer merely economic but has also developed as a 
constitutional entity, where the protection of dignity is equally important within the 
internal market. The ECJ has confirmed this view, indicating that the right to free 
movement is an intrinsic part of affirming workers’ human dignity and a means 
for the improvement “of their living and working conditions and promoting their 
social advancement”.121 Therefore, market citizenship should be used to describe 
the immature beginnings of EU citizenship, to capture a point in its evolution that 
is something to be or already left behind.122  
On the contrary, social citizenship according to Marshall’s contention, focuses on 
the socio-economic equality, at least with respect to “the essentials of social 
welfare”.123 Within the EU legal order, the social dimension of citizenship was not 
initially introduced, but the CJEU has been the driving force in defining the limits 
of ‘social citizenship’. The Court has in fact interpreted the Treaty provisions on 
EU citizenship in conjunction with the freedom from discrimination on the grounds 
of nationality to expand citizens' social rights.124 However, it is argued that the 
unwillingness on the part of the EU legislative and judicial actors, to put in place 
a complete agenda for the development of ‘social citizenship’, has created 
incoherence and uncertainty in the field of EU citizens’ social rights, hindering EU 
citizenship’s role as the fundamental status of the Member States' nationals.125 
The civic republican model of EU citizenship, most commonly denotes an active 
engagement in the life of the political community or a formal legal relationship 
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between individual and polity, while its proponents often speak of citizenship to 
describe the actual degree and nature of public involvement by members of the 
polity. Consequently, the fulfilment of the republican ideal is often demonstrated 
by local citizenship, which would combat the “widening sense of powerlessness” 
that people allegedly experience within the realm of economic and cultural 
globalisation.126 Although the territorial nation state as the natural locus for 
democracy and citizenship is widely spread among supporters of republicanism, 
a civic republican model for EU citizenship would involve the strengthening and 
expansion of both formal and informal participatory mechanism in the EU.127 It 
would also involve reform-initiatives to remove constraints on access to 
citizenship and increase transparency and accountability in the decision-making 
processes.   
Citizenship as a civic republican concept can be seen by some as closely related 
with political citizenship regarding their detachment from market and economic 
values towards more democracy and equal participation. However, political 
citizenship is not precisely considered as another theoretical approach to 
citizenship, but it rather constitutes part of a more general process of political 
integration, towards the aim of an ‘ever closer union’.128 It is thus a longer process 
within the broader development of a political Union, which started with the 
granting of rights to certain categories of workers, expanded to all workers and 
specific categories of migrant statuses including retirees and students, and finally 
shifted towards the majority of EU citizens.129 Therefore, EU citizenship 
undoubtedly has political objectives regardless of the theoretical approach used 
to depict it, since its creation separated freedom of movement from its economic 
need, raising it to “the level of a genuinely independent right inherent in the 
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political status” of EU citizens.130 Numerous scholars share the view that the 
economic integration of the EU functioned as the interim step towards a genuine 
politically developed Union with a common citizenship,131 or at least towards two 
equally significant stages of integration, which reflect the will to create a Union of 
people along with a common internal market.132 
A great number of studies also shifted the focus, from a normative discussion 
about the citizenship 'deficit' to identifying and assessing its constructive 
potential.133 Kostakopoulou has used a constructivist approach to highlight the 
importance of the transformative potential of EU citizenship in her works, while 
leading scholars within the particular domain, argued that EU citizenship has 
played an important role in polity formation both as a legal status attached to 
individuals and as a resonant political ideal.134 According to Kostakopoulou, the 
constructivist approach perceives Union citizenship both as a continuous process 
and a project to be realised as the ‘grand conversation’ regarding the continuing 
political restructure of the EU.135 The thesis adopts this approach accordingly and 
seeks to analyse EU citizenship as an evolutionary process that not only adapts 
to the needs of the Union, but also effectively contributes to the establishment of 
new practices and norms. By choosing to approach citizenship focusing on its 
constructive impact, the thesis also supports the idea that the list of rights 
attached to EU citizenship is not constrained to its current form but it rather 
expands towards other rights provided for in the Treaties, as well as towards 
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unwritten, judicially-developed rights. The constructivist citizenship template 
within the thesis is not trying to supersede the economic understanding of the 
concept but rather promotes a balanced progression of EU citizenship according 
to the new policies and norms of the Union. This model ideally builds on a rights-
based approach towards a constitutionalised Union, primarily through the judicial 
action of the ECJ, which views citizenship as an open-ended source of 
fundamental rights and opportunities. Likewise, Preuß remarkably described EU 
citizenship as a progressive vehicle for the development of the EU, which creates 
the opportunity for EU citizens to “engage in manifold economic, social, cultural, 
scholarly and even political activities irrespective of the traditional territorial 
boundaries of the European nation-states”.136 
Within the context of criticising approaches to constitutionalisation that rely on 
rights-based techniques, Bellamy pointed out that the granting of those rights 
through judicial action often occurred within the context of ‘benign neglect’ of the 
politicised role of the ECJ rather than through of genuine citizen action and 
pressure for change.137 As a result, a lack of active participation in developments 
by a ‘civil society’ is allegedly created. In fact, numerous scholars have been 
researching the Court’s role and contribution within the overall EU legal order. 
Henri de Waele, has accordingly examined the role of the ECJ in the integration 
process from a general normative perspective seeking to “either substantiate or 
disprove the claim once and for all that it has ever genuinely exceeded the limits 
of its judicial function”.138 Contrary to Bellamy’s statement above, the current 
thesis will greatly encourage the judicial activism exercised by the Court, 
including judicial actions for granting rights, as well as the non-originalist authority 
to guide the interpretation of the Treaties. In fact, through the significant 
involvement of the Court, EU citizenship acquired a more ‘tangible’ form and has 
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undoubtedly resulted in, what was very-well described as an ‘exponential growth’ 
of the scope of EU law.139 As AG Leger indicated in his Opinion in Boukhalfa,140 
the concept of EU citizenship had indeed embraced aspects which had been 
already established in the development of (then) Community law, consolidating 
existing law, but it was evidently for the Court to ensure that its full scope was 
attained.141  
This section has attempted to explore the multiple ‘dimensions’ of the concept of 
EU citizenship within the EU legal context, as discussed in the current and past 
literature. This included its role as a membership status beyond the ordinary 
state-centric type, as a set of legal practices and the several conceptualisations 
developed towards EU citizenship depending on its purposes, potentials and 
motivations. The arguments and ideas vary according to the legal school of 
thought and political viewpoint of each academic although recently, emphasis 
had been given to alternative forms of citizenship such as the multi-level 
citizenship within the EU legal order. Finally, the highest variety of academic 
arguments reviewed above, was observed in the dabate around the conceptual 
identity of EU citizenship and the rights attached to it, that will allow for a more 
convincing analysis where both sides of the coin are assessed. 
2.2.3 The fundamental rights under the EU Charter  
Adding further to the list of rights introduced with the concept of EU citizenship,142 
the idea of an EU Bill of Rights had been subject to discussion for some years 
and by 1999 the Charter process was initiated after the European Council’s 
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decision. The presentation of the ‘Draft Charter of Fundamental Rights’ and the 
possibility of declaring such a Charter was generally seen by scholars as “part of 
an ongoing process” that could potentially transform the Union and its legal 
system.143 A great number of academics, including Joseph H. H. Weiler, Koen 
Lenaerts and Piet Eeckhout have further examined the purposes of the Charter 
and evaluated the process, the result and the effectiveness of the mechanism. 
The rights included in the Charter were to a great extent, a consolidation and 
compilation of existing rights and principles, that already enjoyed some 
protection.144 Its drafting was actually based on the jurisprudence of the Court, 
the ECHR and the common constitutional traditions.145 This is expressly provided 
in the Explanations accompanying the Charter. For instance, the right to good 
administration under Article 41 “is based on the existence of the Union as subject 
to the rule of law whose characteristics were developed in the case law of the 
Court”146 including in Orkem and Nölle cases.147  
Since the proclamation of the Charter, the scholarly literature had become 
enormous, substantially dealing with the legal implications of Article 53 for the 
Union legal order on the assumption that the Charter becomes binding law148 and 
with the extent to which Article 51 employs the notion of a more centralising 
effect.149 Moreover, Eeckhout argued that the apparent central purpose of the 
Charter was “to codify and clarify fundamental rights protection in the setting of 
the EU, to list the rights of European citizens with which the EU institutions cannot 
interfere”.150 Yet, the final fate of the Charter was not settled, since it was a non-
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binding instrument. Due to its highly innovative potential, Member States 
preferred to give it the status of a non-binding “soft law” mechanism within the 
then Community legal order, namely the form of a solemn declaration. Not 
surprisingly the Court had maintained its previous jurisprudence solely referring 
to the general principles of law and it was not until the judgment of Parliament v 
Council,151 that it mentioned the Charter in its reasoning.152 
The first attempt to make the Charter a legally binding instrument, was through 
the Constitutional Treaty in 2004. The Constitutional Treaty resolved the status 
of the Charter by stating that the Union shall recognise the rights, freedoms and 
principles set out therein and by incorporating the Charter in the Treaty as a 
whole, to attract citizens’ interest in the legal protection offered by the EU.153 
Above all, the Constitutional Treaty created a link between Union citizenship and 
the protection of fundamental rights under the basic provisions on ‘Fundamental 
Rights and EU Citizenship’, which could arguably be of great assistance in 
establishing a formal connection between them and thus allow for further 
expansion of the concept of EU citizenship. However, the Treaty was defeated in 
the French and Dutch referendums of May and June 2005, which led to the so-
called period of reflection, paving the way towards the Treaty of Lisbon.154  With 
the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, scholarly debates have intensified 
even more, since the Charter eventually gained the same legal status as the 
Treaties. In particular, the Treaty of Lisbon amended Article 6 TEU to provide 
recognition of the Charter without incorporating the text itself in the Treaty. The 
Charter therefore became primary EU law, standing on an equal footing with the 
Treaties.155 The application of the Charter had also significantly increased in the 
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Court’s judicial reasonings,156 demonstrating the importance of the binding status 
of the document in the EU legal order, while year by year it gained more ‘ground’ 
through the prominent role of the Court.157  
The EU is inter alia founded on the rule of law and democracy and one of its main 
objectives is to promote human rights both internally and within the Union.158 
Therefore the legal ‘elevation’ of the Charter has undoubtedly contributed 
towards that goal, since any EU legislation found to be in breach of a Charter 
provision is to be held void and “national law falling within the scope of EU law 
that contravenes the Charter must be set aside”.159 At the same time however, 
several restricting provisions were also incorporated within the Charter, limiting 
the extent of its scope of application and enforceability. In particular, the literature 
around Article 51 is the first to be critically discussed and then in a more limited 
extent the analysis will proceed to Articles 52(5) and 53. 
One of the most controversial limitations that has attracted a lot of discussion, is 
the one under Article 51, which significantly limits the scope of application of the 
Charter and creates two main legal confusions. The first legal confusion derives 
from the fact that the precise scope of application of the Charter is the concept of 
‘implementation of EU law’. Regardless of the great amount of literature that 
Article 51 has attracted, it is still unclear and difficult to predict whether or not a 
domestic measure that has legal effects touching upon the sphere of matters 
regulated by the EU, but that was not adopted to implement EU law directly, will 
be bound by the Charter.160 Amongst others, Filippo Fontanelli highlighted the 
troubles that national courts and private parties face in domestic proceedings in 
which EU fundamental rights are leveraged against state measures, the 
                                                 
156 George Arestis, ‘Fundamental Rights in the EU: Three years after Lisbon, the Luxembourg 
Perspective’ (2013) College of Europe, Cooperative Research Paper 2/2013, 2 
<https://www.coleurope.eu/system/files_force/research-
paper/researchpaper_2_2013_arestis_lawpol_final.pdf?download=1.> accessed 15 September 2016. 
157 Koen Lenaerts and Jose A Gutierrez-Fons, ‘The constitutional allocation of powers and general 
principles of EU law’ (2010) 47 Common Market Law Review 1629, 1656. 
158 Article 2 TEU. 
159 Koen Lenaerts and Jose A Gutierrez-Fons, ‘The constitutional allocation of powers and general 
principles of EU law’ (2010) 47 Common Market Law Review 1629, 1656. 
160 Filippo Fontanelli, ‘The Implementation of European Union Law by Member States under Article 51(1) 
of the Charter of Fundamental Rights’ (2014) 20 Columbia Journal of European Law 193, 193. 
48 
 
uncertainty to which the Court has contributed by failing to bring clarity to the 
interpretation of Article 51(1) and the consequences to human rights protection 
in domestic jurisdictions.161 The unresolved issue of the interpretation of Article 
51(1) of the Charter was acknowledged by AG Cruz Villalón in his Opinion in 
Fransson,162 where he even proposed to interpret the Article along with the 
implicit requirement of “specific interest” on the part of the Union to review certain 
national measures in light of EU fundamental rights.163 The inconsistency and 
vagueness of the interpretation of Article 51(1) of the Charter is still at issue until 
today, including in the current research that will extensively develop on the topic 
from a different perspective, namely with the aim to overcome this limitation 
through the construction of a new jurisdictional test. 
Most importantly, the limitation under Article 51 of the Charter has been 
extensively discussed within the sphere of the recent financial crisis, which is also 
perceived as one of the reasons why the financial crisis is directly related to the 
research objectives and constitutes the most suitable case study for examination. 
It has been particularly criticised for creating structural difficulties regarding the 
application of the Charter for fundamental rights violations related to the 
European Stability Mechanism (ESM). The relevant financial crisis cases will 
clearly demonstrate the deficiencies of Article 51 identified in the literature,164 
including the instability and uncertainty of the scope of application of the Charter 
provisions, which prevents a potentially-EU law matter from being factually 
examined under EU law. Therefore, the case study of the financial crisis is 
regarded as the most functional one to use, since the deficiencies that are 
identified through its analysis are completely in line with the improvements that 
the research aims to achieve by the end of the thesis. In particular, as previously 
discussed, the practical assessment of the ‘triangular’ protection of rights through 
the financial crisis case study will substantially focus on the limited scope of 
application of Charter rights and the devaluation of EU citizenship since the 
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concept had not been of assistance in the claims for fundamental rights 
infringements. The research on the other hand, will strongly perceive the concept 
of EU citizenship as a ‘federalising’ tool for citizens’ rights protection. Therefore, 
the analysis of the financial crisis case law is subsequently expected to stimulate 
the interest in assessing new legal paths to reinforce the system by broadening 
the fundamental rights’ scope of application. The financial crisis case study is 
also directly relevant to the new jurisdictional test proposed within the research, 
since the latter is substantially built on the principle of effective judicial protection, 
which has been evidently violated during the financial crisis. 
The second legal confusion deriving from Article 51, discussed in the scholarly 
literature is the restriction of the horizontal effect of the Charter.165 Numerous 
academics and researchers in the field of EU law, including Eleni Frantziou,166 
Steve Peers167 and Saša Sever,168 have studied the horizontal effect of the 
Charter in the recent years. Even though it would be arguably impossible for the 
Court to apply horizontal effect to interindividual disputes without acting beyond 
the reach of its jurisdiction,169 according to scholarly literature the objections to 
this possibility are “surmountable”.170  In light of the Court’s relevant case law,171 
Saša Sever concluded that excluding the horizontal effect of specific provisions 
of the Charter undermines the full effectiveness of EU law.172 This is largely 
because the right to seek compensation by means of damages from a Member 
State does not act as an adequate deterrent. Likewise, according to Steve Peers, 
the Court has begun to answer some key questions about the horizontal effect of 
                                                 
165 The Charter applies only when it is ‘an institution of the EU or a Member State’ implementing EU law 
that deprives the aggrieved party his rights. 
166 Eleni Frantziou, ‘The Horizontal Effect of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU: Rediscovering 
the Reasons for Horizontality’ (2015) 21 European Law Journal 657. 
167 Steve Peers, ‘When does the EU Charter of Rights apply to private parties?’ (EU Law Analysis, 15 
January 2014) <http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.com.cy/2014/01/when-does-eu-charter-of-rights-apply-
to.html> accessed 5 July 2016. 
168 Saša Sever, ‘Horizontal Effect and the Charter’ (2014) 10 Croatian Yearbook of European Law and 
Policy 39. 
169 Opinion of AG Trstenjak in Dominguez, C-282/10, ECLI:EU:C:2011:559, paras 80, 128. 
170 Eleni Frantziou, ‘The Horizontal Effect of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU: Rediscovering 
the Reasons for Horizontality’ (2015) 21 European Law Journal 657, 660. 
171 Judgment of 15 January 2014, Association de médiation sociale, C-176/12, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2, para 45; 
Judgment of 19 January 2010, Kücükdeveci, C-555/07, ECLI:EU:C:2010:21. 
172 Saša Sever, ‘Horizontal Effect and the Charter’ (2014) 10 Croatian Yearbook of European Law and 
Policy 39, 41. 
50 
 
the Charter in its case law, but criticised it for giving an explanation that could not 
be taken literally when distinguishing the applicability of Article 21(1) from Article 
27 of the Charter that was not an ‘individual’ right.173 
Besides the controversy caused by the limitation and the wording of Article 51(1), 
the rights provided in the Charter are also divided in two different categories 
under Article 52(5), namely ‘rights’ and ‘principles’ but without clearly 
distinguishing which provisions are to be interpreted in each category. Jasper 
Krommendijk had discussed in his studies the recent case law of the Court, 
questioning the way in which the distinction between rights and principles plays 
a role in the cases, the criteria that are used to make such a distinction and its 
possible implications.174 Although the Court had in fact remained silent on the 
issue until recently,175 Krommendijk argued that according to the case law “the 
main difference between rights and principles is that the latter cannot create 
standing or give rise to direct claims for positive action before the Courts”. He 
further concluded that both rights and principles can constitute judicial standards 
for legality review of EU and national acts, as well as standards or tools of 
interpretation.176 There is however no doubt as to the fact that the potency of 
practices and the review of acts of ‘principles’ is more limited than rights, largely 
diminishing the value of the Charter as EU primary law. 
In addition, the limitation placed under Article 53 of the Charter restricts higher 
protection of fundamental rights by the Member States, while at the same time 
could constitute the basis for a regressive interpretation of the Charter 
provisions.177 Lenaerts argued that Article 53 must be interpreted as a ‘stand-still’ 
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clause, according to which the Charter does not allow a reduction of the level of 
fundamental right protection currently attained by EU law.178 In order to avoid a 
regressive interpretation, general principles of EU law should not apply where the 
corresponding Charter provisions offer a higher level of protection.179 At the same 
time, the Court has set limits in the case of Melloni,180 regarding the higher level 
of protection provided by national Constitutions. The answer of the CJEU, on 
whether Member States are allowed to impose a higher level of fundamental 
rights’ protection than the standard set by EU law was clear, stating that “such an 
interpretation of Article 53 cannot be accepted” since it would undermine the 
principle of the primacy of EU law and the effectiveness of EU law.181 However, 
in other areas of EU law besides the cross-border cooperation in criminal matters, 
Member States can go beyond what is required by EU law, but only to the extent 
that the subject matter has not been completely regulated by the Union.182          
The current literature on the limits and deficiencies of the EU fundamental rights 
protection system, regarding both the Charter and the list of rights attached to EU 
citizenship, are of great relevance to the current research. Specifically, the large 
amount of scholarly literature up until today clearly highlights the need for action 
and reinforcement, while the already prominent knowledge allows for 
unprecedented questions to be considered, such as a comparative evaluation of 
the concepts of EU citizenship and the Charter. Despite, the wide literature 
supporting that the Charter places limits on EU citizens’ rights and diminishes EU 
law, very few have touched upon the consequences of those limits on the citizens’ 
fundamental rights in practice.183 Accordingly, the current research will examine 
the consequences of the abovementioned limits placed by both the Treaties and 
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the Charter, in protecting citizens’ rights when infringements occurred due to the 
measures adopted to tackle the recent financial crisis in numerous Member 
States, including Greece, Cyprus and Portugal. The practical assessment of the 
current system with regards to the financial crisis, will provide a clearer picture on 
the specific part that mostly requires reinforcement and pave the way towards a 
new proposal to improve its structure.   
2.2.4 The convergent points of EU fundamental rights and EU citizenship 
rights 
Although there is some resemblance and overlap of the rights provided by the 
instruments of the EU triangular protection, EU citizenship and EU fundamental 
rights have rarely encountered each other in an explicit way. In fact, numerous 
scholars have been advocating the establishment of a link between these two 
concepts since the first few years after the formal incorporation of EU citizenship 
in the Treaties, emphasising its importance and necessity. More specifically, 
O’Leary argued that for EU citizenship to become important and not a ‘cosmetic 
exercise’, it is necessary to establish an explicit link between fundamental rights 
and the scope and operation of EU citizenship.184 Such a possibility became even 
more rigorous after the recent case law of the Court that established the so-called 
‘substance of the rights’ doctrine and arguably opened a possibility for new 
developments, including a structural change in the fundamental rights protection 
architecture.185 
A new wave of literature was offered, whereby a few scholars along with AGs,186 
reconsidered the innovative question of establishing a link between EU 
fundamental rights and EU citizenship rights, inter alia, through the lens of the 
new substance of the rights doctrine. Amongst others, Sara Iglesias Sanchez and 
Armin Von Bogdandy made practical recommendations in an attempt to reinforce 
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the current EU fundamental rights protection system. Specifically, Sara Iglesias 
Sanchez examined in one of her studies, the different possibilities of 
interconnection between EU fundamental rights and the jurisprudential 
construction of Union citizenship, including the proposal of ‘deepening the Inter-
State Dimension’.187 She interestingly made clear that the possibilities of 
establishing the coveted link are not exhausted, owing to the Court’s development 
of the ‘substance of the rights’ doctrine which was described as “an elastic 
formula, susceptible to be adjusted to further developments deemed necessary 
according to the ripeness of the integration process and the political climate”.188 
In fact, according to the article the overlapping powers and the complexity of the 
system of allocation of competences constitute the main difficulties in achieving 
this particular aim.189 In the same light, a proposal to expand the connection of 
the acquired status of Union citizenship with fundamental rights, with careful 
doctrinal construction steps was put forward by Armin von Bogdandy.190 In 
essence, according to von Bogdandy “beyond the scope of Article 51(1) of the 
Charter, Member States remain autonomous in fundamental rights protection as 
long as it can be presumed that they ensure the essence of fundamental rights 
enshrined in Article 2 TEU”.191 Therefore, by having this presumption rebutted, 
individuals can rely on their status as Union citizens to seek redress before 
national courts. Even a violation by a national measure in a purely internal 
situation could give rise to such systemic violations, if the essence of fundamental 
rights under Article 2 TEU, which defines the substance of the rights doctrine, is 
not safeguarded.192  
Another important study to consider produced by van den Brink, partially 
examined the potential impact of the recent series of cases by the Court, on the 
EU fundamental rights architecture and supported that EU citizenship might 
profoundly change it. In particular, van den Brink argued that the relevant 
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question to be answered is whether all EU fundamental rights are EU citizenship 
rights, a question which is however still unanswered and the present research will 
attempt to clarify.193 A positive answer to that question would imply a significant 
extension to the scope of EU fundamental rights in view of the judicially 
developed substance of the rights doctrine. In other words, it would theoretically 
allow EU citizens to rely on EU fundamental rights in a purely internal situation 
when an infringement occurs, since it would bring such a situation by its nature 
‘within the scope of EU law’. Despite various failed attempts by the Member 
States to include fundamental rights among citizenship rights in the Treaty of 
Maastricht, van den Brink persists on arguing that recognising EU fundamental 
rights as EU citizenship rights would be a logical consequence and would 
certainly give more meaning to Union citizenship.194 Finally, he interestingly 
asserted that the ‘substance of the rights doctrine’ in combination with the Court’s 
statements in Josep Peñarroja Fa that the national legislation at issue should 
comply “with the requirements of EU law concerning the effective protection of 
the fundamental rights conferred on EU citizens”,195 can result in the logical 
consequence of including fundamental rights in the substance of EU citizenship. 
Kochenov on his part, very interestingly analysed the “fundamental 
developments” and the “ground-breaking consequences” of the new judicial 
approach of the ECJ, arguing that it is solely focused on the intensity of the 
Member States’ interference with the rights enjoyed by individuals in their 
capacities as EU citizens and is “blind to the pseudo-economic thinking of the 
traditional vision”.196 Although no practical connection was distinctly made 
between fundamental rights and citizenship, the article demonstrated that the 
recent case law of the Court “opened up a possibility for a radically new approach 
to the rationale behind the Union”, towards a ‘more citizens’ Union’. 
The relationship between citizenship and the protection of fundamental rights was 
also partly discussed in a work produced by Hanneke van Eijken and Sybe A de 
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Vries. According to van Eijken and de Vries the judgment of the Court in Ruiz 
Zambrano may have “important ramifications for the scope of application of 
fundamental rights in the Union and thus for the scope of application of EU law in 
general”.197 As discussed in the study, the protection of fundamental rights is 
triggered in the situations embraced by the concept of ‘falling within the scope of 
EU law’ and hence, a broad interpretation of Article 20 TFEU could easily trigger 
the application of fundamental rights. What is further suggested is that, in 
continuation of the jurisprudence of the ‘substance of the rights doctrine’, the 
enjoyment of “at least certain fundamental rights could be qualified as crucial for 
the enjoyment of European citizenship rights”.198 On the contrary, it also 
suggested that instead of extending the scope of application of fundamental 
rights, Ruiz Zambrano has rather resulted in a “levelling down” of fundamental 
rights protection in the Member States”.199 In particular, Member States now seek 
to restrain their laws on the acquisition of nationality to persons born on their 
territory, to prevent the access to EU citizenship and in turn to internal situations 
been settled under EU law and so on. For instance, the relevant law in Ruiz 
Zambrano was revised and according to the new law, persons born in Belgium 
who would potentially become stateless do not require Belgian nationality if, 
“owing to an administrative procedure or registration” the new-born would be able 
to obtain the nationality of their country of origin.200  
Beyond the scholarly literature and the Court’s rulings discussed, the Opinions of 
the AGs are also of great importance and contribution to the research. Although 
the Opinions are not binding for the legal reasoning and conclusions of the Court, 
since 2010 numerous Opinions referred to the possibility of establishing a link 
between EU fundamental rights and the recently developed ‘substance of the 
rights’ doctrine. For instance, AG Sharpston’s 178-paragraphs Opinion in Ruiz 
Zambrano, explored whether Mr Zambrano could “rely on the EU fundamental 
right to family life independently of any other provisions of EU law”, raising the 
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major issue of the scope of application of fundamental rights under EU law.201 In 
other words, the question was whether the Charter could have had an impact, 
“through the backdoor”.202 Although the ECJ did not uphold AG Sharpston’s 
Opinion, where the Charter played a crucial role, her Opinion was perceived as 
“a direct call for the ECJ to shape and fine-tune its future case law on fundamental 
rights”.203 It additionally constituted a great source of ideas and principles around 
the current constitutional interplay between unwritten and written fundamental 
rights within the Union legal order.204 
2.2.5 Overview of EU citizenship literature review 
To sum up, despite the wide literature advancing the reinforcement of the current 
fundamental rights protection mechanism, only a few have touched specifically 
upon the possibility of placing fundamental rights at the core of the doctrine that 
protects the ‘genuine enjoyment of the substances of the rights’ conferred by EU 
citizenship and not effectively enough. All scholarly works discussed will 
undoubtedly contribute to achieving the main objective of the research, whether 
they are in line with the position adopted in the thesis, namely the works 
embracing a movement towards a more expanded and meaningful EU citizenship 
or at odds with the thesis. As regards the literature specifically focusing on the 
structural connection between EU citizenship and fundamental rights, an initial 
appraisal appears to be provided, but further analysis is certainly needed since 
none of the proposals had been sufficient enough. Even more limited is the 
literature examining a possible structural link between the recently developed 
doctrine by the Court and the fundamental rights under the Charter. The thesis is 
thus aiming to fill the apparent gap in the literature by demonstrating an original 
way of connecting EU citizenship with fundamental rights, through a judicial 
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incorporation test in accordance with the rationale of the ‘substance of the rights’ 
doctrine. 
As a result, it is necessary to define and delimit the meaning of fundamental rights 
within the proposal made namely, to address the scope of application of 
fundamental rights within the sphere of the research. Until quite recently, 
fundamental rights were relatively easy to identify; they were, generally speaking, 
“judicial creations of the ECJ which formed a part of the general principles of 
law”.205 The term ‘fundamental rights’ is more commonly used in constitutional 
law than the term ‘human rights’ and is a potentially broader notion recognising 
rights in international documents.206 The pluralistic system of rights protection 
within the EU legal order, combined with the complicated system of division of 
competences had generally made it difficult to determine the rights and interests 
to be regarded by the ECJ as fundamental.207 Therefore, the structures and 
objectives of EU law played a key role in the determination process. With regards 
to the delimitation of the term ‘fundamental rights’ for the purposes of the current 
research, additional factors need to be considered. The main objective behind 
the intention of adding ‘fundamental rights’ within the concept of EU citizenship 
is their effective invocation through the substance of the rights doctrine, in order 
to ultimately benefit from the rights’ protection in purely internal situations. 
Therefore, a careful and structural consideration of the term ‘fundamental rights’ 
is necessary not only to safeguard the interests of the supranational legal order 
but also those of the individuals and the Member States involved. 
The fundamental rights generally protected within the EU legal order have been 
usefully divided into two categories by O’Leary, that will be of great assistance in 
defining fundamental rights in the research. The first category refers to the 
subjective aspects of fundamental rights, namely the rights conferred on 
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individuals as a means to protect their rights and interests, such as the freedom 
of expression or freedom of religion.208 The second, focuses on rights with values 
of a more objective nature, such as the right to effective judicial protection, equal 
treatment or the right to have one’s legitimate expectations upheld.209 The 
objective aspect of fundamental rights can also be said to constitute a means for 
EU law to safeguard its legitimacy and authority over the lives of individuals and 
the legal and political conditions in which they live.210 Therefore, the EU is relying 
on the protection of fundamental rights as part of its constitutional construction. It 
is hence argued in the current thesis that fundamental rights with objective 
aspects based on O’Leary’s division, can legitimately lie within the list of 
fundamental rights aiming to be incorporated, explicitly or impliedly, into EU 
citizenship. On the other hand, the rights conferred on individuals as a means to 
protect their interests, had to a great extent been neglected in the integration 
process, rendering their inclusion in the list of rights under Article 20 TFEU largely 
unsustainable. This is a result of the fact that social legitimacy implies a “broad 
empirically determined societal acceptance of the system”, while legitimacy 
occurs when the national government “commits to and actively guarantees values 
that are part of the general political culture, such as justice, freedom and general 
welfare”.211 Since the subjective aspect of fundamental rights, is not per se used 
as a means for safeguarding the EU’s legitimacy, their inclusion under the list of 
rights of EU citizenship and in turn their use in purely internal situations, becomes 
even harder to justify. It is thus argued that the legitimacy of including this 
category of rights within the list of Article 20(2) TFEU, can be safeguarded when 
subjective rights are also recognised as foundational values under Article 2 TEU, 
which automatically binds the Member States. Therefore, in terms of language 
use within the current reseach, ‘fundamental rights’ will be referring to the rights 
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eligible to be included in the list of EU citizenship rights, as will be seen below, 
unless a more general reference to ‘fundamental rights’ is made directing to a 
broader definition of the concept.  
2.3 Methodological Statement 
2.3.1 Theoretical approaches linking fundamental rights with EU 
citizenship 
The principal objective of the current research is the establishment of a link 
between EU fundamental and citizenship rights to broaden the scope of 
application of citizens’ rights and ultimately the possibility of using fundamental 
rights in purely internal situations provided the conditions set are satisfied. In 
order to achieve this aim, the research is using theoretical approaches including 
constitutionalism, constructivism and federalism, that are substantially used in 
other disciplines such as political science and international relations. The use of 
an interdisciplinary approach can result in new knowledge that would not have 
been reached through a strictly legalistic theory acting alone,212 while the study 
can share broader perspectives and bodies of expertise. 
Constitutionalism forms one of the core theoretical approaches of the research 
and a methodology that can be employed to reveal new insights into the EU as a 
legal and political construct.  The supranational Union as a constitutional entity 
began to attract serious consideration in academic and political circles in the early 
1990s.213 Since then, the terms constitutionalism and constitutionalisation have 
acquired a particular connotation within EU law, referring to the transformation of 
the (then) Community from an international to a constitutional legal order,214 
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which is what differentiates the Union from other transnational systems. In 
general, constitutionalisation can be seen as the process by which EU Treaties 
evolved from a set of legal arrangements binding upon national states, into a 
vertically integrated legal regime conferring judicially enforceable rights and 
obligations on legal and natural persons, within the scope of application of EU 
law.215 Therefore, the development of the protection of fundamental rights 
constituted itself a significant step in the modelling of EU constitutional law. The 
constitutional perspective of the Union was also expressed in the Court’s case 
law.216 It was explicitly demonstrated in Les Verts, where the Court held that the 
(then) Community was “based on the rule of law, inasmuch as neither its Member 
States nor its institutions can avoid review of the conformity of their acts with the 
basic constitutional charter the [EU] Treaties”,217 which established a complete 
system of legal remedies and procedures designed to enable the ECJ to review 
the legality of acts of the institutions.218  
The implications of the constitutional nature of EU law on the obligations imposed 
on EU institutions by international agreements, were also assessed by the ECJ 
in Kadi.219 In particular, the higher EU standards on fundamental rights protection 
applied in this case, since according to the ECJ they form constitutional principles 
of the Treaties that cannot be prejudiced.220 Numerous academics, including 
Tridimas and Gutiérrez-Fons demonstrated their preference for the ECJ’s ruling 
over that of the Court of First Instance, which adopted an internationalist 
approach rather than a constitutionalist one.221 Specifically, the Court of First 
Instance was criticised for having “accorded to UN primacy its fullest weight 
allowing it to perforate the constitutional boundaries of the Community legal 
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order”.222 Therefore, besides the constitutional nature of the EU in relation to 
Member States, it also adopted a constitutionalist approach to EU and 
International law. Union Citizenship has also had far-reaching constitutional 
implications on the domestic systems since its establishment, considering that 
the Court has chosen a constitutional interpretation rather than an integrationist 
one in its case law. The Baumbast series of cases, discussed in the following 
Chapters, has substantially reshaped the duties of national authorities and courts 
towards Union citizens, based on an ad hoc proportionality assessment.223 As a 
result, the principle of equality was reinforced, whereby individuals are 
empowered and judicial protection becomes more effective. On the other hand, 
constitutionalism within the EU has also been contested and criticised around the 
possibilities of ‘constitutional translation’ to non-state contexts. For instance, 
Walker described constitutionalism as a “deeply contested but indispensable 
symbolic and normative frame for thinking about the problems of viable and 
legitimate regulation of the complexly overlapping political communities of the 
post-Westphalian world”.224  
The current research embraces the constitutional nature of the EU in relation to 
Member States and uses constitutionalism to assess the various ways in which 
citizenship can play a role in polity formation within the EU context, including the 
broadening of the scope of EU fundamental rights. The initial lack of attention to 
fundamental and human rights, had been replaced by the recognition that trade 
and commercial activities within the EU can have fundamental rights implications, 
adding a political and social perspective to the Union through further integration. 
Considering the indispensability of a constitutional grounding for the integration 
process, the EU should undoubtedly build its credentials and seek legitimacy as 
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a constitutional entity, examining the “the values and principles that an entity 
possesses or should possess”.225 
Another core theoretical approach facilitating the connection between 
fundamental rights and EU citizenship within the research is that of 
constructivism, which was initially developed in social sciences and currently 
constitutes one of the most important theories of International Relations.226 As a 
relatively new theory, constructivism has become more influential in EU studies 
following the signing of the Amsterdam Treaty. It is generally seen as a useful 
tool for studying European integration as a process,227 since constructivists are 
predisposed to think about how humans interact in such a way that produces 
structures.228 In particular, social constructivism examines the way in which 
entities such as the EU, act as arenas for communication and persuasion.229 It 
holds that the law goes deeper and does more than merely constraining 
behaviour and constructivist insights have also been brought “to bear by those 
who see to understand the law’s role in the construction of social reality”.230 Social 
constructivists are interested in how collective understandings and identities 
emerge. According to Shaw, seeing “legal and political categories as socially 
constructed gives us wider range of intellectual tools with which to understand 
the context and meaning of European integration” (especially the political 
integration) and the resulting in law.231 
The theoretical approach of constructivism is also directly connected to 
constitutionalism, which under the sign of the modern state has always been 
constructivist in nature, namely many of the norms of the constitutional order are 
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themselves directed toward its operationalisation.232 Likewise, according to von 
Bogdandy constitutional scholarship in the EU legal area can successfully 
reposition itself, focused on, but not limited to doctrinal constructivism.233 The 
constructive and practical elements of legal scholarship converge in a function of 
doctrinal constructivism that can be called “maintenance of the law as social 
infrastructure” and demands participation in the development of the law to keep 
it in line with changing social relationships, interests and beliefs.234  
The constructivist theoretical approach is substantially used in the research to 
assess the transformative potential of EU citizenship and the ways in which it is 
constructed, through the use of language, the development of ideas and the 
establishment of norms. Thus, it is believed that identities such as EU citizenship 
are never fixed, but rather simply constructed. In fact, a constructivist approach 
towards EU citizenship, rather than a normative discussion, allows a view on the 
developing practice of EU citizenship, its contribution to the European integration 
process and to building supranational institutions.235 More importantly, through a 
constructivist approach the research perceives EU citizenship as exceeding the 
rights expressly incorporated under Article 20 TFEU, calling into question the 
traditional ways of thinking about membership and community, while entailing 
possibilities for new transformative politics beyond the nation-state.236 The 
constructivist approach has indeed assisted with the formation of the new 
jurisdictional test within the research, the ‘internal applicability of EU law test’, 
which seems to hold great prospects for achieving the objectives of the research, 
namely to broaden the scope of application of EU fundamental rights, through the 
expansion of the concept of EU citizenship. 
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The theoretical approaches used in the current research, also include the theory 
of federalism to ensure an effective and consistent protection of fundamental 
rights on the EU level.237 It must however be clarified that the various models of 
federalism are not merely a means of organising states in its classic sense and 
consequently the European vision of federalism cannot be only one. In the 
constitutional experiences of other systems, federalism has historically 
represented something quite different, originally being conceived as a theory of 
governance for a union of states.238 In view of the American founders, federalism 
was conceived both as an institutional tool and as a constitutional theory for the 
creation of a governmental structure,239 while embodying the constitutional 
values of freedom, pluralism and self-governance on which the US federal human 
rights arrangement is largely based.240 Dan Elazar, rightly explained that the 
federal principle should not be confused with its specific manifestation in the 
federal state.241 Accordingly, in the words of Pescatore, “federalism is a political 
and legal philosophy, which adapts itself to all political contexts on both the 
municipal and the international level, wherever and whenever two basic 
prerequisites are fulfilled: the search for unity, combined with genuine respect for 
the autonomy and the legitimate interests of the participant entities”.242 
The theory of federalism (distinct from the theory of federal state) is thus used 
within the realm of the research with the aim of linking EU fundamental rights with 
EU citizenship, through a proposal materialising at the EU level rather than the 
national. The use of this theoretical approach should therefore be seen as an 
attempt to prevent a crisis from spreading its consequences to the Union as a 
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spill-over effect,243 rather than as a way of obliging the Member States to 
surrender their sovereignty. Indeed, because “federalism emphasizes 
constitutionalized pluralism and power sharing as the basis of a truly democratic 
government”,244 the theory has acted as a catalyst for the protection of local 
diversities and identities in the US. Moreover, in its operation, the theory has been 
able to combine the horizontality of constitutional pluralism, with the verticality of 
constitutional sovereignty.245 A proposal in accordance with the federalism 
principle, has the advantage of using EU citizenship as a federalising tool to 
create a level-playing field and preserve the effectiveness of EU law.246 It is 
further argued that a proposal on EU level would allow for more effective 
protection of EU citizens’ rights, not necessarily because of the standard of 
protection per se, but rather for functionality and efficiency reasons. In essence, 
when relevant infringements occur throughout the Union and during the same 
period or when the values and effectiveness of EU law are prejudiced, it is more 
functional to intervene supranationally to rapidly provide equal level of protection 
for all the Member States, rather than to allow national discretion to act 
individually. This is especially crucial when the principal cause of an infringement 
or prejudice is the result of an inadequacy which materialises on the EU level. 
The recent financial crisis constitutes such a case, where action must be taken 
on the EU level, to effectively protect EU citizens’ rights. 
Lastly, the role of the CJEU has been vital in developing and reinforcing the 
protection of fundamental rights and it is believed that even more can be achieved 
through its contribution. Therefore, judicial activism and the non-originalist 
interpretation approach constitute part of the theoretical approaches of the thesis 
to examine the CJEU’s importance and ‘judicial capabilities’ in achieving the 
objectives of the research. Legal reforms towards more inclusiveness in the 
practice of EU citizenship are seen as undesirable challenges by national states, 
rendering the ability of the CJEU to attach new constructive meaning to the status 
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of EU citizenship the core option for making the concept meaningful. Likewise, 
as discussed above, the ‘substance of the rights’ doctrine, is a judicially 
developed test, shaping the scope of EU law. Therefore, while Rottmann itself 
constitutes an interesting starting point, for further reflection on the EU and 
national citizenship nexus, its broader interest partly lies in the fact that it sits at 
the beginning of a new period of judicial activism on the part of the ECJ, in relation 
to the scope and character of EU citizenship.247 At the same time, Rottmann and 
the subsequent series of cases can consequently lead to far-reaching 
consequences on the relationship of EU citizenship and fundamental rights. 
As previously mentioned, part of the literature has contrarily described the Court’s 
judicial activism in the recent line of cases, as having methodological deficits and 
constituting an unjustifiable extension of the powers of the EU.248 The judicial 
activism of the ECJ has been a longstanding debate in the academia, commonly 
focusing on whether the Court can be said to have overstepped the line.249 
Arguments in favour of both positions have been formed, with academics like 
Kochenov substantiating judicial activism, especially when the need for a reform 
is crystal-clear in the disputed context.250 On the other hand, academics including 
Hailbronner and Thym disapproved it, while asserting for more respect to the 
wording and structure of EU law on the part of the ECJ.251 After analysing the 
arguments of the scholar debate and the relevant jurisprudence, the thesis will 
demonstrate great support in favour of the Court’s judicial activism especially in 
fields where legal gaps and ambiguities exist, such as that of EU citizenship. 
Accordingly, in the entirety of the thesis the critical examination of the judicial 
rulings will be conducted based on a non-originalist approach, not only to bridge 
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the legal gaps but also to keep the Court’s jurisprudence in pace with the 
necessities of the Union at the time.252 Likewise the Court’s recent, innovative 
rulings discussed, which can arguably lead to positive developments in the field, 
are profoundly supported in the thesis, rather than cautioned against, in full 
knowledge of the fact that the established cross-border situation approach is not 
sustainable in the long run.253      
2.3.2 Research methods, research design and techniques 
The current thesis, aims to be a qualitative one subject to rich and detailed data 
that contributes to the in-depth understanding of the contexts in question. The 
purpose of the qualitative research is to discover ideas through the specific 
research questions addressed, on the general consideration of reinforcing the 
current EU fundamental rights protection system, through the ‘acquired status’ of 
Union citizenship. Moreover, information already published will be used to 
examine the current fundamental rights protection system, yet with the purpose 
of re-examining it from a particular point of view. As discussed above, the case 
study of the recent EU financial crisis will be used to observe from that particular 
point of view, the extent to which the current system is effective in protecting EU 
citizens’ rights, when infringements occur as a result of the measures adopted to 
tackle the crisis. 
As seen from the literature review analysis, the research will use primary sources 
of law, essentially legislation and case law, focusing on aspects of EU law and 
the law of International Organisations. Some of the key pieces of legislation used 
are the EU Treaties, the Charter of fundamental rights and some EU Directives 
and Regulations, as well as the ECHR. Furthermore, the ESM Treaty (ESMT) will 
be considered with regards to the case study of the financial crisis, as well as 
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national legislations and national Constitutions of EU Member States, including 
from Cyprus, Greece and Portugal.  
Regarding the case law, the research will extensively study and analyse the 
jurisprudence dealing with fundamental rights and EU citizenship under the EU 
legal order, as well as the jurisprudence of international and national courts. As 
explained, the role of the CJEU specifically, has been vital in developing and 
reinforcing the protection of fundamental rights within the Union throughout the 
years. The so-called ‘genuine enjoyment of the substance of the citizens’ rights’ 
doctrine formed and developed by the Court, will constitute the primary doctrine 
on which the proposal of the current study is expected to be based. In addition, 
numerous Opinions by the AGs of the CJEU will be also reviewed, since they 
have been of great influence for the legal reasonings and conclusions of the 
Court. One example is the Opinion of AG Sharpston in Ruiz Zambrano, which 
even though not followed by the Court, has explored significant aspects of the 
scope of application of EU fundamental rights. Within the realm of the case study 
on the financial crisis, the case law of national courts of EU Member States will 
be examined, including the case law of the Portuguese Supreme Court of Justice 
(Supremo Tribunal de Justiça), the Supreme Court of Cyprus and the Supreme 
Court of Greece (Court of Cassation, Council of State). 
Data from secondary sources will be collected, including the ones discussed in 
the literature review. These sources that are of a secondary nature have the form 
of theoretical works, empirical works which lead to the development of grounded 
theory, and more policy-oriented studies which fit directly into the policy-making 
process. Particularly, secondary sources are of relevance to the current research 
when their authors have been directly involved with the concepts under 
examination and their works constitute reliable sources by having the authenticity 
widely recognised. In general, fundamental rights protection within the EU has 
acquired great recognition by the scholarly literature since the early years of the 
Union, in the form of books, journal articles, online articles, legal reviews, 
historical records, case reports and opinions. 
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2.4 Concluding remarks 
The scholarly research devoted to the position of fundamental and human rights 
within the EU has been a disputed issue since the very establishment of the 
Union, that initially stayed silent on human rights and outsourced their protection 
to a different organisation. The amount of judicial and academic literature 
increased following a period of alleged positive steps towards an adequate EU 
protection mechanism. Those steps included the introduction of the formal EU 
citizenship status, the drafting and enforcement of the Charter, the elevated legal 
status of the Charter after the Treaty of Lisbon and the application and scope of 
the Charter in practice since then. Consequently, the existing literature in the field 
mainly focuses on the deficiencies of the current EU fundamental rights protection 
mechanisms and the need to strengthen it. Yet, despite the increase, there is little 
clarity and adjustment on how to reinforce the fundamental rights protection 
system, fill the gaps of the law and protect Union citizens in practice.   
After the abovementioned line of ground-breaking judgments of the CJEU, the 
scholarly research greatly engaged with the drastic implications that have 
occurred for the long-established purely internal situation doctrine and the 
principal implications of the new approach; the so-called ‘substance of the rights’ 
doctrine. Hanneke van Eijken, Dimitry Kochenov, Jo Shaw and Michael Olivas 
are only few of the researchers who intended to analyse the new judicial route; 
identify its principal implications and ascertain its legal capabilities, in relation to 
the protection of fundamental rights of EU citizens. Moreover, numerous scholars 
went even further to examine the possibility of establishing a link between EU 
fundamental rights and EU citizenship rights such as Dimitry Kochenov, Armin 
von Bogdandy, Sara Iglesias Sanchez and Hanneke van Eijken. However, only 
a few have touched specifically upon the possibility of placing fundamental rights 
at the core of the doctrine that protects the ‘genuine enjoyment of the substance 
of the rights’ conferred by EU citizenship, while no literature exists, examining a 
structural link between the recently developed doctrine and the fundamental 
rights included in the Charter. However, the limited amount of literature available 
is not an indication of the doctrine’s inability to reinforce the current fundamental 
rights protection system. In fact, the substance of the rights doctrine is a relatively 
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recent development, which was immediately followed by the Draft Agreement 
concerning the accession of the EU to the ECHR. It is therefore possible that a 
great number of researchers viewed the accession as the forthcoming route 
towards reinforcing the current system, avoiding the analysis of alternative routes 
available at the time. After the rejection of the Draft Agreement and more recently, 
the substance of the rights doctrine and EU citizenship’s nature are more 
frequently considered, as discussed above.254  
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3 CHAPTER 3 – SETTING THE SCENE: THE EU ‘TRIANGULAR’ 
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS PROTECTION SYSTEM 
3.1 Introduction 
The issue of EU fundamental rights protection is in a dynamic phase. The Union 
is evidently no longer an organisation that merely pursues economic objectives, 
but its Treaties and case law also contribute to the evolution towards a political 
and constitutionalised Union. Consequently, a shift has occurred from viewing 
citizens as merely factors of production to seeing them as individuals with rights. 
In the preceding Chapters, the thesis argued that the political integration in the 
field of EU fundamental rights, is primarily evolving through a ‘triangular’, inter-
connected system of protection, including the constructivist transformation of EU 
citizenship, the institutionalised developments of EU law, such as the legally 
binding document of the Charter and the protection of fundamental rights as 
general principles of EU law.255 Yet major components of a comprehensive and 
all-embracing fundamental rights policy, are still absent, which is even more 
perceptible during periods of crisis, when the citizens’ rights are vulnerable and 
exposed to violations for the ‘common interest’. It is therefore necessary to 
assess the origins of these gaps, demonstrate the foremost route to pursue 
further political integration in the field of fundamental rights and subsequently 
assess their impact in the course of the austerity measures challenges. 
One of the major institutional roles, throughout the political integration, if not the 
most important one, is the role held by the CJEU which has been acting as a 
‘driving force’, towards development and reinforcement of the current 
fundamental rights protection system.256 The general proposal of the thesis, is 
also addressed to the CJEU as the main actor and the Chapter will begin with a 
recapitulation of the role of CJEU in the EU, including its judicial activism (3.2). 
This background will serve to set the basis for the following sections, starting with 
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the analysis of the legal nature and content of the instruments making up the 
current ‘triangular’ protection system (3.3). The Chapter subsequently proceeds 
with an in-depth analysis of the legal instruments’ scope of application, aiming to 
conclude, whether (and if so how) the barriers to their scope of application can 
be overcome based on the legal nature and content of each instrument (3.4). In 
other words, to try and identify the best route for further, more effective 
development, by assessing the evolving potential of the relevant instruments, 
against their limitations and deficiencies. The Chapter will lastly discuss the 
relationship of the EU with the ECHR, concluding that an International human 
rights organisation, like the Council of Europe, although offering protection, 
cannot constitute the alternative to an EU system of protection, especially within 
complex situations exclusively deriving from the EU legal order itself (3.5). By 
bringing these arguments together, the chapter makes the case that the 
strengthening of the current system is indeed required and perceives the concept 
of EU citizenship as the most dynamic and suitable starting point to achieve this 
aim.  
3.2 The role of the CJEU 
The ECJ has historically been a motor in what used to be a stagnant Community. 
Today, in a constitutionalised and politically developed Union the CJEU retains 
the responsibility of both protecting and developing the objectives and values of 
the Union as enshrined in the Treaties.257 In order to work as a constitutional 
guardian, the ECJ seeks to make law by shaping the scope of EU law, through a 
series of principles, concepts and tests, developed and applied by the Court when 
it interprets and applies the Treaty provisions, a competence which derives from 
Article 19 TEU.258 It has undoubtedly made a substantive contribution to law-
making in a functional sense, by developing the general principles of EU law and 
providing definitions for core Treaty concepts. Especially in relation to the 
promotion of fundamental rights, the CJEU has been vital in developing and 
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reinforcing their protection within the EU legal order, not only by recognising the 
importance of fundamental rights in the Union as a whole, but also by “giving 
meaning and value to [citizenship], thereby establishing new institutional norms 
which will impact on and modify national legal cultures”.259 In particular, the 
development of EU citizenship which constitutes the key concept of the research, 
has been pushed forward mainly by three factors including the ground-breaking 
work of the CJEU, the “academic commentary by those who saw important 
potential behind evasive formulations in the Treaties” and the legislators at both 
national and supranational level.260 Although all these three factors are 
profoundly interlinked, the most influential one is arguably the Court, which has 
always made significant efforts in developing and reinforcing the protection of 
fundamental rights within the EU legal order. Most importantly, the Court has 
been the driving force in developing the aspiring ‘substance of the rights’ doctrine 
which generates even more opportunities to broaden the scope of application of 
EU fundamental rights and will play a crucial role in the current thesis.261 
Therefore, the Court’s role as a ‘maker’ of EU law is considerably indisputable 
especially in the field of fundamental rights development. In fact, the current 
debate focuses on whether the ECJ should maintain the activist approach or 
whether it has gone beyond its essential judicial duties. In particular, the Court 
has been either characterised as a positive contributor within the overall EU legal 
order, or accused of being an excessively activist judiciary.262 Accordingly, in the 
words of Judge Pescatore, “what is described by one as activism is seen by 
another as a just and necessary safeguard”,263 while the term ‘activism’ is 
frequently used to describe a sometimes-pejorative connotation of excessively 
creative interpretation or interpretation that approximates legislation.264 
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Moreover, arguments deeply-rooted to the well-tested approaches of the Court, 
indicate that the ECJ will have to pay more respect to the wording and systematic 
structure of both primary and secondary Union law.265 On the contrary, it is more 
persuasive to argue that activism is inherently linked with the legitimacy of the 
Court, where that connection is normally approached by attributing to activism a 
status of a measuring criterion that ensures the maintenance of legitimacy levels 
in order to pre-empt a legitimacy deficit.266 Therefore, being faithful to the well-
tested and traditionalist thinking of the Court is not wrong per se, but as Kochenov 
rightly argues, such a comforting approach can bring truly negative 
developments, especially when an obvious need of reform is present.267 
As previously clarified, from the thesis’ point of view the Court’s activist stance 
has been greatly beneficial for the protection of fundamental rights by inter alia, 
providing principled solutions to problems, thereby advancing the constructive 
understanding of Union citizenship.268 It is consequently argued that the Court 
should maintain its activist stance in future cases, as it can still play an important 
role in providing deeper understanding around the concept of EU citizenship and 
ultimately extend the field of application of EU fundamental rights. Specifically, 
with a possible inclusion of fundamental rights in the ‘substance of the rights’ 
doctrine, situations that were previously determined as purely internal, would now 
fall within the scope of EU law and thus EU citizens would be able to rely on EU 
fundamental rights in any case.  
Being a judicially active Court does not automatically imply the judicial supremacy 
and expansion beyond other EU institutions or the national legislators.269 Activism 
is a necessary and inevitable element of any legal system designed to administer 
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an ever-changing society, provided that it is objectively exercised in accordance 
with the rule of law and not driven by unfairly prejudiced objectives.270 Although 
these dangers can possibly materialise, there is a broad consensus among legal 
authors that the ECJ has been faithfully interpreting the rules, legitimately filled 
some gaps, and has never engaged in excessive activism.271 In fact, the Court 
has acted in an overall manner genuinely corresponding to the tasks entrusted to 
it under the Treaties and it continues to do so ruling on a case-by-case basis. The 
potential of the recent rulings deriving from Court’s judicial activism, should thus 
be studied and applauded for the admirable courage demonstrated by the Court, 
rather than be criticised for the divergency from the traditional legal thinking.272  
3.3 The Legal Nature and Content of Fundamental Rights 
Protection Instruments 
Besides identifying the various flaws of the current fundamental rights protection 
system, the key to achieving the desired reinforcement is to also assess the legal 
nature and potential of the instruments making up the ‘triangular’ protection 
system. In particular, the analysis of the legal nature of the instruments focuses 
on their content meaning the rights they give protection to whether these are 
written or unwritten, as well as on the instruments’ processes and structures 
within the project of EU integration. The EU is arguably an organisation that is 
subject to constant evolution and change, not only because of the enlargement 
of the Union, but also due to the rapid evolution in technologies, social and 
financial/economic norms.273 Therefore, besides establishing a concrete 
fundamental rights instrument, enshrining an extensive list of citizens’ rights to be 
protected, it is necessary for the instrument to be able to keep pace with the 
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changes in the Union, as a living instrument and to embrace potential for further 
developments whenever necessary.  
3.3.1 EU citizenship’s content and its constructivist character  
The first corner of the ‘triangle’ is the legal concept of Union citizenship, which 
undoubtedly constituted a decisive move towards a constitutionalised Union with 
its formal incorporation in the Maastricht Treaty.274 Although, a personal status of 
legal attachment to the (then) Communities, had clearly matured long before the 
Maastricht Treaty, which essentially demonstrated the natural spill-over effect, 
inherently connected to the articulation of the internal market.275 EU citizens are 
since then, defined both, as members of the communities in which they hold 
nationality and as members of a broader European political community.276 More 
importantly, it has inter alia contributed to creating a feeling of belonging, by 
changing the rules and practices of border crossing and by providing access to a 
list of certain rights for citizens.277  
The success and the promising features of EU citizenship were not however 
obvious from the very first days of its establishment, while in fact, it is argued that 
they are still developing until today. EU citizenship initially seemed as an 
incomplete and weak institution, a pale shadow of its national counterpart, that 
did not add anything substantially new to the existing Community law in 
practice.278 O’Leary described it as appearing to simply ‘constitutionalise’ certain 
rights, which previously existed in Community law, introduced few new ones and 
provided a legal basis for the enlargement of the content of Union citizenship.279 
A similar attitude, was also adopted by the CJEU towards EU citizenship, which 
during the first years of the establishment of the new legal concept, had adopted 
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a ‘consolidating’, rather than ‘constitutionalising’ approach, using the concept of 
EU citizenship in order to reaffirm existing Community law.280 
The list of rights provided under Article 20 TFEU, although clearly non-
exhaustive, remained to a great extent limited. No legal connection was declared 
with fundamental rights or internal situations, either through the legislative 
procedure under Article 25 TFEU or through a judicial incorporation, until the very 
recent judicial developments, which substantially developed the promising 
features of EU citizenship.281 It was thus rightly criticised, as falling short of 
establishing the full range of modern citizenship rights, which include the civil, 
political and social rights that establish the basic conditions for full membership 
in a community.282 As a political status, EU citizenship is expected to enable 
citizens to become active members of the political system, to ensure political 
voice and provide fundamental rights protection to EU citizens.283 
On the contrary, during the negotiations of the Maastricht Treaty the initial plans 
on the adoption of EU citizenship took the general view that it must be deriving 
from full recognition and protection of the human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, as defined in the ECHR, both for individuals and social units, in 
particular the family.284 The European Parliament, further indicated that it was 
“inconceivable to base citizenship, on anything other than the expansion of 
fundamental rights and freedoms in addition to their recognition and 
protection”.285 The character of EU citizenship was thus determined since its legal 
establishment, as a rather dynamic one that would evolve, by the progressive 
acquisition of rights stemming from the development of the EU particularly, from 
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the gradual addition of specific rights in new policy-areas transferred to the 
Union.286 The Commission gave an interesting definition of this evolving 
character, in the early days of citizenship, which this thesis completely shares, 
explaining that it is one of the main principles on which Union citizenship is based 
and it should always reflect “the aims of the Union, involving as it does an 
indivisible body of rights and obligations stemming from the gradual and coherent 
development of the Union's political, economic and social dimension”.287 EU 
citizenship has indeed proved to be of ‘constructivist’ nature, especially through 
the ECJ’s case law, by deepening European integration even further, based on a 
federal logic, while broadening the potential impact on EU fundamental rights.  
In particular, the Court in Martínez Sala, put “flesh on the bones of EU citizenship” 
by recognising that it has extended the personal and/or material scope of the 
Treaty provisions.288 The incorporation of EU citizenship in the Treaties, was 
subsequently followed by “a glorious march of European citizenship from a 
meaningless addition to the Treaties to one of the key concepts of EC law”,289 
acquiring a social dimension as well, after passing from a complex and 
multifaceted body of case law, pointing to all kinds of different directions, 
frequently dividing the members of the Court.290 The ruling is thus seen as the 
‘genesis’ of a series of judgments which evolved the legal thinking around the 
concept of EU citizenship. 
Specifically, Union citizenship has been used as an activator of other Treaty 
provisions, such as non-discrimination on the basis of nationality in Trojani291 and 
Grzelczyk,292 where the ECJ had substantially broadened the scope of the 
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principle of equal treatment.293 It also famously indicated that “Union citizenship 
is destined to be the fundamental status of nationals of the Member States, 
enabling those who find themselves in the same situation to enjoy the same 
treatment in law irrespective of their nationality”.294 Similarly, in Baumbast the 
Court made clear that the Treaty “does not require that citizens of the Union 
pursue a professional or trade activity…in order to enjoy the rights provided” 
demonstrating the shift away from ‘economic and market citizens’, to a social and 
political dimension of citizenship.295 At the same time a free-standing right to 
move and reside was established, regardless of the citizens’ economic status. 
Union citizenship moved further, to combating non-discriminatory restrictions 
such as in Tas-Hagen and Tas,296 where AG Kokott noted that “Union citizens 
can assert their right to free movement even if the matter concerned or the benefit 
claimed is not governed by Community law”.297 The Baumbast line of cases, has 
also had far-reaching constitutional effects, empowering the individual and 
rendering judicial protection more effective, while it has reshaped the duties that 
national courts and authorities have towards Union citizens.298 
Besides strengthening the rights already enshrined in the Treaty, the 
constructivist nature of EU citizenship culminated with the inclusion of new, 
unwritten rights into the concept, after a recent series of cases, initiated in 2010 
with Rottmann,299  which developed the innovative and promising ‘substance of 
the rights doctrine’.300 Particularly, the Ruiz Zambrano case protected an EU 
citizen against forced removal from EU territory and “not only the territory of the 
Member State of which [EU citizen] is a national”, a right not expressly listed in 
Article 20(2) TFEU.301 In addition, the ability to benefit from equality in a wholly 
internal situation, in the absence of any reference to a cross-border situation, 
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arguably constitutes such an unwritten right.302 Therefore, even though Article 25 
TFEU has not been used to enhance the protection under EU citizenship, the 
constructive nature of EU citizenship evidently allows for development, through a 
judicial incorporation. The definition given by the Commission can thus be 
equated to the need of establishing a concrete link between EU citizenship and 
fundamental rights, to keep pace with the various developments of the Union and 
to eventually generate a real and substantive EU citizenship as intended, after a 
wait of twenty years.  
The concept of the multifaceted judicial progress of EU citizenship evident above, 
has been perceived through different angles. According to Kostakopoulou, it has 
been approached so as putting the individual in the centre,303 while from Davies’ 
perspective the differentiated approach is ‘humiliating the State’.304 Since its 
introduction however, EU citizenship has been fundamentally enriched, arguably 
owing to its transformative nature and capability, opening doors for further 
development and expansion. It is now safe to say from the case law, that subject 
to the limitations and conditions laid down in the Treaty and secondary legislation, 
all EU citizens, enjoy under Article 21(1) TFEU; the right to leave their home 
state305 and enter into another, a free-standing and directly effective right of 
residence in another Member State,306 the right to enjoy social advantages on 
equal terms with nationals for those lawfully resident in another Member State307 
and the right to have decisions taken against them regularly reviewed.308 
3.3.2 The nature of the EU Charter and its list of rights 
Regardless of the influence exerted by the constructive dimension of Union 
citizenship, in forming the current fundamental rights protection policies, a 
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significant role was also played by the “effects of institutional interaction, dialogue 
and competition and the impact of the general organisational climate and critical 
events”,309 such as the the adoption of the EU Charter. The idea of the Charter, 
proclaimed in 2000, was welcomed as a sensible way of gaining more support 
for the EU and bringing the Union closer to the citizens.310 At the end of the 1990s, 
the EU experienced a pressing need to grant social rights the same status as 
other rights and the intention to make fundamental rights more visible, instead of 
hinted or hidden in the case law of the CJEU.311 The Charter had in fact reunited 
and consolidated a wide range of rights and freedoms, far beyond just civil, 
political, economic and social rights, including ‘third generation’ fundamental 
rights such as the protection of cultural and ecological interests, data protection, 
guarantees on bioethics and transparent administration.312 However, the Charter 
was not entrusted legally binding status, until nine years after its adoption when 
the Treaty of Lisbon came into force due to some Member States’ fears that an 
EU catalogue of fundamental rights would threaten their national sovereignty.313 
From their standpoint, the CJEU would rely on the Charter as a ‘federalising 
device’, similarly to what had happened in the US, to replace fundamental rights 
as defined by the national constitutions with a single common standard.314 
After its legal elevation, the Charter, has undoubtedly contributed to the enhanced 
protection of EU fundamental rights and has marked a new stage in the process 
of EU integration, by systematising in a single legally binding document, the 
sources of inspiration scattered in various national and international legal 
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instruments.315 Unlike the draft Constitutional Treaty, the Treaty of Lisbon only 
made a reference to the Charter, without including its whole text in the Treaty. 
Specifically, Article 6 TEU was amended recognising that “the rights, freedoms 
and principles set out in the Charter...shall have the same legal value as the 
Treaties”.316 However, this does not undermine “the tremendous relevance” of 
the compulsory EU Bill of Rights, which became a standard for judicial review of 
EU measures and national measures implementing the community law and a 
relevant aid in the interpretation of national and European measures.317 On the 
contrary, since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the number of cases in 
which the Charter is mentioned has significantly increased in the Court’s 
reasoning.318 According to Lenaerts, the Charter as primary EU law, now fulfils a 
triple function: just as general principles of EU law, the Charter firstly “serves as 
an interpretational aid for both EU secondary law and national law falling within 
the scope of EU law”.319 For instance, the Court in Detiček relied on the Charter 
as an aid to interpret Regulation No. 2201/2003 by stating that “the regulation 
recognises the fundamental rights and observes the principles of the Charter, 
seeking in particular to ensure respect for the fundamental rights of the child as 
set out in Article 24 of the Charter”.320 Secondly it may be “relied upon as 
providing grounds for judicial review”, where if EU legislation is found in breach 
of a provision of the Charter is to be held void, while national law falling within the 
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scope of EU law must be set aside.321 It finally retains the role of a source of 
authority for the ‘discovery’ of general principles of EU law. 
The content of the Charter as a whole, indicates and orients the ‘human needs 
for a good life’.322 It is therefore clear that the list of rights enshrined under the 
Charter is far more extended than that of EU citizenship. Unlike Article 20 TFEU, 
the Charter is also expressly protecting socio-economic rights that have been 
violated the most, during the financial crisis. On the other hand, considering the 
nature of both concepts, the list under EU citizenship may currently be limited, 
but its constructivist nature arguably allows for expansion of the ‘inter alia’ list 
under Article 20 TFEU. Therefore, while the list of rights under the Charter, 
adequately incorporates the rights violated during the financial crisis, the precise 
extent of Union citizenship rights, cannot be clearly defined from a strictly textual 
perspective. It is however strongly believed that the essence of EU citizenship is 
much broader than the list provided under Article 20(2) TFEU, constructed in the 
broader understanding of what supranational citizenships entail.323  
3.3.3 General principles of EU law as a hybrid concept 
The third corner of the EU triangular system, is the protection of fundamental 
rights as general principles of EU law, many of which are unwritten and judge-
made, but over time their majority has been codified in the Treaties.324 With the 
introduction of the Maastricht Treaty, the recognition of fundamental rights as 
general principles, was further enhanced, with Article 6(3) TEU, which granted 
them a direct foundation in the Treaty, enhancing their authority, role and 
standing.325 It is also important to add that the Treaty of Lisbon has preserved the 
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use of general principles of EU law for the protection of fundamental rights as 
well. Among their functions, general principles assist with the interpretation of 
primary and secondary law,326 while forming an independent basis for Member 
States liability.327 Moreover, in hierarchical terms, they are considered as part of 
primary law, especially when enshrined in the Treaty, or as a special category of 
norms, just below primary law but above all other EU law,328 and can thus be 
used to review the legality of secondary EU law and international agreements 
signed by the EU.329  
More importantly, general principles are largely used to fill legal gaps, in 
accordance with the overall body of EU law and the general principles, where 
relevant EU laws are lacking or not providing a concrete answer.330 Particularly, 
the Charter remains constituting a source of authority for the ‘discovery’ of 
general principles of EU law, which would eventually allow the Court, “to integrate 
new rights which are not written in the Charter but which would correspond to 
changes in society and would be established in the Member States”.331 It can thus 
be argued that general principles are both institutional and constructive in nature, 
since they are largely enshrined in the Treaty, yet the Court is constantly 
recognising new rights as falling within the ‘general principles umbrella’, under 
Article 2 TEU. Besides the legal nature and content of the instruments, their 
effectiveness largely depends on their material and/or personal scope of 
application and the existence of any legal restrictions. 
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3.4 The Actuality of the Legal Instruments’ Scope of Application  
Despite the evolution of EU citizenship and the ‘upgrade’ of the Charter into 
having legally binding status, the reach of these instruments is defined by their 
scope of application as determined in the Treaties, which is arguably limited as 
the financial crisis case study will also demonstrate. In other words, although the 
content of the instruments within the ‘triangular’ protection is promising, namely 
the range of rights they protect, it becomes peripheral if those rights can hardly 
be invoked by citizens due to the limited scope of their application. Especially 
after the establishment of EU citizenship, as O’Keeffe correctly puts it, “the 
importance […] lies not in their content but rather in the promise they hold out for 
the future”, whereby the concept of EU citizenship appears to be the most 
dynamic one in nature, capable of being strengthened, but not diminished.332 It is 
therefore necessary to analyse in depth the extent to which the current ‘triangular’ 
system is characterised by a strictly limited scope of application and if so, the 
ease with which the restrictions are overcome for each instrument respectively.  
Particularly, the traditional cross-border element for the application of EU 
citizenship provisions constitutes the first limitation of the ‘triangular’ system as a 
whole (3.4.1). The requirement for a cross-border link has not only limited the 
application of EU citizenship provisions but has also led to a form of differential 
treatment, namely the ‘reverse discrimination’. However, as will be seen below 
this requirement has been gradually eliminated in the case law, up to the point 
where it was in fact totally inexistent in Rottmann and Ruiz Zambrano. Another 
important limitation is Article 51(1) of the EU Charter which is delimiting its 
provisions’ scope of application (3.4.2). Although this limitation has been broadly 
interpreted by the Court, it is a hard barrier to overcome due to the institutional 
nature of the EU Charter that would require a legal amendment to completely 
eliminate its effects. Finally, fundamental rights as general principles of EU law, 
representing the third corner of the ‘triangular’ system do not necessarily apply 
within the same scope depending on the legal interpretation adopted by the 
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Court, while the main enquiry is whether general principles overlapping with 
Charter provisions can be said to apply in a broader scope (3.4.3). 
3.4.1 EU citizenship and the traditional cross-border element 
EU citizenship has been largely defined not by a link to a ‘demos’ but by a link to 
a market,333 while working within the framework of the ‘internal market thinking’. 
Even after the Lisbon Treaty, the trend leans towards the integration of economic, 
labour market and social policies in the logic of economic growth.334 Particularly, 
the Union has been preserving an excessive focus on economic freedoms and 
the promotion of the ‘market citizen’ to the detriment of other forms of 
citizenship,335 which has arguably resulted in diminishing the essence of EU 
citizenship and the attempts made by the Maastricht Treaty to connect with the 
citizen.336 More specifically, the application of EU citizenship provisions, is 
normally dependent upon the existence of a cross-border element. Purely internal 
situations, lacking a cross-border element or any structural nexus with EU law, 
fall outside the scope of application of the Treaty provisions, including those of 
EU citizenship and of the fundamental economic freedoms.337 Therefore, in the 
context of the free movement of persons provisions, the purely internal rule 
provides that situations involving an individual who “remains confined within the 
territory of his own Member State and does not entail the application of a measure 
which has a deterrent effect” on the exercise of one of the fundamental freedoms, 
escape the ambit of EU law.338 
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This requirement of EU law leads to the so-called, ‘reverse discrimination’, which 
involves less favourable treatment suffered by persons in a purely internal 
situation and who cannot enjoy EU law protection in their own Member State.339 
This form of differential treatment has traditionally been considered to fall outside 
the scope of EU law, since it does not impede the achievement of the Union’s 
economic aims.340 It is thus defined as ‘reverse’ because, while it is the norm for 
Member States to be trying to favour their own nationals, in instances of reverse 
discrimination, it is the unexpected group of nationals of that Member State, who 
cannot point to a cross-border element, that are treated less favourably.341 
Instances of reverse discrimination arise, when a Member State applies a more 
restrictive legal regime to its own nationals, than the one applied, by virtue of EU 
law, to nationals of other Member States within its territory.342 It can also emerge 
as a result of a finding of the ECJ that a non-discriminatory national measure 
which applies in the same way to both domestic and foreign situations, amounts 
to a breach of one of the fundamental freedoms, because of its ‘impeding’ nature 
to the market.343 Therefore, the ‘static’ Union citizens, in contrast to the mobile 
transnational ones, do not seem to derive many benefits from the institution of 
citizenship, as a fundamental building block of the EU.344 In the words of 
Tryfonidou, reverse discrimination is in reality discrimination “based on the non-
contribution to the internal market […] and discrimination based on the ground of 
a lack of a cross-border element”.345   
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On the one hand, the concept of reverse discrimination, has been characterised 
as reasonable and respectful of the need to keep a federal balance between the 
Union and its Member States, namely the necessary evil within the context of 
multi-level EU constitutionalism.346 On the other hand however, as AG Sharpston 
rightly argued there is something “deeply paradoxical about [reverse 
discrimination], since it is abundantly clear that such wholly internal situations are 
becoming increasingly difficult to justify, since they ‘sit uneasily next to the idea 
of the internal market’” and the equality of EU citizenship.347 Convincing 
arguments that is ‘time to move on’ exist, yet it is difficult to see on what 
fundamental basis this can be done, considering the constantly encountered and 
complex picture of the market pattern.348 The federal balance within the Union 
must be undoubtedly preserved not only owing to the fact that there is currently 
no concrete prospect and concurrence for a federation, but also because the 
current formation of the EU aims to safeguard and respect the national identities 
and the diversity between the Member States. Yet, maintaining reverse 
discrimination, is arguably the incorrect way to retain this balance, since it directly 
contradicts the objectives of EU citizenship and its substantive content as well as 
with foundational principles of the Union such as equality. The concept of EU 
citizenship, through its constructivist nature, can in fact constitute the 
fundamental basis ‘to move on’ from the hardly-justified barrier, as will be further 
examined.349 
With the legal establishment of EU citizenship, reverse discrimination in purely 
internal situations has been substantially criticised, in view of the fact that EU 
citizenship is not necessarily a market concept, or at least should not constitute 
merely such a concept, and reverse discrimination targets mostly those who are 
viewed as not contributing to the internal market.350 Normally, in EU citizenship 
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cases, the cross-border element that parallels the exercise of classic economic 
free movement rights is clearly identifiable,351 including in Bickel and Franz,352 
where the defendants, an Austrian and a German national respectively, were 
facing criminal proceedings in Italy. Moreover, in Martínez Sala the cross-border 
element was clear since the claimant, a Spanish national had moved to 
Germany,353 as well as in Bidar,354 where the claimant had moved from France 
to the UK, where he stayed with his grandmother to complete his schooling, after 
his mother’s death, before seeking a student loan to finance his university studies. 
Moreover, in the situations where Union nationals are invoking rights arising from 
EU citizenship, against their own Member States, a form of movement away from 
that Member State was usually preceded, followed by a return. For instance, in 
the case of D’Hoop,355 the applicant had moved from Belgium to France, where 
she completed her education, and then returned back to Belgium where she 
sought to claim the ‘tideover’ allowance granted to young people who had just 
completed their studies and who were seeking their first employment.356 This 
category of cases, including D’Hoop, constituted a clear attempt by the Court to 
use the concept of citizenship as ‘destined to be the fundamental status of 
nationals of the Member States’, with the aim of expanding its earlier 
jurisprudence that banned any direct or indirect discrimination on grounds of 
nationality against lawfully resident EU migrants, regarding any substantive social 
benefits,357 including various social assistance allowances, within the whole 
material scope of EU law.358 
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The same element of movement also occurred in Grunkin and Paul,359 where the 
child of the applicants was born, lived and attended school in Denmark and 
subsequently travelled to Germany, the country of which he was a national. After 
moving to Germany, the national authorities refused to recognise the child’s 
surname as it had been determined in Denmark. In its reasoning, the Court stated 
that the case fell within the scope of the (then) EC Treaty and even though the 
rules governing a person’s surname fell under the national competences of the 
Member States, there was still a need to comply with (then) Community law.360 It 
is therefore clear that EU law, including the Charter’s fundamental right 
provisions, apply when free movers return to their home Member States. 
More importantly, according to AG Sharpston, the CJEU has already identified 
an increasing amount of “citizenship cases in which the element of true 
movement is either barely discernible or frankly non-existent”.361 In those cases, 
known as the ‘passport migrants’ cases, the fact that EU citizens were residing 
lawfully in a Member State other than that of their nationality, was sufficient to 
establish a cross-border link within the meaning of Article 21 TFEU.362 The case 
of García Avello363 constituted one of the first cases of this trend, while in the 
same manner the CJEU observed in Zhu and Chen that Article 21 TFEU 
precluded British authorities from deporting a Chinese citizen who was the mother 
of an Irish infant and had sufficient resources to support both.364 The fact that the 
infant had acquired Irish, ius soli citizenship and had never left the UK, was not a 
determining factor in the Court’s ruling.  
Consequently, the Court seems to have stretched the ratione materiae of EU law, 
to cover virtually hypothetical cross-border situations, such as those relying on 
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cross-border birth,365 wives’ movements,366 or potential movements in the 
future.367 It is thus settled case law that “the situation of a national of a Member 
State who [...] has not made use of the right to freedom of movement cannot, for 
that reason alone, be assimilated to a purely internal situation”.368 As Spaventa 
rightly argues, “no national rules fall a priori outside the scope of the Treaty, since 
movement is enough to bring the situation within the scope of EU law”, without 
the need of that movement being necessarily physical travel or economic 
activity.369 
Despite reducing the hardly-justified phenomenon of ‘reverse’ discrimination, to 
a great extent,370 EU citizenship has managed to completely overcome the strict 
requirement for a cross-border element, by creating an independent, EU 
citizenship-based right, in a series of cases that established the ‘substance of the 
rights’ doctrine.371 The CJEU made a clear attempt to re-set out the material and 
personal scope of EU citizenship, indicating that in cases involving EU citizenship 
it is ready to deviate from the traditional, strictly cross-border situation approach 
to the scope of application of EU law,372 so as to allow more cases to fall within 
the jurisdiction of the CJEU. It further correctly ruled that the right of residence 
established by Article 21 TFEU does not necessarily depend upon a previous 
cross-border movement and can be invoked against one’s own Member State in 
view of securing the right of future cross-border movements.373 
Further departure from the traditional cross-border requirement occurred, in Ruiz 
Zambrano, where the Court ruled that EU law was applicable because Article 20 
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TFEU prevents Member States from taking measures that have the effect of 
“depriving EU citizens of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of rights 
conferred on them by the citizenship of the Union” even in situations with no 
cross-border element.374 It therefore created the possibility of EU law 
‘intervening’, once the enjoyment of the essence of EU citizenship rights is 
brought into question, in cases previously considered as ‘wholly internal’. 
Consequently, the CJEU was equally pushed into reassessing the concept of 
‘purely internal situations’ as well, by advancing more situations within the scope 
of EU law.375  
Despite the promising judicial outcomes for EU citizenship namely, the 
surpassing of its main restriction and its application in purely internal situations, 
it is still largely unsustainable to give a compellingly clear understanding of its 
rights scope of application. The judicial activism of the ECJ combined with EU 
citizenship’s constructivist nature, can result in surprising rulings both in the 
negative and the positive sense. In fact, as Kochenov puts it, “it might seem that 
virtually nothing is yet settled in the EU citizenship field: the essential starting 
points of thinking about EU citizenship remain contested well into its adult age”.376 
Specifically, the essential points of the legal meaning of EU citizenship within EU 
law and more importantly the structural relationship of the concept with 
fundamental rights as general principles of EU law and under the Charter. 
By reason of the constructivist nature of EU citizenship combined with the 
activism of the ECJ, “any Union citizen now falls within the [personal] scope of 
the Treaty, without having to establish cross-border credentials”.377 An economic 
engagement within the internal market does not necessarily play a role in shaping 
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the material scope of EU law, EU citizenship now does the trick.378 It is thus 
believed that, besides the certain limitations identified above, EU citizenship can 
form the key element in reinforcing the current status of EU fundamental rights, 
due to its transformative potential and value. More importantly, EU citizenship 
has the ability to overcome legal restrictions with relative ease, compared to the 
rest of the instruments, especially the Charter, whose textual restrictions are hard 
to defeat.    
3.4.2 Institutional limitations imposed by the Charter  
The Charter on its side has long proved to be a contentious issue in European 
politics. Particularly, in order to prevent it from threatening the supremacy of 
national constitutional laws or becoming a centripetal force at the service of 
European integration, specific limitations were incorporated under Articles 51-54, 
specifying the situations under which the Charter may be invoked and how to be 
interpreted.379 The limiting provisions, which can be hardly surpassed, have 
arguably generated adverse effects for the dynamism of the instrument. 
One of the most important limitations that has drawn great attention from 
academia and is the main focus of this thesis, is the restriction of the field of 
application of the Charter under Article 51(1). This provision sets the Charter’s 
scope through the elusive concept of ‘implementation of EU law’ and has severely 
influenced the legal jurisdiction of the claims against austerity measures.380 
According to this concept, internal measures adopted in the exercise of 
exclusively domestic competence, should remain unaffected by the Charter. 
Although the Court had already accepted this general rule in Stauder long before 
the establishment of the Charter itself, in its post-Lisbon case law it has not done 
the same with the restriction.381 Although the opposing stance retained by the 
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CJEU is generally encouraging, it continues to be difficult to predict whether a 
domestic measure will be bound by the Charter, if it has legal effects touching 
upon the sphere of matters regulated by the EU, but not adopted to implement 
EU law directly.382  
The Court in ERT383 interestingly gave a wider interpretation to the 
‘implementation of EU law’ concept and ruled that all national measures are 
considered to implement EU law when they “fall within the scope of Community 
law”.384 The difference in the wording is crucial since the focus shifts to whether 
the national measure under examination, operates within the area affected by EU 
law, irrespective of whether it actually implements it. In particular, according to 
Lord Laws, this shift in the wording could allow a purely domestic measure to fall 
‘within the scope of application of the Treaty’ if it affects the operation of the 
common market.385 It is however necessary, to place a threshold of relevance to 
trigger the application of EU fundamental rights since not every single national 
measure can be found to have a link with EU law. An early example of this is the 
Maurin386 case, in which the Court held that the mere existence of a Directive 
mentioning labelling was not enough to justify the application of EU fundamental 
rights in domestic proceedings on the crime of mislabelling.387 The ERT test was 
denoted as a sophisticated applicable test that could reliably determine, under 
the scope of EU law, applicable acts other than implementing and derogating 
ones.388 Ladenburger further maintained that the relevant trigger for the 
application of the Charter is the existence of a “sufficiently specific link between 
the national act at issue and a concrete norm of EU law applied”.389 
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The famous Fransson390 ruling is the reference for understanding the current 
status of the ‘implementation’ concept, in which the applicant was seeking the 
unmediated application of Article 50 of the Charter, which guarantees the 
principle of ne bis in idem.391 AG Cruz Villalón acknowledged the unresolved 
issue of the interpretation of Article 51(1) of the Charter and proposed to read into 
the Article the implicit requirement of “specific interest”, on the part of the Union, 
to review certain national measures in light of EU fundamental rights.392 The 
Court proceeded to the classic interpretation of Article 51(1) of the Charter, 
without following the AG’s theoretical effort and found that the Charter applied, 
since a loss of revenue arising from the failed collection of VAT also entailed a 
loss of revenue for the EU budget.393 The Fransson case can be said to adopt an 
‘extensive interpretation’, since it accepted that a remote connection with EU law 
was enough to trigger the Charter, demonstrating once more, how much grey 
area remains in the interpretation of this provision.394 As van Bockel and Wattel 
wisely argue, the Court in Fransson, did not merely pour the ‘new wine’ of the 
Charter, into the ‘old wineskins’ of the case law on the scope of application of 
general principles of EU law.395 The Court went further than that, towards merging 
the previous series of case law into a single doctrine, under which the scope of 
application of the Charter coincides with that of EU law, irrespective of which kind 
of applicability of EU law is involved.396 
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It is therefore evident that Article 51(1) bears a level of complexity in assessing 
the scope of application of the Charter provisions and it does so until today. The 
scope of EU fundamental rights is therefore interpreted variously, with the Charter 
being more likely to apply to national rules in cases with a stronger EU interest, 
while applying only in extreme cases regarding the co-ordination of rules.397 
Therefore, although the Court has interpreted the limited scope of application of 
the Charter broadly, under Article 51(1), the level of discretion available allows it 
to promote a differentiated understanding of the Charter’s field of application, in 
selected cases. As Fontanelli correctly argues, this limitation is eventually 
confirming that the Charter is just the “human rights shadow of Union law, not a 
self-standing repository of new powers for the Union”, as it would be anticipated 
within a constitutionalised Union.398 The vagueness and uncertainty of the scope 
of application of EU fundamental rights deriving from the Charter has been 
subject to criticism by the EU institutions as well. Particularly, the European 
Parliament in 2016, criticised the interpretation given to Article 51 stating that 
citizens’ expectations often “go beyond of what is allowed by the strictly legal 
provisions of the Charter” and called on the Commission to do more to meet 
citizens’ expectations, by finding a new approach to the interpretation of Article 
51.399 Moreover, the Parliament had previously proposed the deletion of Article 
51 of the Charter, within the framework of strengthening the protection of 
fundamental rights in the EU Treaties, recognising the structural difficulty created 
from it.400 
Although the primary aim of Article 51 is to make the Charter applicable against 
both EU institutions’ and Member States’ acts, the lack of preciseness of the 
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concept of ‘implementing Union law’, reveals that the Charter does not seem to 
provide “effective means to enforce fundamental rights against recalcitrant 
Member States”.401 The complication was further increased, in the claims against 
the austerity measures attached to the financial assistance packages, which 
clearly illustrates the need for reinforcing the system, towards a truly 
constitutionalised Union. This provision can be largely clarified if a broader and 
more stable use of the Charter was to be adopted as intended in the current 
research, so as to make rights more visible to EU citizens, especially in situations 
that are firmly within the scope of EU law or are clearly connected to it even 
without strong internal market connection, such as the cases governed by the 
ESM.  
Another legal confusion deriving from Article 51(1), is that the Charter applies 
only when “an institution of the EU or a Member State” is implementing EU law. 
Therefore, by identifying a particular group of addressees and remaining silent 
on other possibilities, it is questionable whether fundamental rights can be 
invoked vis-à-vis other individuals, even though it is well-known that traditionally, 
provisions of primary EU law are capable of being invoked horizontally when 
fulfilling the conditions for direct effect.402 The horizontal effect of fundamental 
rights aims to neutralise asymmetries in contractual relations between individuals 
and to provide a minimum of social justice in the private relations of individuals 
so as to guarantee basic fairness to the ‘weaker’ party.403 Although the possibility 
of the Court, applying horizontal effect to interindividual disputes, without acting 
beyond the reach of its jurisdiction may seem impossible, the various objections 
can be surpassed in order to broaden the scope of application of the Charter.404 
Essentially, excluding horizontal effect from the Charter’s scope, would be 
incompatible with EU law’s ability to produce horizontal effects in the sphere of 
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fundamental rights, prior to the Charter’s entry into force.405 Therefore, as AG 
Villalón indicated in his Opinion in Prigge, the question that needs to be tackled, 
is whether the source-based case law of the pre-Lisbon years must be 
reassessed altogether, in light of the fact that fundamental rights have “been 
enshrined in the ‘Lisbon Charter’ and it is therefore from this source that the 
possibilities and limitations of [their] usefulness must flow”.406 Moreover, although 
Article 51 makes no mention of private parties, it does not specifically exclude 
horizontal effect either, and the strict textual approach in respect of fundamental 
rights is not greatly supported by the Court. At the moment, the CJEU has 
exclusive powers to decide which provisions of the Charter have horizontal effect 
and which lack it.  
The Court has interpreted Article 51(1) broadly, ruling in a number of cases that 
certain Charter provisions directly apply in interindividual disputes, mainly 
resulting from preliminary references concerning the directives on employment 
law, as seen below. Specifically, based on the Court’s case law, if a provision of 
the Charter has been implemented by a Directive and if it has been intended to 
facilitate the application of a specific general principle of law, then it has horizontal 
effect.407 The Court clarified the circumstances under which the provisions of the 
Charter can be invoked vis-a-vis, in Association de médiation sociale408 where 
trade unions challenged a private employer’s refusal to establish worker 
consultation according to Directive 2002/14.409 Although the employer had acted 
in consistency with French law, the EU Directive as implemented, allowed 
exclusions for special employment contracts and for apprentices. One of the 
questions before the Court was whether Article 27 of the Charter could be invoked 
in an interindividual dispute. AG Villalón in his Opinion, responded affirmatively, 
stating that since horizontal effect of fundamental rights is not unknown to EU 
law, “it would be paradoxical if the incorporation of the Charter into primary law 
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actually changed that state of affairs for the worse”.410 On the contrary, the Court 
ruled that in order for Article 27 to be “fully effective, it must be given more specific 
expression in EU or national law”. Therefore, the corresponding Article 27 of the 
Charter could not be invoked against private employers based on the Court’s 
ruling. 
The facts of this case were distinguished from those of Kücükdeveci,411 where 
the Court emphasised that the “principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age 
at issue...laid down under Article 21(1) of the Charter, is sufficient in itself to 
confer on individuals an individual right which they may invoke as such”.412 It 
follows from the case law that the Court is not willing to transpose this 
Kücükdeveci approach to provisions other than those which are a specific 
expression of the principle of equality in the chapter on ‘equality’ of the Charter.413 
The reason could be that the prohibition of non-discrimination on the grounds of 
age, sex and nationality, constitutes a specific application of the principle of 
equality which is a general principle of law and is applicable in interindividual 
disputes, thus granting horizontal effect to the corresponding Charter provisions, 
Articles 21(2) and 23. However, the Court does not specifically indicate that a 
certain provision, must constitute, at the same time, a general principle of law, 
neither it explains what ‘sufficient in itself’ includes, allowing itself a margin of 
discretion when deciding each case.  
It is clearly evident that Article 51(1) of the Charter is largely phrased in a cryptic 
way, generating arguments around its efficiency and effectiveness, which in turn 
undermine the full effectiveness of EU law and the protection of EU citizens for 
numerous reasons, including the difficulties encountered in invoking rights 
provisions, as well as the exclusion of horizontal effect from the Charter.414 That 
being the case, the limitations incorporated within the Charter, should not be 
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interpreted restrictively, in order for the instrument to be meaningful. The Charter 
should not be understood as an unpreventable outcome of development, which 
imposed further tasks on the states, towards the cooperation with international 
functional institutions.415 It should be rather understood as a legal instrument 
initially based on a functionalist idea, which now has the potencies of being 
developed and expanded into the desired level to provide a common standard of 
protection for all the Union citizens.  
However, during the financial crisis challenges, the Court has generally 
approached the Charter as an inflexible and unalterable concept.416 Although the 
Charter’s scope of application is not designed to be substantially broadened, to 
prevent conflicts with the division of competences, there was arguably some room 
for expansion. In terms of the scope of application of the fundamental rights 
instruments, it is argued that the constructivist concept of EU citizenship can more 
effectively overcome its limits in comparison to the Charter, namely the cross-
border element requirement and the notion of purely internal situations. This is a 
positive development since it reinforces EU citizenship’s dynamism to protect 
individuals in their capacities as EU citizens, against any unjust deprivations of 
their EU rights.417 At the same time, it shows greater potential for EU citizenship 
to safeguard citizens’ rights, in further sectors and cases that was not able to do 
so previously. Similar dynamism and potential are also traced in general 
principles of EU law, that constitute instruments of constitutional dialogue and 
can easily facilitate the constant renewal of the EU legal order.418 
3.4.3 The scope of general principles of EU law 
General principles of EU law, are also invoked when ‘implementing Union law’, in 
view of the fact that almost all Charter rights have been previously recognised as 
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general principles, that have in turn always been applicable to cases falling within 
the scope of EU law.419 Unlike the Charter however, due to their hybrid nature 
discussed above, the scope of application of general principles, is not as 
restricted as the Charter’s. On the contrary, general principles of EU law can also 
be invoked as grounds for judicial review,420 when examining the validity of 
national measures derogating from EU requirements and where a specific 
substantive EU rule is applicable to the situation in question.421  
More importantly, according to AG Bot in his Opinion in Scattolon, the restrictive 
scope of application defined for the Charter was not intended to restrict the scope 
of application of the fundamental rights recognised as general principles of EU 
law,422 which can still be invoked where the Charter cannot. Consequently, 
fundamental rights as principles of EU law can also be of assistance when 
seeking to invoke rights with broader applicability. In fact, the Court has recently 
based its ruling exclusively on Article 19(1) TEU merely requiring the existence 
of a virtual link with EU law, overcoming the barrier under Article 51(1) of the 
Charter.423 Although this judicial approach points out to the pre-
constitutionalisation years, when fundamental rights policies in the EU were 
solely based on judge-made general principles, it constitutes a significant 
development towards a reinforcement of the system.  
The combination of the broad scope of application of general principles along with 
their ability to develop ‘common law’ in order to fill legal gaps overlooked by the 
Union legislator as discussed above, will greatly contribute to the proposal of the 
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current thesis.424 In particular, the flexibility of general principles deriving from 
their partly-constructive nature, arguably allow them to easily adapt to any 
situation where the effectiveness of EU law is questioned, even in liaison with the 
concept of EU citizenship as assessed further, which can lead to positive 
developments within the current system. 
3.5 Can the ECHR form the alternative solution? 
Within the EU, there are two further levels of jurisdiction guaranteeing the 
protection of fundamental rights of EU citizens. In particular, the national level, 
which is formed of national courts and the continental and pan-European level, 
enforced by the ECtHR.425 Therefore, in cases where the Charter does not apply, 
the protection of fundamental rights is guaranteed under the 
national constitutions or constitutional traditions and the international conventions 
they have ratified. There is no doubt as to the important role and encouragement 
of the ECtHR, towards accepting human rights within the EU constitutional 
framework, by its pioneering case law. The ECHR gained even more recognition 
within the EU legal order through subsequent Treaty provisions.426 Specifically, 
with the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty and under Article 6(2), the EU 
became bound expressly to respect fundamental rights, inter alia, as guaranteed 
by the ECHR. Subsequently, with the Lisbon Treaty, the EU was provided the 
necessary legal competences to enable accession into the ECHR to take place, 
under Article 6(2), which could have filled some of the gaps of the current 
protection system. 
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For some the accession of the EU to the ECHR was a long awaited development 
for a ‘greater Europe’,427 though for others was an undesirable step.428 By 
submitting the Union’s legal system to independent external control, any 
individual would have been able to bring a complaint regarding violations of the 
Convention rights by the EU before the ECtHR.429 However, to the surprise of 
many, the Court’s Opinion 2/13 prevented the EU from acceding the ECHR by 
stating a number of reasons for finding the Draft Accession Agreement 
incompatible with primary EU law.430 Specifically, the Court emphasised the 
incompatibility of the Agreement with Article 344 TFEU, in that it fails to exclude 
recourse to the ECtHR to settle inter-State disputes.431 Opinion 2/13 among 
others, implies that the CJEU is reluctant to tie its own hands to the ECtHR. It 
rather prefers to retain control, while reserving the possibility of giving its own 
divergent interpretation of fundamental rights’ norms.432 Therefore, at least for the 
moment, the fundamental rights as guaranteed by the ECHR, will remain general 
principles of EU law,433 a significant ‘guiding principle’ for the CJEU’s case law434 
and an alternative judicial protection system for EU citizens. 
The Court also identified the possible adverse effects of the accession on 
particular characteristics of EU law and its autonomy, due to the lack of 
‘coordination’ between Article 53 of the Charter and Article 53 ECHR, as well as 
the alleged disregard of the principle of ‘mutual trust’ especially in Justice and 
Home Affairs matters. In particular, the CJEU took a major step in interpreting 
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and defining the role of Article 53 of the Charter within the field of criminal justice 
in Melloni.435 It specifically rejected the argument that Article 53 of the Charter 
allows Member States to implement their national standards of fundamental 
rights protection, when they are higher than those in the Charter and to give them 
priority over implementing EU law. According to the Court such an interpretation 
“would undermine the principle of the primacy of EU law” and the effectiveness 
of EU law.436 In other fields of EU law beyond the cooperation in criminal matters, 
Member States can still go beyond what is required by EU law, provided that the 
subject matter has not been completely regulated by the EU.437 At the same time, 
the Court argued that Article 53 of the Charter must be interpreted as a “stand-
still clause” in order to preserve the constitutional autonomy of EU law,438 not 
allowing a reduction of the level of protection held by EU law at the time.439 In 
other words, if the ECtHR expands the level of fundamental rights protection, the 
CJEU will be obliged to reinterpret the Charter in order to attain the level of 
protection guaranteed by the ECHR, while if the ECtHR decides to lower the level 
of protection below the one guaranteed by EU law, the CJEU should be prevented 
from interpreting the Charter in a regressive way. Article 53 ECHR on its part, is 
viewed as a “maximisation clause” to ensure the minimum standard of protection 
and it allows the Contracting Parties to apply higher standards of protection that 
the one guaranteed by the Convention.440 
The current rule on the relationship between EU and the ECHR, is maintained by 
the Bosphorus presumption,441 which was recently appraised in detail before the 
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ECtHR in Avotiņš v. Latvia,442 as a long-awaited answer to Opinion 2/13 of the 
CJEU. In Bosphorus the ECtHR held that, “if equivalent protection of human 
rights, existed in the EU legal order, then it could be presumed that an EU 
Member State had complied with the ECHR, when it did no more than directly 
implement legal obligations flowing from its EU membership”,443 where it had no 
discretion in the nature of implementation. The ECtHR further stated that any 
presumption can be rebutted where the human rights protection in the particular 
case was considered as ‘manifestly deficient’.444 This approach, known as the 
doctrine of equivalent protection, basically allowed the ECtHR not to engage in 
the review of case involving the EU, as long as, the EU human rights regime is 
equivalently protective with the ECHR.445 The Bosphorus presumption had been 
strongly criticised, as being a shield to the application of EU law from ECtHR 
scrutiny, by those who support a more rigid and fair control mechanism. On the 
contrary, the ‘equivalent protection’ approach potentially facilitates a specific and 
well-seated enquiry into the level of fundamental rights protection by the EU and 
the CJEU in individual cases,446 while evidently accommodating the autonomy of 
the EU legal order and allowing the Union to solve problems on a treaty basis, 
rather than the courts themselves. The ECtHR chose to uphold the Bosphorus 
doctrine in Avotiņš, although many expected the possibility of dropping this 
presumption, due to the critical approach of the CJEU toward the ECtHR in 
Opinion 2/13. However, a detailed analysis on the recent developments of the 
post-Opinion case law, conducted by Glas and Krommendijk revealed a 
seemingly stricter approach in Avotiņš than before.447 The ECtHR seems to have 
shown its dissatisfaction by clarifying that the autonomy of EU law is not 
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unlimited, while applying the Bophorus doctrine somewhat more strictly than 
before Opinion 2/13, compared to prior case law.448  
The present state of fundamental rights in Europe was described by AG Cruz 
Villalón as ‘a crowded house’.449 Although the EU has other, more pressing 
problems at the moment, such as the social consequences of the recent financial 
crisis, the ‘backsliding’ of the rule of law and the withdrawal process of the UK 
from the Union, it is commonly believed that the human rights framework in 
Europe is complex and unsatisfactory.450 One of the elements rendering it so is 
arguably the current relationship between the EU and the ECHR.451 Therefore, 
despite the significant role of the ECHR in the EU legal order, it is believed – 
especially after the collapse of the accession negotiations – that the 
reinforcement of the fundamental rights protection system must take place 
through other means within the sphere of EU law, rather than through the Council 
of Europe. One of the main reasons is that the Convention begins and ends in 
the ECtHR, which is not a court of last instance, but of ‘unique’ or single instance, 
whose sole source of legitimacy lies in the rights they are called upon to 
guarantee at the international level.452 In addition, the Convention completely 
rests on the good will of the signatory states to function, questioning its 
effectiveness.  
In terms of remedies, the judicial protection at the EU supranational level is 
considered to provide certain advantages to litigants over actions in Strasbourg, 
since “there is no prior requirements of exhaustion of all domestic remedies, 
thereby offering a ‘one-stop forum’ for the protection of fundamental rights”.453 
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Moreover, the ECHR has been characterised as lacking direct enforceability in 
many domestic legal orders and facing serious work-load challenges.454 The 
criticism is mainly attributed to the fact that although EU institutions currently 
observe the ECHR, there is no possibility of a direct action against the EU before 
the ECtHR, by a Union citizen, challenging the EU’s interpretation of the 
Convention.455 The EPC in 1954, interestingly provided for a right of action by 
individuals, before the Community Court against the Community institutions for 
violations of the Convention.456 The failure of the European Defence Community 
Treaty (EDC), signalled the ‘death’ of the EPC Treaty as well, since it had been 
legally based on Article 38 of the EDC Treaty. Although this demonstrates an 
ambitious human rights framework on the part of the EU, it is clear that subjects 
which could lead to controversial and political issues, as the ones resulting to the 
downfall of the EDC and EPC treaties, were preferred to be avoided.457 Currently, 
although applicants may bring an action against EU Member States before the 
ECtHR, based on Article 34, invoking an ECHR provision, where the state’s acts 
derive from national implementation of EU law, there is no direct EU involvement 
in the action before the CJEU.458 This can create further problems at the 
enforcement stage as indicated in Matthews459 and Kokkelvisserij,460 where 
single EU Member States, as the only respondents, would not have been legally 
able to execute any Strasbourg Court judgment, finding a rights violation in EU 
law,461 since this required the amendment of EU legislation, which involves all the 
Member States. 
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On the contrary, the Charter represents a common law of fundamental rights 
protection, which builds upon the foundations of the ECHR and national 
constitutions, in the Union and its Member States. EU law was always meant to 
be a fully-fledged legal order underpinned by a solid construction of fundamentals 
right and principles, within a ‘supranational legal order’.462 The EU Charter could 
thus become a “force for some degree of harmonisation” in the field of EU 
fundamental rights,463 complementing the essential standards approach of the 
ECHR and creating a common standard of protection throughout the EU. In that 
sense, the ECHR does not appear to constitute a satisfactorily effective 
alternative to EU fundamental rights protection system and this is even more 
perceptible during the financial crisis legal challenges, as examined in Chapter 4. 
Therefore, the Union legal order is the appropriate vehicle for reinforcing and 
expanding the system, compared to an external international organisation like the 
Council of Europe,464 which is frequently of limited assistance, especially when 
the EU institutions are mostly involved in a series of challenges.  
3.6 Conclusion 
Significant developments have taken place within the ‘triangular’ system of 
fundamental rights protection, primarily through the exercise of judicial activism 
of the ECJ, which granted more essence to the concepts underpinning the current 
system. By believing that “Union citizenship is destined to be a fundamental 
status of the nationals of the Member States” and to keep pace with the norms of 
EU integration, the ECJ has managed to build on the constitutional perspective 
of Union citizenship.465 In particular, the case law on EU citizenship has 
constantly departed from the long-established logic of economic growth. The 
formation and application of the substance of the rights doctrine constituted such 
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a departure, which facilitated the expansion of the personal and material scope 
of application of EU law towards purely internal situations.466 In other words, the 
lack of a cross-border link had not prevented the cases under dispute from falling 
within the realm of EU law, which is not an easy task to achieve, especially when 
the requirement is entirely inexistent.  
Aside from the influence deriving from the constructive nature of Union 
citizenship, the analysis above has also emphasised the effects of institutional 
developments such as the adoption of the EU Charter, an instrument of primary 
law, as well as fundamental rights as general principles.467 The idea of the 
Charter was generally embraced by the Member States as a way of placing the 
citizens in the centre of the Union’s structure and giving constitutional and federal 
ambitions for the future of the EU.468 However, due to the Charter’s unstable 
scope of application, it is argued that the concept of EU citizenship can more 
effectively overcome its restrictions, so as to provide greater protection to citizens’ 
rights within the EU legal order. In this light, EU citizenship will be placed within 
a new jurisdictional test as designed in the current research, which essentially will 
attempt to form an interlink between EU citizenship and EU fundamental rights.  
The assessment of the future evolution of such a link, arguably seems legitimate, 
since the Court’s case law and jurisprudence on fundamental rights is constantly 
developing. New judicial doctrines and principles are frequently introduced, 
rendering the ECJ the main addressee of an analogous proposal. In order to 
illustrate the necessity for further appraisal of this interlink, the following Chapter 
will examine the use of the triangular protection system, by both the national and 
supranational Courts, as well as the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, in relation to the 
claims brought against numerous austerity measures, during the recent financial 
crisis. 
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4 CHAPTER 4 – THE MODERN PROTECTION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS; 
THE FINANCIAL CRISIS CASE STUDY 
4.1 Introduction 
Having analysed the main deficiencies and prospects of the present fundamental 
rights protection system, the current Chapter will attempt to illustrate these 
findings ‘in practice’. For the purposes of this more pragmatic analysis, one of the 
most severe crises since the establishment of the Union was selected, namely 
the EU financial and sovereign debt crisis which involves an unusual example of 
EU co-imposed conditionality on Member States.469 As will be further discussed, 
a lack in citizens’ rights protection was clearly evident during the crisis primarily 
due to the difficulty in challenging the consequences of the conditionality and was 
currently selected for the purposes of the research for two main reasons. Firstly, 
the numerous claims brought before the Court challenging the austerity 
measures imposed, for fundamental rights infringements will substantially confirm 
the limited scope of application of the Charter provisions along with the unstable 
judicial interpretation adopted, as one of the main causes of the lack of effective 
judicial protection. At the same time, the ESM will provide a good example, of the 
difficulty in invoking EU fundamental rights when it comes to more complexed 
situations, occurring under the sphere of international intergovernmental 
agreements concluded between Member States. Secondly, the financial crisis 
case study will emphasise the lack of EU citizenship provisions in the judicial 
processes, which is also harmonised with the objectives of the research, namely 
to grant EU citizenship more concreteness and value. The thesis will essentially 
use the case study to assert that within a constitutionalised Union there is a duty 
to protect citizens, against any deprivations of their rights that also contradict with 
the purposes of the Union itself.  
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Along this line, the need for reinforcing the current fundamental rights protection 
system will be highlighted even further. Specifically, the necessity of a broadened 
scope of application of fundamental rights will be emphasised, towards 
preserving the effectiveness of EU law, in prima facie internal situations that have 
resulted in such violations that could easily spread across the Union without the 
intervention of EU law. Although the fundamental status of EU citizenship has not 
played any substantial role in the financial crisis claims, it is suggested that it can 
actually provide adequate protection of EU citizens’ rights, while preserving the 
essence and purpose of the EU. This suggestion is based on the belief that EU 
citizenship is not constrained to its current, ‘confined’ form owing to its evolving 
character which is designed to encounter constant evolution and progress.470 It 
can accordingly lead to further developments, with the aim of filling the gaps of 
the current fundamental rights protection system, identified mainly during the 
financial crisis and aligning EU citizenship with the objectives of a 
constitutionalised Union.471 
The chapter begins by briefly setting out the causes and effects of the financial 
crisis in the EU, as well as the measures taken to tackle the crisis, including 
austerity measures (4.2). Subsequently, it analyses the protection provided by 
the instruments under the Union’s legal order, to EU citizens against 
infringements of their rights caused by the conditionality attached to the 
assistance packages, to assess how the limitations identified in Chapter 3 have 
influenced their effectiveness (4.3). A respective analysis follows, regarding the 
protection granted under the ECHR (4.4) and the national courts of the Member 
States (4.5), leading to the conclusion that citizens were driven in a deadlock 
situation, mainly stemming from the legal gaps in the effectiveness and 
accountability of the fundamental rights protection system. 
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4.2 A word on the crisis 
The financial crisis has not only led to serious doubts about the viability of the 
EMU’s integration mechanisms, but from the political and constitutional 
perspective doubts also emerged over the general future of the EU as a political 
project, in the face of citizens’ growing dissatisfaction. It is therefore a crisis, not 
only with economic and financial consequences, but also, if not even further, with 
constitutional and societal consequences.472 While the financial crisis had started 
in 2007 in the US, it was already clear by 2010, that various Eurozone economies 
were seriously affected. EU countries continuously refinanced their public debt, 
by paying debts that had matured, by borrowing new money from the markets 
and by selling financial instruments, such as bonds.473 The crisis had changed 
the cost of funding, namely once the markets paid more attention to the specifics 
of each euro economy, they started to have doubts as to specific countries’ 
credibility as debtors.474 Consequently, this lack of trust and confidence 
generated the rise of the cost of borrowing and refinancing, leading the already 
financially troubled countries at the risk of being blocked out of private markets. 
Particularly, the markets started to doubt the ability of some euro countries to 
repay their debt for numerous reasons (initially, Ireland, Portugal and Greece), 
driving the Euro area to the so-called sovereign debt crisis.475  
The Union has tried to tackle the Eurozone crisis, stabilise the European markets 
and overcome the financial debts, through multiple responses, while at the same 
time, to stay within its limited powers and rely on legitimate responses. 
Particularly, the responses to the crisis include, actions taken by the European 
Central Bank (ECB), whose role and practices dramatically changed after the 
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crisis,476 as well as mechanisms of financial assistance, the two temporary EU 
funding programmes: the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and the 
European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM) and permanent ESM, which 
had replaced the two earlier ones.477 Lastly, numerous reforms were made in 
terms of Directives and Regulations, so as to improve the economic coordination 
and financial supervision.478  
The financial assistance packages were accompanied by strict conditionality 
based on austerity, as a way of alleviating the budget concerns, an unusual tactic 
by the EU, outside the context of membership conditionality. The austerity 
measures agreed under the Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) inter alia, 
include reductions in government state spending, cuts in wages and pensions 
and increases in tax revenues, yet their effectiveness remains a debated 
matter.479 Numerous austerity measures, are seemingly in contradiction with EU 
fundamental rights and have been repeatedly challenged, inter alia before the 
ECJ which, as subsequently discussed, has adopted a largely reluctant approach 
towards cases involving complex economic issues, by promoting its own 
understanding of the field of application of the Charter. 
4.2.1 Financial Assistance Mechanisms established beyond the EU legal 
order 
Initially, the creation and functioning of the first two emergency mechanisms, the 
EFSM and the EFSF in 2010, positively contributed to the balance and stability 
of the Euro area but had proven to only be a short-term solution.480 The 
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emergency funding programme of the EFSM, created based on Article 122(2) 
TFEU, relied upon funds raised on the financial markets and guaranteed by the 
European Commission, through the budget of the EU.481 On the other hand, the 
EFSF was created by the Eurozone Member States within the framework of the 
Ecofin Council, as an international agreement.482 The temporary mechanism was 
financed through the issuance of EFSF bonds and other debt instruments on 
capital markets.483 Due to the escalation of the crisis, a permanent stabilising and 
balancing mechanism was needed in the Eurozone. For this reason, the ESM 
was allegedly designed with the aim of ‘safeguarding financial stability in the euro 
area’484 and of promoting European solidarity between the Union Member States 
on a permanent basis.485  
The setting up and establishment of the ESM is based on two main parameters. 
First, the Member States have concluded and ratified an intergovernmental 
international Treaty (ESMT), outside the EU legal order and beyond the Treaty 
rules on the EMU. Second, the mechanism has urged the Member States to insert 
a new paragraph (3) in Article 136 TFEU, through the use of a simplified 
amendment procedure under Article 48(6) TEU, to allow the Eurozone Member 
States to “establish a stability mechanism to be activated if indispensable to 
safeguard the stability of the euro area as a whole...subject to strict 
conditionality”.486 The establishment and legitimacy of the mechanism was 
contested before the CJEU in Pringle which concerned a preliminary reference 
from the Irish Supreme Court, on the ratification of the ESMT by the Irish 
Government and it is discussed in detail below.487 With the CJEU’s reasoning in 
Pringle, the legal hurdles raised against the establishment of the ESM were 
overcome, and the ESM Treaty which had entered into force on 27 September 
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2012 could not be overturned. The Court arguably used AG Kokott’s concept of 
solidarity,488 as an argument against an extensive interpretation of the Treaty 
provisions, particularly Article 125 TFEU, which restrains the establishment of the 
mechanism.489  
The ESM has maximum lending capacity of €500 billion to provide assistance 
and when a Member State addresses a request to the ESM,490 the procedure for 
granting stability support will be examined and assessed by the so-called Troika 
of International lenders, to appraise whether public debt is sustainable and what 
kind of support programme should be offered.491 However, the question that 
remains to be answered, is how this mechanism operates and whether its use 
has indeed infringed citizens’ fundamental rights and revealed the weaknesses 
of the current rights protection system identified in Chapter 3.  
4.2.2 Conditionality and Austerity Measures 
The vast majority of the austerity measures, accompanying the financial loans 
granted by the financial assistance mechanisms, including the ESM, have been 
repeatedly criticised in relation to their content, as well as to their existence as a 
whole. According to the ESM Treaty “the purpose of the ESM shall be to mobilise 
funding and provide stability support” and “the granting of any required financial 
assistance under the mechanism will be made subject to strict conditionality”.492 
The requirement for strict conditionality was also raised in Pringle, where the 
Court said that it is necessary under Article 136(3) TFEU in order to ensure that 
the “mechanism will operate in a way that will comply with EU law, including the 
measures adopted in the context of the coordination of the Member States’ 
economic policies”.493 In particular, strict conditionality is needed to ensure that 
“the ESM is compatible with Article 125 TFEU and the coordinating measures 
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adopted by the Union”.494 Additionally, it is necessary in relation to moral hazard 
dynamics, which can occur where a Member State takes more financial risks 
when someone else seems to bear their costs or when the actions of a Member 
State can lead to the financial detriment of another.495 Consequently, the 
requirement for conditionality attached to the financial assistance, makes it 
unattractive for Member States, to seek liquidity support without real need and 
prevents detriments on the stabilisation of the Eurozone that could be caused by 
a moral hazard.   
Overall, the financial assistance packages that were granted to Eurozone 
Member States can be divided into four categories which differ in relation to their 
legal nature.496 First, there are the bilateral loans between Eurozone Member 
States, supplemented by an IMF Stand-By Arrangement, such as in the case of 
Greece I in 2010.497 Second, the financial assistance granted through the EFSM, 
based on Article 122(2) TFEU, such as in the cases of Ireland and Portugal and 
third, through the temporary mechanism of the EFSF, which aided Ireland, 
Portugal and Greece II.498 Lastly, financial assistance is granted through the 
permanent ESM, such as in the case of Cyprus, Spain and Greece.499 It is 
therefore clear that numerous financial assistance programmes were established 
outside the EU legal order. 
Within the general context of the Eurozone financial and sovereign debt crisis 
along with the various financial assistance schemes, the relevant EU institutions 
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(and EU institutions’ configurations) that have adopted acts include the Economic 
and Financial Affairs Council of Ministers (Ecofin), the European Commission and 
the European Central Bank.500 Therefore, despite the fact that most of the 
adjustments programmes are concluded outside the EU institutional and legal 
context, the conditions attached to the financial assistance are agreed in an MoU, 
which is predominantly negotiated and monitored by the European Commission, 
acting together with the ECB and the IMF. Particularly, under the ESM Treaty the 
Commission – in liaison with the ECB and where possible, together with the IMF 
– is granted the mandate of “negotiating with the ESM Member concerned, an 
MoU detailing the conditionality attached to the financial assistance facility”.501 
The European Commission also signs the MoU on behalf of the ESM, following 
the approval of the Board of Governors. It is important to add that the so-called 
Troika of international lenders, is recognised as an ad hoc informal hybrid of the 
IMF, the Commission and the ECB, whose members are high-level staff 
appointed by each institution respectively, but acts as a consortium without 
having a distinct legal personality.502 Therefore, it is not possible to rule on the 
validity of the ‘acts’ of the Troika as such, but only of its constituent institutions.503 
In other words, the Union institutions commit to the ESM by entering into legal 
acts, which differ in form from actions under EU law. Further to the EU institutions’ 
acts, those of the Member States can also be challenged, regarding the 
implementation of the provisions of the MoU, into the national legislation.504 
The purpose of the MoUs negotiated, was to impose certain macroeconomic 
principles on the grant of the financial assistance, yet their precise contractual 
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classification in international law has been controversial.505 One of the questions 
to be answered is whether the MoUs can themselves infringe fundamental rights, 
that is to say, whether the alleged violations are the result of the cooperation by 
the Commission and the ECB in a legally relevant manner, as legal acts under 
Article 216 TFEU. In turn, another question for consideration involves the extent 
to which the MoUs can be classified as acts of EU institutions, under Article 
267(1) TFEU. The ECJ has previously classified effects of legal acts as 
infringements of fundamental rights, even when those effects were de facto and 
indirect, provided their objective was to encroach or cause third parties to do 
so.506 Consequently, even if the MoU could be perceived as a non-binding 
instrument, it is functionally linked to other instruments, so the terms enshrined in 
it clearly play a legal role, as the concerned Member States are obliged to respect 
them.507 The contradicting argument that the ESM ‘conditionality’ is identical to 
the non-binding ‘recommendations’ for the general coordination of the economic 
and employment policies, under Articles 121(1) and 148(4) TFEU and thus 
cannot give rise to reciprocal claims for infringements, is inaccurate, since the 
Court has clearly distinguished the ‘conditionality’ from the “instruments for the 
coordination of the economic policies of the Member States”.508 The view that EU 
institutions are entering into legal commitments, in a different form than those 
under EU law, was further shared by the Court in Pringle, stating that “the 
activities pursued by [the ECB and the Commission], within the ESM 
Treaty…commit the ESM”.509 Thus, within the context of the ESM, when the 
Member States implement the MoUs, as sui generis legal acts may lead to 
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breaches of fundamental rights, constituting indirect and de facto effects of legal 
acts, which the ECJ considers to be encroachments on fundamental rights.510 
The austerity measures imposed as conditions for the release of the financial aid 
packages have affected social rights and citizens’ entitlements, seemingly 
resulting in devastating effects on the exercise of fundamental rights in the EU 
legal order, including the socio-economic rights.511 Numerous applicants have 
therefore relied on fundamental rights to bring claims challenging the austerity 
measures both against their Member States and against EU institutions, for 
participating in post-crisis developments, such as the ESM and the financial 
assistance deriving therefrom.512 The claims were brought before the 
supranational and International Courts, as well as before the courts of the 
Member States, relying on national constitutional provisions. However, the 
differentiation and complexity of the financial assistance mechanisms used have 
rendered the procedure of bringing a judicial claim an arduous process. As 
Kilpatrick puts it “the less clearly a bail-out is based on standard EU sources, the 
less straightforward questions about its EU reviewability become” in all the levels 
of legal jurisdiction.513 In particular, the diversified legal orders on which the 
financial assistance mechanisms have been established, their structure and 
usage, together with the unstable scope of application of fundamental rights 
discussed above, have caused serious structural problems for the applicants. 
4.3 The Modern Protection of Rights under the EU legal order 
The thesis argues that the current fundamental protection system is largely 
ineffective in protecting EU citizens’ rights and that a broadened scope of 
application of fundamental rights would fill some of these legal gaps, that derive 
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therefrom.514 The financial crisis, constitutes a useful example to practically 
assess the modern ‘triangular’ protection of rights, while stimulating the interest 
in new legal paths to reinforce it. Generally, the Court has repeatedly referred to 
the Charter in its rulings, only to conclude that in most cases it cannot be invoked 
due to a lack of connection with EU law. Therefore, leaving aside the level of 
protection which could actually have been offered by the Charter and whether the 
measures would be rendered justified and/or proportionate, the Court’s persistent 
preference for interpreting Art. 51(1) in the narrowest way possible, when in fact 
a connection with EU law could be identified, has led EU citizens to a deadlock, 
primarily concerning the claims against the Member States.515 This approach 
largely deprived citizens from the ability to proceed in such litigation to the factual 
assessment of the measures in question and possible remedies, by taking 
advantage of the unstable status of the scope of application under the Charter 
and promoting their own specific understanding of it. As a result, the legal 
procedure is concluded following the jurisdictional examination, before 
proceeding to any factual assessment. On the contrary, fundamental rights as 
general principles of EU law have been rarely referred to in the case law and only 
very recently with a positive impact,516 while the concept of EU citizenship has 
not played a substantive role in the context of the financial crisis in general. The 
limited applicability of these legal instruments, has prompted the thesis’ interest 
in assessing new routes towards the protection of EU citizens’ rights, such as the 
‘fundamental status’ of EU citizenship, which although not previously used in 
similar situations, it arguably has the capacity to constitute the key in reinforcing 
the constitutional protection of citizens, due to its transformative nature. 
In order for the bailout cases to reach the CJEU and claim for human and 
fundamental rights infringements, there are two key avenues: the preliminary 
references from national courts on the interpretation or validity of EU sources and 
the direct annulment actions, but none of these avenues seems to have worked 
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yet.517 The ESM Treaty itself, does not make any reference to these key avenues 
and nor does it provide any alternative protection to the individuals, to reach the 
Court. It only makes one express reference to the CJEU, conferring it the 
jurisdiction to rule on disputes concerning the interpretation and application of the 
ESM Treaty that arise between the parties or between the parties and the ESM, 
including any dispute about the compatibility of the decisions adopted by the ESM 
with that Treaty.518 
Based on the Treaties, the CJEU is competent to rule on the validity of legal acts 
having binding effect, adopted both by EU institutions and the governments of 
EU Member States.519 There is however a distinction made, between ‘privileged’ 
and ‘non-privileged’ complaint applicants. Privileged applicants include the 
Member States and the EU institutions and it is widely accepted that the Treaty 
makes it easier for them to challenge the acts of the EU.520 In contrast, non-
privileged applicants, including individuals, can directly complain to the Court 
against acts of EU institutions, but only under certain conditions and thus, their 
possibilities of getting financial crisis-related claims, to the CJEU, are remarkably 
restricted and have so far proved unsuccessful.521 The Court has generally 
interpreted these conditions strictly, especially in the field of labour law,522 where 
it has previously refused to accept collective organisations as individually and 
directly concerned, within the meaning of the Treaty, when representing their 
members.523 Alternatively, to the direct challenges under Article 263 TFEU, 
natural and legal persons can bring a claim for human and fundamental rights 
infringements to the CJEU, through national courts and the preliminary reference 
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procedure, subject to Article 267 TFEU. Relatively, the Court in Pringle indicated 
that “any party has the right, in proceedings before the national courts, to plead, 
before the court hearing the case, the invalidity of an act of the Union and to ask 
that court, which has no jurisdiction itself to declare the act invalid, to put that 
question to the Court by means of a reference for preliminary ruling”.524  
Due to the complexity associated with the instruments used during the crisis, 
when analysing the claims for fundamental rights infringements, through the 
judicial avenues provided, a division should be made, between the obligations of 
the Member States who signed the ESM Treaty and implement the MoUs in 
national laws and the obligations of the EU institutions, who act as delegated 
institutions and monitor the process. The analysis of the case law, both against 
the actions of the Member States and those of EU institutions, show a relative 
reluctance on the part of EU Courts to establish a link with EU law, even a remote 
one, where arguably a clear connection exists that could have surpassed the 
limitations placed by, inter alia, the EU Charter. 
4.3.1 Protection from Actions of the Member States 
The assessment of the protection granted by the Charter for claims of 
fundamental rights infringements deriving from austerity measures, will start from 
the obligation of the Member States to safeguard fundamental rights when 
implementing the MoUs into the national laws. The financial assistance provided, 
shall be dependent upon compliance by the Beneficiary Member State, with the 
measures set out in the MoU.525 For this reason, full and timely implementation 
of the conditionality agreed in the adjustment program into national laws by the 
beneficiary Member State is critical, to restore financial stability and return to 
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sustainable growth. An appropriate level of discretion in implementing it, is often 
available, which can create obstacles in identifying a connection with EU law.526 
The case of Pringle involved a preliminary reference from the Irish Supreme Court 
on one of the most remarkable crisis-related reforms, namely the establishment 
of the ESM. Amongst the arguments put forward by the applicant, was that the 
right to effective judicial protection under Article 47 of the Charter, precluded the 
conclusion of such an international agreement.527 The question was thus whether 
the ESM fell outside the scope of application of the EU Charter, since the rescue 
fund was established by an international agreement between the Eurozone 
Member States and clearly fell outside the EU legal order.528 Responding, the 
CJEU ruled that based on Article 51(1) of the Charter, “its provisions are 
addressed to the Member States only when they are implementing Union law” 
and are not intended to “extend the field of application of Union law beyond the 
powers of the Union”.529 Therefore, the general principle of effective judicial 
protection, as well as the rest of the Charter provisions, do not apply to the 
stability mechanism. In other words, the Court ruled that the provisions of the 
Charter are not applicable with regard to the implementation of the MoU, for 
providing stability support by the ESM, since the Member States are not 
implementing Union law within the meaning of Article 51(1) of the Charter.530 
The decision of the CJEU regarding the non-applicability of the Charter has raised 
intense debate and has been characterised as surprising.531 The reason is 
primarily because the ESM Treaty under Recital 4 of the Preamble, indicates that 
the EU framework should be observed by the ESM members, especially “the 
economic governance rules of the European Union” set out in the TFEU, despite 
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the fact that the ESM Treaty is concluded outside the Union legal order. 
Therefore, considering the binding legal status of the EU Charter and the fact that 
it shares the same legal value with the rest of the Treaties within the EU 
framework, Member States must normally observe and comply with its provisions 
as well. The ruling in Pringle can thus be characterised as somewhat inconsistent 
with the text of the ESM Treaty.532 
Moreover, the decision of the CJEU regarding the Charter was surprising, since 
it is also inconsistent with the Court’s own approach in previous rulings, where 
the Court ruled that even when EU Member States act outside of the Union, they 
still have an obligation to respect the rights recognised in the EU Charter. In 
particular, the Member States are under the general duty of loyal co-operation 
enshrined in Article 4(3) TEU, to observe Union law when they enter into mixed 
agreements and/or when they sign bilateral agreements where the Union is not 
a party. Correspondingly, in Commission v Greece, the Court repeatedly held and 
affirmed that “these duties of action and abstention bind Member States when 
they negotiate, conclude, ratify or implement international agreements either 
without co-operating with the Commission or the Union being a party to the 
agreement”.533 In addition, the Court in Åkerberg Fransson equated 
‘implementation’ with ‘scope of application’, meaning that even a remote 
connection with EU law could trigger the applicability of fundamental rights 
guaranteed by the Charter, which was clearly not the case in the following rulings 
discussed.534 Therefore, the Court’s approach in Pringle, seems to run counter to 
previous rulings and principles, which arguably left more room for a connecting 
link with EU law. Thus, when assessing the applicability of the EU Charter in 
challenging austerity measures, as implemented by the national governments, it 
is an important consideration that some bail-out mechanisms will not 
automatically fall within EU law, especially when the Court is following a narrow 
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approach. However, the Court made no reference to the possible application of 
the Charter against EU institutions, in the context of the ESM Treaty. The case of 
Pringle constitutes only the beginning of a series of, arguably, inconsistent cases, 
which as seen below, have created a gap in the effective judicial protection 
principle, both because of the limitations of the EU Charter itself and the 
unwillingness of the Courts to bring the cases into their jurisdiction.  
The case of Sindicatos dos Bancarios,535 involved a preliminary ruling by the 
Labour Court of Porto (Tribunal do Trabalho do Porto). In Portugal the cuts to 
public sector wages, including the loss of the thirteenth and fourteenth month 
salary, led the trade unions to argue that the radical reforms to national labour 
law contravened the Charter.536 In this case, the reference raised the compatibility 
questions of the legal reforms with the Charter, including whether ‘the salary cut 
made by the State, by means of the Lei do Orçamento de Estado 2011, applicable 
only to persons employed in the public sector or by a public undertaking’,537 is 
contrary to the principle of prohibition of discrimination, in that it discriminates on 
the basis of the public nature of the employment relationship.538 The Court 
indicated that the request concerned the conformity of the implementing national 
law from the Troika MoU with the EU Charter. However, it rejected the request 
for a preliminary ruling, on the basis that the provisions of the Portuguese Act 
under consideration were not implementing Union law in the sense of Article 51(1) 
and on the basis of Article 6 TEU, which limits the applicability of the Charter 
provisions to the competences of the Union without extending them.539 
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Further judicial reluctance was underlined in the interesting ruling of the Court in 
Sindicato Nacional.540 This case concerned a Portuguese Court’s preliminary 
reference on the compatibility of the removal of collectively agreed holiday and 
Christmas allowances from the Portuguese State Budget Act of 2012, with the 
Charter’s principle of equal treatment. On the one hand, the Portuguese 
Government seemed to ‘have gone further than its commitments in the MoU’ 
when implementing it into national law, meaning that the Charter will not apply in 
regards to a discretionary autonomous governmental action.541 Yet, on the other 
hand, as Kilpatrick supports, a full reconstruction of the Portuguese bailout 
sources, actually shows an explicit and tight link between the challenged measure 
and EU law.542 Particularly, the national legislation makes express reference to 
the Council Decision on granting financial assistance to Portugal and the MoU 
clearly stipulates that the loan is conditional on national reforms of this kind.543 
However, despite the tight link with EU law evident within the national legislation, 
the Court ruled that it has ‘no jurisdiction to hear and determine the present 
request from preliminary ruling’, since no link with EU law was found and the 
national law was not ‘implementing Union law’ within the restricting meaning of 
Article 51 of the Charter.544  
Following the same legal approach, the Court has also declined preliminary 
rulings from Romania regarding reforms to Romanian labour law. It is worth 
noting that Romania received financial assistance on the basis of the EU Treaty 
(Articles 143(1) and 143(2)) and a Council Decision clarifying the series of 
conditionality to be implemented, included also in the MoU.545 Particularly, in 
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Corpul National al Politistilor,546 the Court declined a preliminary reference 
challenging the compatibility of national law with the Charter, since a link for the 
enforcement of EU law was not found, because the order of reference did not 
“contain any concrete evidence to show that the laws in examination aim at 
implementing the law of the Union”.547 The reductions in the public-sector 
salaries, enshrined in Laws 118/2010 and 285/10,548 were part of a package of 
measures designed to rebalance the books of the Romanian government and a 
condition precedent for further instalments of money being granted by the EU and 
the IMF.549 It therefore seems that the link with EU law in this case, clearly existed. 
However, the Court preferred the escape route, provided by the restricting 
provisions of the Charter, from having to decide difficult cases involving financial 
issues. 550  From different viewpoint, this escape route derived from the fact that 
the orders for reference, were inadequately drafted, failing to clearly indicate the 
link with EU law, making it easier for the ECJ to reject them. However, even with 
this consideration in mind, the EU courts must be proficient in distinguishing 
between those cases with inadequate framing of the orders for reference and the 
clear problems of comprehensibility and accessibility that derive from the complex 
nature of the bailouts and allegedly create difficulties for the principle of effective 
judicial protection for EU citizens.551   
Unlike in the Corpul case, in Florescu, the CJEU was straightforwardly asked 
about the validity and interpretation of specific provisions implemented in national 
law by the MoU agreed between the Commission and Romania in 2009.552 In this 
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case the Court indicated that the MoU in consideration, should have been 
regarded as an act of EU institution, within the meaning of Article 267 TFEU, 
since the act’s legal basis lied in the provisions of EU law and was concluded by 
the EU. Specifically, the Court stated that “the MoU gives concrete form to an 
agreement between the EU and a Member State on an economic programme, 
whereby that Member State undertakes to comply with predefined economic 
objectives in order to be able, to benefit from financial assistance from the EU”.553 
Consequently and above all, the Court indicated for the first time that since the 
MoU is an act of EU institutions, it must be regarded as implementing that law, 
within the meaning of Article 51(1) of the Charter, despite the amount of discretion 
they have, in deciding the implementing measures.  
The much-desired EU law connection was recognised by AG Saugmandsgaard 
in his opinion in Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses.554 The preliminary 
ruling was essentially asking the extent to which the austerity measures imposed, 
including the deduction of remunerations of members of the judiciary are 
incompatible with the principle of judicial independence as a requirement of 
effective judicial protection.555 AG Saugmandsgaard specifically distinguished the 
current case from Sindicato dos Bancários mentioned above, since the referring 
court here, had supplied more explicit information, as to the existence of an 
implementation of EU law within the meaning of Article 51.556 The Court on its 
side clearly sought to overcome the legal barriers imposed by Article 51(1) of the 
Charter. More specifically, by invoking the principle of effective judicial protection 
as a fundamental right, the Court disengaged the principle from the legal barrier 
of Article 51(1), making clear that the material scope of Article 19 TEU goes 
beyond the scope of Article 47 of the Charter. Although this is a positive 
development for the protection of fundamental rights, it is another demonstration 
of the weaknesses of the EU Charter, forcing the Courts to shift to the pre-
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constitutionalisation years, when the protection of rights was solely depended on 
general principles.  
It is evident that in the cases concerning the conformity of the national 
implementing laws deriving from the MoU, with the Charter, the restriction under 
Article 51 and its inconsistent interpretation, have created serious difficulties, 
leaving many to wonder how fundamental rights are among the foundational 
values of a constitutionalised Union, if the use of its main protection instrument 
can be limited more easily than it can be invoked. It might indeed be problematic 
that in various cases the MoU allows the Member States a margin of discretion 
in their implementation to national law. However, it seems that in essence the 
limiting provisions of the Charter allow the Court to apply it more strictly, when in 
fact a connection with EU law could be identified, leading EU citizens to an 
unbreakable deadlock regarding the claims against Member States. At the same 
time, this tremendous complexity of the legal instruments, also discourages the 
lower courts from engaging in a concrete analysis capable of delivering a solid 
question to the ECJ, while it is ultimately easier for them to place the case within 
the national legal framework and disregard any argument based on EU law.557 
Currently, there have been some positive signs suggesting that the CJEU might 
be inclined to reconsider these issues in the near future, including the constant 
rejections of preliminary references by order, such as the cases of Florescu and 
Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, which gave the Court a chance to 
reconsider its approach. However, despite these recent developments, if the 
Court persists in being unwilling to help the lower national Courts in these 
matters, this trend of disregarding arguments under EU law will continue. 
4.3.2 Protection from Actions of EU Institutions 
Surprisingly, similar approach to that against Member States’ actions, was also 
followed in claims against actions taken by EU institutions, although the 
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applicability of, at least, the Charter is incontestable.558 EU institutions have been 
widely used throughout the financial crisis, outside the natural habitat of the EU 
legal order, questioning the consistency of their use with EU law, both in the case 
of the Court itself and the other institutions.559 The text of the ESM Treaty 
repeatedly refers to the action to be taken by the European institutions. According 
to Article 13(3), the European Commission – in liaison with the ECB – in the legal 
form of the ESM, is granted the duty of negotiating the MoUs with the Member 
States and of overseeing the austerity plan, laying down the conditions that 
millions of Europeans depend on. Finally, they will coordinate the implementation 
of the rescue operation and members participate as observers in the meetings of 
the Board of Governors. The ESMT also confers some powers to the ECJ when 
a dispute between an ESM Member State and the ESM arises.560 Things are less 
complicated with respect to the Court because according to Article 273 TFEU, 
the Court has jurisdiction in “any dispute between Member States which relates 
to the subject matter of the Treaties” provided that it is submitted “under a special 
agreement between the parties”. Moreover, the ESMT expressly mentions Article 
273 TFEU at Recital 16, as the provision to confer jurisdiction to the Court in such 
cases, where the ESMT is declared to be a “special agreement”. 
The use of EU institutions in the ESMT, is seen as a positive aspect of the Treaty, 
provided that in this way, the objectives of the ESM are closely associated to the 
fundamental values of the EU that the mechanism should be based on, such as 
solidarity, cohesion and fundamental rights. According to Lo Schiavo, the use of 
EU institutions shall be appraised as “an institutional guarantee that the Member 
States have assured in order not to distance themselves too much from the 
established Union legal order”.561 However, the Courts do not seem to share the 
same opinion since they initially made no reference to the obligations of EU 
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institutions under the Charter when acting as delegated institutions. Specifically, 
the Court in Pringle made reference to the non-applicability of the Charter with 
respect to the Member States, but nothing was stated about the possible 
application of the Charter to EU institutions, within the context of the ESM.562  
On the other hand, AG Kokott in her opinion in Pringle, emphasised that ‘the 
Commission remains, even when it acts within the framework of the ESM, an 
institution of the Union and as such is bound by the full extent of EU law, including 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights’.563 Moreover, the Committee on 
Constitutional Affairs of the European Parliament rightly pointed out that “EU 
institutions are fully bound by Union law and that within the Troika they are 
obliged to act in accordance with fundamental rights, which, under Article 51 of 
the Charter, apply at all times”.564  Article 51 of the Charter, indeed applies to the 
EU institutions at all times and all measures taken by them should comply with 
the provisions of the Charter. Moreover, the Court has consistently held, that the 
ESM must operate in a way that will comply with EU law, including the EU 
Charter. 
In the same light, the applicants in the recent case of Ledra Advertising Ltd 
attempted to rely on Articles 340 and 263 TFEU asking firstly for annulment of 
the paragraphs of the 2013 MoU,565 stipulating the Cyprus haircut of deposits 
(paras 1.23-1.27) and secondly for damages for the deposits lost as a result, 
primarily arguing that the Commission and the ECB were the true authors of these 
actions.566 The ECJ interestingly stated in relation to the obligations of the 
institutions acting outside the scope of EU law, that “the Commission, retains 
within the framework of the ESM Treaty, its role of guardian of the Treaties as 
resulting from Article 17(1) TEU, so that it should refrain from signing a MoU 
whose consistency with EU law it doubts”.567 The Court further continued by 
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stating that “the Charter is addressed to the EU institutions, including when they 
act outside the EU legal framework” and “in the context of the adoption of a MoU 
the Commission is bound...to ensure that such a MoU is consistent with the 
fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter”.568 Although there was hardly any 
doubt on the obligations of EU institutions even when acting beyond the EU legal 
framework, Ledra was the first ruling of the Court that expressly pronounced this 
obligation, responding to one of the questions left unresolved since Pringle. The 
ECJ then proceeded to the examination of the three preconditions for establishing 
a non-contractual liability for the Commission.569 Although the case was 
dismissed on the facts it constituted a significant step towards a more effective 
interpretation of Article 51(1) of the Charter within the context of the crisis. 
At the same time, in Konstantinos Mallis and Others the parties appealed 
challenging the General Court’s decision to dismiss their actions for annulment 
of the Eurogroup statement of 25 March 2013,570 concerning the restructuring of 
the banking sector in Cyprus.571 The ECJ stated that the fact that “the 
Commission and the ECB participate in the meetings of the Eurogroup does not 
alter the nature of the latter’s statements and cannot result in the statement at 
issue being considered to be the expression of a decision-making power of those 
two EU institutions”.572 The Court further pointed out that the Eurogroup “cannot 
be equated with a configuration of the Council or be classified as a body, office 
or agency of the European Union within the meaning of Article 263 TFEU” and 
thus appeals were dismissed.573 The conclusion of the ECJ in Mallis left no room 
for subjecting actions of the Eurogroup to judicial review before the CJEU, despite 
the clear declaration by the General Court and AG Wathelet that the Eurogroup 
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statement on the Cyprus bail-in,574 could be perceived as categorical and 
inconsistent with its definition and tasks as an informal body.575 
From an EU law standpoint, based on the Treaties, EU institutions should be 
bound by the Charter, which is applicable even where there has been a 
delegation of functions, since EU institutions, through their integration into the 
ESM, are not intended to carry out its tasks but to ensure the observance of EU 
law.576 The limiting provision under Article 51(1), should normally create no 
obstacles for the applicability of the Charter for actions taken by EU institutions. 
Despite the limitation under Article 51(1), which constituted the main obstacle 
under the Charter, some commentators also argued that based on Article 52(5), 
the Charter’s social rights are not fully-fledged rights, but only programmatic 
principles that do not give rise to directly enforceable rights.577 This tendency to 
include all social rights into the ‘principles’ category, appears superficial and 
fallacious and arguably has adverse effects on the effective judicial protection for 
EU citizens. Therefore, even if the obstacle of Article 51(1) was overcome, both 
for actions of the Member States and EU institutions, the rest of the limiting 
provisions of the Charter could still create difficulties.  
It has been confirmed inter alia, by the UN Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights,578 that social rights can give rise to different types of obligations, 
some of them being directly enforceable, while others adopt a more advisory 
character.579 Consequently, with regard to the Charter, “good arguments can be 
made for ranging fundamental social rights in the ‘rights’ category, rather than in 
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the ‘principles’ one” overcoming this troublesome distinguishment, which as 
explained in Chapter 2 
, is likely to diminish the dynamism of numerous Charter provisions.580  Yet, no 
reference to Article 52 of the Charter was made by the EU courts, throughout the 
financial crisis case law, since Article 51(1) of the Charter, impeded the finding of 
even a remote connection with EU law, so as to proceed with a further analysis 
of alleged violations.  
4.3.3 The role of EU citizenship 
Contrary to the minimal application of the Charter and the general principles, EU 
citizenship has not played any substantive role in the austerity measures case 
law. This is primarily due to the limited list of rights attached to EU citizenship, 
lacking any socio-economic rights, rendering it irrelevant in such cases, which 
are grounded in alleged fundamental rights infringements, thus demoting 
citizenship from being ‘the fundamental status of Union citizens’, as judicially 
intended.581 There is also the requirement of a cross-border element, which works 
as the triggering link with EU law in a similar way to Article 51 of the Charter. 
However, the strict requirement for a cross-border link, has been largely 
overcome and Union citizenship advances great future prospects, in bridging the 
gap created in effective judicial protection, by broadening its scope of application 
through the recent development of the Court, the so-called ‘substance of the 
rights doctrine’, without violating the division of competences neither triggering 
any hostile climate from the Member States.582  
Although the concept of EU citizenship did not have any substantial impact on 
the financial crisis rulings, the opposite has occurred. The pressure deployed by 
the crisis, has led EU actors to reshape the way in which some of the most 
relevant features of EU law are interpreted and applied, such as that of EU 
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citizenship.583 Particularly, the contents of EU citizenship, especially the right to 
free movement, have been considered by some EU countries to pose a burden 
to the national interest in protection the state budget.584 On the other hand, some 
EU countries have modelled EU citizenship as a tool that could help them face 
the financial difficulties and constraints brought on by the financial assistance 
packages. A clear example of this national reaction, is represented by the investor 
and citizenship schemes that have been recently adopted by Cyprus and/or 
Malta, where EU citizenship is reshaped as a “commodity” that can be sold - 
subject to certain conditions - by member states.585 The current legal framework 
of such a development of EU citizenship seems legally permitted at the 
international and EU level,586 despite the various arguments against it, 
undermining solidarity between Member States and being undemocratic.587  
The concept of citizenship was arguably introduced in the EU legal order as a 
constitutional tool, to bring the citizens closer to the Union and to each other and 
promote further integration and to achieve a more political Union. The fact that 
EU citizenship could not be used to protect citizens’ rights during the crisis but it 
has become a source of governmental profits seems to contradict with the initial 
objective of the concept and the rationale behind a supranational citizenship of a 
constitutionalised entity, especially when the recourse to protection of citizens’ 
rights through other means resulted in a deadlock.  
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4.3.4 Protection under EU legal order; The gap in effective judicial 
protection 
The EU Charter has undoubtedly contributed to the development and evolution 
of fundamental rights, within the EU legal order and although it also incorporates 
socio-economic rights, it is evident from the case law above that it has not 
adequately protected EU citizens, from infringements during the financial crisis. 
Neither the requests for preliminary references from national courts, seem to 
have been successful due to the ‘lack’ of connection with EU law, nor the direct 
annulments actions due to the relatively difficult standing to establish. This 
deficiency has arguably led to numerous gaps in the effective judicial protection 
of EU citizens for three main reasons.  
The most important one is the limited access to justice in invoking fundamental 
rights infringements, especially for measures adopted under the ESM. As Tomkin 
rightly argues, the fact that the creation of such a permanent stability mechanism 
that has a direct impact on the lives of EU citizens, lies beyond the reach of the 
EU legal order and is subject neither to general principles, nor to the rights 
enshrined in the Charter, can be considered as undermining the principle of 
effective judicial protection and democratic accountability.588 One of the primary 
reasons for this relatively low access to justice, is the limiting provision of the 
Charter under Art. 51(1), which allowed the Courts to generally treat the actions 
taken by the Member States to implement the MoUs, as wholly internal situations. 
EU citizens were thus prevented from invoking the provisions of the Charter since 
the measures adopted under the ESM Treaty and the rest of the EU funding 
programmes were not considered as ‘implementing Union law’ within the 
meaning of Article 51(1), even when, at least a remote structural connection 
existed. By acting in this way, the Court is contradicting its own constant priorities 
and case law, whereby it has tended to “reformulate questions to give greater 
benefit of the doubt as to their EU law relevance” and has only refused to examine 
questions that have absolutely no link with EU law, which is clearly not the case 
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in austerity measures requests.589 Consequently, the requests for preliminary 
references were mostly rejected based on the same argument, leading to the 
exclusion of the use of EU law in national Courts as well. Direct access to EU 
Courts also appeared to be precluded due to the lack of a reviewable act or of 
direct concern of acts of EU origin for individuals. 
Additionally, due to the said limiting provision, EU Courts have been reluctant to 
render the Charter applicable against EU institutions, when acting within the ESM 
context which is not the intended application of the provision from the perspective 
of EU law. Specifically, the non-applicability of the Charter on EU institutions 
within the context of the ESM is not clearly indicated within Article 51(1), while 
based on the Treaties, EU institutions should always be bound by the Charter. 
The general reluctance of the Court is arguably based on the nature of the claims 
under dispute, which include complex economic situations and its decisions can 
have substantial impact on the politics of a country including national democracy 
and rule of law.590 Judicial protection therefore appeared to be available for 
individuals only at the national level, excluding legal review of the supranational 
raison d’être.591 As assessed above the Court had consequently demonstrated a 
preference for ‘evading’ the performance of a legal assessment rather than 
embarking on judicial activism, in order to avoid the hostile reaction which would 
ensue, especially if a strict limitation was to be surpassed, seriously affecting the 
division of competences.  
In the case of Ledra Advertisting, the Court tried to provide a remedy, to solve 
this first gap of the effective judicial protection identified. Whilst the threshold for 
actually obtaining damages remains high and was not overcome in the said case, 
the fact that under different factual circumstances the Union could be held 
financially liable for individual rights’ violations by austerity measures, represents 
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a necessary and significant step forward at the EU level, especially in filling the 
gaps of effective judicial protection.592 Although the judgment of Ledra, reduced 
the fragmentation of effective judicial protection against austerity measures 
despite a legal framework which, made it difficult for EU Courts to establish their 
jurisdiction, the protection gap is not yet fully filled.593 It is greatly believed that 
this protection gap has potentials to be solved through the concept of EU 
citizenship and the recently developed ‘substance of the rights doctrine’, as seen 
below.   
Despite the intergovernmental formation and structure of the ESM, which 
prevents the finding of a direct connection with EU law, Keppenne has correctly 
characterised it as a ‘semi-intergovernmental’ treaty.594 While the ESM Treaty is 
distinguished from the EU decision-making process and the CJEU may only 
adjudicate on disputes between the ESM members and those of the members 
with the ESM, at the same time, it is intrinsically linked to EU law, due to the role 
of EU institutions and its application should be consistent with it. This is therefore, 
where the second reason for the gap of effective judicial protection materialises, 
namely the unwillingness of the Courts themselves. In particular, the MoUs 
adopted under the ESM Treaty, and especially those adopted under EU law as 
discussed above, have at least, a remote connection with EU law, which should 
normally suffice for providing more effective routes to justice. Bearing in mind, the 
previous rulings of the Courts, the obvious connection with EU law in specific 
cases and the clear obligation of EU institutions to abide EU law in all cases, it 
seems that the ECJ has used Article 51(1) quite strictly to avoid the need of ruling 
within the context of difficult financial and economic situations. This situation has 
thus left the citizens exposed to infringements of their rights, which within a 
constitutionalised Union should be impermissible and unacceptable.  
Lastly, from the perspective of effective judicial protection, it turns out to be 
problematic when national measures implementing content that was set at 
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supranational level, are adopted due to non-legal reasons, such as economic 
pressure on national legislators, rather than due to an EU legal obligation. More 
specifically, if the economic pressure “derives from the need of a national 
legislature to receive financial assistance from external sources, in order to avoid 
a sovereign default”, it then becomes a problem for the judicial bodies as well, 
since it is more likely for them to rely on political or economic grounds when 
issuing decisions that challenge these measures.595 Moreover, if national judicial 
bodies are not willing or able to constrain the executive in times of crisis, then 
one might wonder to what extent these measures are only temporary in nature or 
subject to mechanisms of political accountability.596 
Besides the challenges discussed above mainly focusing on violations of socio-
economic rights, the analysis in the current subsection has clearly revealed the 
legal gap in effective judicial protection as well, which constitutes the cornerstone 
for a proactive protection of fundamental rights in general.597 In this respect, 
greater emphasis will be given in the research to eliminate the gap in effective 
judicial protection, not only to make room for the proactive protection of rights but 
also because the principle of effective judicial protection undoubtedly constitutes 
a means for EU law, to safeguard its legitimacy and supranational authority.598 
The analysis above also demonstrated a disparity in the pursuit of Union 
objectives, namely that the EU seems more willing now to act to address the 
current rule of law crisis and protect the democratic judicial processes at the 
national and European level, than it did during the financial crisis.599 The EU 
however, has a general duty to protect its citizens against deprivations of their 
rights including complex economic situations, when at least a remote connection 
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with EU law exists or when the values of the Union are in any way comprised. 
The enjoyment of the essence of rights, constitutes such a value and can be 
effectively preserved through a dynamic use of the concept of EU citizenship. 
4.4 The ECHR as the alternative source of protection 
In addition to the protection provided by EU law-based instruments, citizens have 
the choice of referring to the ECtHR for violations of the Convention, which 
remains part of the general principles of EU law, when protection within the Union 
is not adequate. As with the EU Charter, it is debatable whether the MoUs 
encroach on the Convention’s human rights or merely have a negative impact on 
them.600 The ECtHR has a similarly broad concept of encroachment with the 
CJEU, holding that even mere announcements which have not at that stage had 
any legal consequences, might affect the legal positions in the ECHR in a legally 
relevant manner.601 The ECHR concept of encroachment, therefore covers all 
measures adversely affecting the scope of protection of a fundamental right.602  
The competence of the ECtHR is limited by the content of the rights protected by 
the Convention, which largely disregards social rights but does include property 
rights under Article 1 of Protocol No.1,603 which have  resulted in remarkable 
developments in social protection.604 However, it seems that the ECHR can 
hardly fill the legal gaps left within the EU legal order, especially regarding a 
situation such as the financial crisis, which is taking place on a supranational, 
rather than an international level. In particular, the analysis of the case law shows 
that the ECtHR seems to have followed a similar approach with the EU Courts 
for claims against the actions of the Member States, indicating that the measures 
adopted were of an emergency character in view of the urgent and difficult 
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economic situation of each country, yet with some inconsistencies between the 
different cases of each Member State. It has thus acted with caution and 
reluctance, when examining the measures adopted under the EU funding 
programmes for violations of rights. At the same time, the ECHR is not applicable 
for actions taken by EU institutions, leaving no choice for EU citizens when it 
comes to violations of their rights on the part of institutions. In addition, the ECtHR 
arguably faces further difficulties in delivering justice for fundamental rights 
infringements, such as the lack of direct enforceability and the severe work-load, 
which calls, once more, for the need of an internal reinforcement of the system 
within the EU legal order.605   
4.4.1 The ECHR against actions of the Member States 
As discussed, the Member States bear the main responsibility for violations of 
fundamental rights resulting from the various measures implemented in national 
law, in response to the crisis. The Member States therefore, have obligations 
under EU law and the EU Charter but also under the ECHR, to which all the EU 
Member State are signatory parties. A number of EU citizens relied upon the 
Convention before the ECtHR, to challenge the measures implemented by the 
Member States from the MoU in consideration, as a response to the financial 
crisis. Most of the applications were based on Article 1 of the first Protocol of the 
Convention, which guarantees the protection of property, yet with low success 
rate.   
The case of N.K.M. v Hungary concerned the imposition of a high rate of tax on 
severance payment, ten weeks before the applicant’s dismissal.606 For the 
applicant, this represented an overall tax burden of approximately 52% on the 
entirety of the severance, meaning about three times the general personal 
income tax rate.607 The applicant therefore complained under Article 1 of the first 
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Protocol of the ECHR, read alone and in conjunction with Article 13.608 The 
ECtHR found that there had been a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 since 
the applicant had been exposed to an excessive and individual burden by the 
Hungarian authorities.609 In particular, despite the wide discretion that the 
authorities enjoy in matters of taxation, the means employed had been 
disproportionate to the legitimate aim pursued of protecting the public purse, 
while the applicant was not provided of a transitional period in order to adjust to 
the new severance scheme.610 This decision, which is one of the very few cases 
in which violation under the ECHR was found, can be contrasted with more recent 
cases of the ECtHR, where the Court had expressed doubts in relation to the 
potential of using Article 1 of Protocol No.1 against austerity measures. 
The ECtHR had specifically raised such doubts in Koufaki and ADEDY which 
concerned a series of austerity measures adopted by Greece including the 
reduction of salaries and pensions of civil servants.611 The applicants argued that 
these measures, enforced with Laws 3833/2010, 3845/2010 and 3847/2010, 
constituted a deprivation of property and violated the relevant provision. The 
ECtHR declared the case inadmissible as being manifestly ill-founded, ruling that 
the right to property under the Convention, does not recognise a right to a specific 
amount of pension or remuneration. In applying the proportionality test, it 
considered that the measures adopted met a fair balance between the need to 
restrain the crisis and the protection of human rights.612 In particular, the reduction 
of the first applicant’s salary was not such that it risked exposing her to 
subsistence difficulties incompatible with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.613 
Shortly afterwards, in the cases of Da Conceição Mateus v. Portugal and Santos 
Januário v. Portugal, the pension cuts imposed by the Portuguese legislation 
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implementing the MoU were challenged.614 The ECtHR followed a similar 
approach to that of Koufaki and ADEDY, assessing whether a fair balance had 
been struck between the general interest of the community and the protection of 
the applicants’ fundamental rights. It subsequently found that “in the light of the 
exceptional economic and financial crisis faced by Portugal at the material time 
and given the limited extent and temporary effect of the reduction of their holiday 
and Christmas allowances” the applicants did not bear a disproportionate and 
excessive burden and a fair balance had been struck.615 The application was 
therefore rendered as manifestly unfounded and was inadmissible.  
The ECtHR, once more followed the same approach in September 2015, 
unanimously declaring the application of Da Silva Carvalho Rico v. Portugal as 
inadmissible.616 The application concerned the reductions of retirement pensions 
following the austerity measures applied in Portugal. Given the overall public 
interests at stake in Portugal and the limited and temporary nature of the 
measures applied to the applicant’s pension, the Court indicated that the 
reduction was a proportionate restriction of the applicant’s right to protection of 
property with the legitimate aim of achieving medium-term economic recovery.617 
The Court also interestingly made reference to the margin of appreciation allowed 
to the Member States, when it comes to general measures of economic and 
social policy. Particularly, it was stated that “since the legislature remained within 
the limits of its margin of appreciation, it is not for the Court to decide whether 
better alternative measures could have been envisaged in order to reduce the 
State budget deficit”.618 
It is worth noting that the ECtHR in both the Da Conceição Mateus and others 
and Da Silva Carvalho Rico v. Portugal judgments, based its rulings on the 
existence of proportionality and fair balance, partly because of the temporary 
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effects of the reductions challenged, which arguably outweigh their adverse 
effects. On the contrary, no such reference was made by the Court in the Greek 
case, in relation to the permanent effects of the measures in examination, which 
are likely to jeopardise the proportionality and fair balance, subsequently 
protected and which should have normally played a role in declaring the 
measures disproportionate. This lacuna might be partly owed to the fact that the 
application brought by ADEDY arguably suffered from abstract and weak 
argumentation, since it was brought on behalf of all its members, both with high 
and low income. The ECtHR therefore found, that the applicants had not invoked 
in a particular way how the situation has deteriorated to the extent that the wages 
and pensions existence is compromised.619  
According to the analysis of the case law conducted above, it seems that the 
ECtHR has been acting with caution when assessing the lawfulness of austerity 
measures within the context of the Convention, rendering the alternative route of 
the ECHR largely incapable of protecting the rights of EU citizens under the 
Convention. Yet, owing to the ECtHR’s established case law in this area and its 
previous hesitation, the way in which it assessed the Greek and Portuguese 
cases, was not surprising but rather somewhat expected. It does not however 
mean that there is no longer space for developing litigation strategies involving 
the ECtHR, towards higher protection of EU citizens in periods of crisis. 
4.4.2 The ECHR against actions of EU institutions 
Although the Member States bear the main responsibility for violations of 
fundamental rights when implementing the MoUs in national law, when these 
measures are imposed upon them as part of the conditionality attached, the 
creditors also bear some responsibility for these violations. Although Article 6 
TEU expressly requires the accession of the EU to the ECHR, the negotiations 
on the draft accession agreement collapsed, after the CJEU found it incompatible 
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with EU law in Opinion 2/13.620 It is therefore doubtful, whether the ECHR is 
applicable against actions taken by the EU institutions, since the Union is not 
formally a member of the ECHR. From the point of view of international law, since 
the EU is not formally bound by the ECHR, there is no legal obligation on the 
Union institutions to observe it. However, the CJEU asserted in Wachauf that 
even without international conventions binding the EU itself, “the measures which 
are incompatible with the fundamental rights recognised by the constitutions of 
those States may not find acceptance in the Community”.621 The Court further 
indicated that “International treaties concerning the protection of human rights on 
which the Member States have collaborated or…have acceded can also supply 
guidelines to which regard should be had in the context of Community 
law”.622  This view  is also reflected in Article 6 TEU and Article 52(3) of the EU 
Charter, as well as, in the fact that the main criteria of the protection of 
fundamental rights in EU law derive from the standards set by the Convention 
and the ECtHR,623 while the CJEU has repeatedly based its decisions on ECtHR 
judgments.624   
With the broadening of EU law and since the ECHR norms are extensively 
incorporated into EU law, an infringement of the ECHR could also mean an 
infringement of EU law.625 It is therefore reasonable to argue that the ECHR 
constitutes a further essential fundamental rights criterion, for actions of the EU 
institutions. Arguments have been put forward, indicating the possibility of 
extending the Member States’ liability for breaches of the Convention by EU 
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institutions.626 Particularly, to extend the liability for legal acts with joint 
accountability, to situations in which the breaches of the Convention partly occur 
by the EU institutions.627 For instance, the Board of Governors, under Article 
5(6)(f) of the ESMT, is granted decision-making powers for the economic policy 
conditions enshrined in Article 13(3) of the ESMT and thus the Member States 
could be held liable under the ECHR for its decisions.628 In other words, since 
unanimity is required in the ESM Board of Governors, representatives of the 
States can have direct influence by exercising veto, which should otherwise give 
rise to legal liability.629 Beyond this theory however, the powers of the ECtHR in 
protecting EU citizens, throughout the financial crisis, have proved limited. 
Specifically, as seen, in terms of the obligations of Member States under the 
Convention, the ECtHR has been acting with reluctance and inconsistency. On 
the other hand, the ECHR cannot be invoked against EU institutions who have 
been acting as delegated institutions of the Troika, rendering the recourse to the 
ECtHR for challenging austerity measure, almost futile.630 In order however for a 
claim to reach the ECtHR, the exhaustion of all domestic remedies is necessary. 
It would therefore be useful to conduct an assessment on the judicial approach 
adopted by national courts within the context of the financial crisis challenges and 
to observe the national application of EU law as well. 
4.5 Judicial Challenges before national Courts 
Besides the challenges before the Courts on EU and Pan-European levels, 
austerity measures were also legally challenged before the national courts of the 
Member States. The judges at national level, although not creating law, should 
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be active agents of change in situations where constitutional rights are put at risk 
by national legislation, whether or not this legislation is the result of an 
international obligation or constraint.631 Unlike the EU courts and the ECtHR, who 
have been more hesitant in examining austerity measures from the perspective 
of fundamental rights, the national constitutional courts of numerous Member 
States have been somewhat more active. Nevertheless, a tendency of national 
judges not to refer to EU law is identified, while their approach and reasoning 
seem inadequate to provide efficient protection to EU citizens for austerity 
measures challenges. Most of the measures challenged before national courts, 
were pronounced constitutional, giving priority to the Member States’ economies; 
others were ruled unconstitutional due to fundamental rights infringements, while 
a few were dismissed based on jurisdictional reasons.  
Austerity measures were infrequently ruled unconstitutional mainly in Portugal, 
where the citizens who have suffered severe deprivations by the conditionality 
imposed, especially in the public sector, have mainly channelled their legal 
reactions through the rise of possible constitutional violations. Particularly, the 
Portuguese Constitutional Court was asked to examine the legality of various 
austerity measures on an annual basis since 2012, when a range of changing 
measures, including those related to the cut of subsidies, the cancellation of 
clauses in collective agreements and reductions of rights and benefits of public 
employees and pensioners, have been found to be in contradiction with the 
Portuguese Constitution in Acórdão.632 Although this ruling ran counter to the 
tendency of other Member States, the majority of the Court decided that these 
measures were excessive, more stringent than the previous measures of the 
state budget Law for 2011. The Court indicated that the rules of the Budget Law 
for 2012, came at a time when citizens were heavily taxed and the new reductions 
were considered excessive, precisely because “as the sacrifice or hardship 
imposed to the citizens in order to achieve public interests grows, so must grow 
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equally the demands of equity and fairness in sharing those sacrifices”.633 The 
Court however, decided to delay the effects of its decision, so as for Portugal to 
continue to have access to external financial assistance.634 In particular, the legal 
rules were deemed unconstitutional but not with retroactive effect, avoiding the 
restitution by the state of some of the non-paid salaries.635 The same legal 
challenge arose, against the next annual budget, where the Court, relying on the 
same reasoning, again found that the measures were unconstitutional, yet 
without any practical impact on the protection of citizens’ rights.636 
Despite the very few national rulings, where austerity measures adopted by the 
government were rendered unconstitutional, the vast majority of national courts 
demonstrated a rather apparent attitude towards the structural reforms carried 
out, ruling that the public interest outweighs their adverse effects on citizens’ 
rights. In the first wave of Greek challenges prior to the second economic 
adjustment programme, where the Greek State attempted to restrain the public 
spending through reductions in pensions and related benefits, the national Courts 
rendered the restrictive measures as constitutional and confirmed their 
compatibility with the ECHR. Particularly, case 668/2012 concerned the 
compatibility of the abolition of various seasonal pension bonuses and reduction 
of pensions, with Article 1 of Protocol 1 of the ECHR and Article 17 of the Greek 
Constitution.637 The case was rejected by the Council of State, stating that 
reasons of overriding public interest necessitated the loan agreement, including 
the aim of tackling the state’s pressing economic needs and achieving financial 
stability in the long-term. It was further ruled, that full compliance with the 
principles of proportionality and necessity was achieved and that the legislation 
did not need to be adopted by the Parliament by a qualified majority, as the loan 
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agreement did not constitute an international agreement under Article 28 of the 
Greek Constitution.638 The domestic authorities were thus able to decide on the 
amount of the allocated welfare benefits in giving priority to economic or other 
conditions. More generally, the approach of the Council of State was in line with 
previous case law, according to which when the State faces a state of necessity, 
it can allow protection of public interest to prevail temporarily over constitutional 
rights.639 Furthermore, until now, it has based its reasoning on general 
constitutional principles such as the principle of equality of public burdens, the 
principle of proportionality and the overriding principle of public interest, which 
were broadened to include the concept of immediate cash needs.640 
It therefore emerges that the Greek courts did not safeguard a right to a pension 
of particular amount, either stemming from the ECHR or the Greek Constitution, 
but rather accepted that under these severe economic conditions, the legislative 
branch can adopt restrictive measures. Without rendering this approach 
incorrect, it can be argued with certainty that in doing so, even in such severe 
economic difficulties, adequate living conditions must be preserved by the laws 
and the judicial system, especially for vulnerable groups and to guarantee a fair 
distribution of the ensuing economic burden on all the citizens. Specifically, the 
requirements of at least, Articles 2 and 4(5) of the Greek Constitution should be 
ensured.641 
Moreover, in the case of Cyprus, the most important internal cause of the 
country’s banking crisis, was the insufficient awareness of the banks’ apparent 
business success, if the conditions changed for the worse, as they did.642 The 
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conditionality imposed, in return for the financial aid granted by the ESM, included 
cuts in civil service salaries, allowances, social benefits and pensions, as well as 
increases in VAT, tobacco, alcohol and fuel taxes and higher public health care 
charges.643 Besides the austerity measures, Cyprus also agreed to close the 
country’s second-largest bank, the Cyprus Popular Bank and impose a one-time 
bank deposit levy on all uninsured deposits of this bank and around 40% of 
uninsured deposits in the island’s largest commercial bank, the Bank of 
Cyprus.644 Consequently, numerous applicants tried to get damages for losses 
suffered due to the austerity measures applied, as well as due to the 2013 bail-in 
and the haircut of depositors’ rights.645 
In Giorgos Charalambous v. Republic of Cyprus,646 the applicants raised a 
recourse challenging the constitutionality of Law 112(I)/2011, based on which the 
cutting off their salaries of the special contribution occurred.647 Particularly, 
special contribution is deducted monthly from gross pay and pensions of officials 
and employees respectively in the public sector, except for the hourly workers for 
the Republic, to the amount specified by the Law. In a similar approach to the 
Greek rulings, the Cypriot Supreme Court rejected the recourse with a majority 
of 9 to 3 judges, stating that the applicants had failed to convince the Court that 
the disputed legal provisions were unconstitutional beyond any reasonable doubt. 
In particular, the Supreme Court indicated that the State has the discretion in 
“times of extreme economic crisis” to take measures targeting specific groups of 
the population “without necessarily violating the principle of equal treatment”.648 
Based on the ruling of the Court, the measure in examination could not be 
deemed as ‘extreme’ or ‘disproportionate’, given the severe economic situation 
of the country. This ruling is however controversial, since the dissenting judgment 
of the case by three judges, rendered the examined law unconstitutional, as 
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violating Articles 23, 24, 26 and 28 of the Constitution. It specifically focused on 
the fact that Article 23 of the Constitution does not include the public interest as 
a legal exception, while Article 1 of Protocol No.1, which is providing such an 
exception, was not invoked in anyway by the Government and thus the disputed 
legislation does not cover this issue. More importantly, the Supreme Court 
emphasised the lack of any reference to the principle of proportionality and 
compensation within the disputed Law, which should normally constitute an 
adequate ground for rendering a measure unconstitutional.649 Thus, the 
dissenting judgment rightly concluded that in a democratic society, the legislator 
and the executive body should take care to regulate budgetary in equal measure 
so that the impact of the burden of any financial crisis is shared equally among 
all citizens, while respecting the principle of proportionality and equality.650   
Contrary to its earlier case law, the Portuguese Constitutional Court also adopted 
this approach in Acórdão,651 where it was called upon to examine the 
constitutionality of the increase in working hours of the public servants (without a 
respective increase in salary) and the rules rendering such an increase 
mandatory, prevailing over collective agreements. The Court ruled that such an 
increase in working hours was a foreseeable event and a decision that a freely 
elected lawmaker could take. It is worth noting however, that this decision was 
taken on a small majority of seven against six, where the dissenting judgments 
spoke of possible excessive interference with collective agreements and 
collective bargaining, stating that changing the content, by law, of a collective 
agreement or extinguishing it by law, was a serious violation of the fundamental 
right of collective bargaining.652   
This decision seems relatively cautious, conceivably due to the strong criticism 
by the European Commission, accusing the Constitutional Court of “blocking key 
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political changes” through its rulings.653 It has been also argued that the 
Portuguese Court has generally used the equality principle as an excessively 
flexible tool, in order to achieve various predetermined objectives.654 In particular, 
the judges would have chosen their objectives and then find the legal reasoning 
suitable to achieve them a posteriori.655 Moreover, as Hinarejos puts it, the 
defence of the national constitutional settlement in these cases, unfortunately 
comes down to setting the minimum of social rights that needs to be protected 
when making hard economic policy choices in times of financial instability, leaving 
the citizens’ rights exposed to violations, especially after the criticism imposed by 
the European Commission.656 It is also worth noting that the Tribunal 
Constitucional raised no argument or reference related to EU law, possibly in 
order to avoid any direct conflict with the EU. It is therefore evident that the 
general approach followed by the Supreme Court in Cyprus is similar to that of 
the Portuguese and Greek courts, where limitations to human and fundamental 
rights become necessary, during times of extreme financial crises and for the 
sake of saving public spending. In contrast, these rulings were usually taken on 
small majorities, where dissenting judgments accepted the limitation of national 
sovereignty as an expected consequence of applying the principle of primacy of 
EU law. 
The last category of rulings before national courts, is that of dismissed cases, 
primarily owing to jurisdictional factors. Particularly, the legality of the measures 
adopted to impose the Cypriot ‘bail-in’, were challenged in Myrto Christodoulou 
where the majority, classified the matter as one belonging to the sphere of private 
law, and thus the proper course of action was to initiate actions for damage for 
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breach of contract and tort law.657 The issue was therefore rendered as not being 
one of administrative law, as it concerned the loss suffered during the ‘bail-in’ and 
whether this loss would have been greater, had the bank been put under 
liquidation, rather than under the resolution regime.658 The recourse filed under 
Article 146 of the Cypriot Constitution was thus dismissed and the majority 
decision did not examine the possibility of sending a preliminary reference or the 
EU perspective of the matter.659 
In this case, the provisions of the EU Charter were not examined, nor affected 
the conclusion of the Court. However, what is worth noting is the dissenting 
judgment of Judge Erotokritou, who followed a different approach and proceeded 
with a more thorough examination of the applicability of the Charter. The Judge 
related the disputed matter to human rights, by stating that it affects the right to 
property as protected under Article 17 of the Charter, under Protocol 1 of the 
ECHR and Article 23 of the Cypriot Constitution. He further concluded that a 
compatibility test can be undertaken, which includes a review of the balance 
between, the public interest and the restrictions on individual rights within the 
framework of the Constitution and of the EU Treaties, which can only be 
undertaken by the Supreme Court within its exclusive administrative revisional 
jurisdiction, and which must be maintained at all times, including during crisis 
time.660 This ‘compatibility test’, contrary to the regular scope of EU law test, 
should arguably encompass the principle of proportionality and reasonableness, 
directly applying EU law, including general principles and referring to the CJEU 
questions of interpretation.661 Judge Erotokritou, further warned against ‘political 
decisions’ being taken overnight, under extreme pressure (including at the EU 
level), allegedly in the interest of the State, escaping the test and undermining 
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the rule of law and the principle of legality, common to both the national and the 
EU legal orders.662 
It is lastly important that in neither of the cases brought before the courts in 
Portugal, Greece and Cyprus, there has been a full assessment of the 
compatibility of the measures with EU law and specifically with the EU Charter. 
This tendency, appears as a joint consequence of the limiting provisions of the 
EU Charter, which are largely restricting the scope of fundamental rights and of 
their strict judicial application. The outcome of these national rulings could differ 
to a great extent, if EU law could have been applicable, with the remote 
connection to EU law available, and thus prevent EU courts from repeatedly 
rejecting the request for preliminary rulings, as seen above.  
4.6 Reflections on the financial crisis case study 
The developments in the field of fundamental rights in the Union, including the 
institutionalised development of the Charter and various Directives, as well as the 
constructive development of EU citizenship have transformed the EU’s landscape 
forever and the EU will (hopefully) never go back to the pre-Charter, pre-human 
rights days when the EU was a glorified trading area.663 However, as seen, during 
the financial crisis and the period after, the Union has been marked by failed 
attempts in acting as a constitutionalised entity and protecting fundamental rights, 
by giving priority to the economic and financial needs of the Member States. The 
current fundamental rights protection system has been unable to address 
violations stemming from the financial crisis, driving EU citizens to deadlocked 
situations, while generating a gap in effective judicial protection.664 This inability 
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has been arguably caused by a number of inter-connected factors, including the 
restricting provisions of the Treaties and the unwillingness of the CJEU to 
interfere with executive or policy decisions taken by institutions, for complex 
economic questions, with the danger of the Union stepping beyond its vested 
powers,665 thus largely limiting its rulings to procedural irregularities or manifest 
errors, to safeguard the public interest, instead. 
The recent financial crisis and the on-going legal actions, have therefore, not only 
highlighted the need for improved economic and fiscal policies in the context of 
the EMU, but also the need to ensure more respect for fundamental rights and 
non-market values in a constitutionalised Union, to avoid similar scenarios from 
occurring in the future.666 This reinforcement can be achieved, primarily by 
eliminating the negative effects of Article 51(1) of the Charter and by taking 
advantage of the concept of EU citizenship. No mention of EU citizenship was 
made by the Courts in the claims challenging austerity measures, nor any attempt 
to form a structural connection of the concept with fundamental rights in danger.  
According to this thesis what is necessary to be done, in order to provide both an 
effective and efficient protection of fundamental rights, is to allow straightforward 
application of EU law in wholly internal situations, when a minimum connection 
to EU law exists or when the respect/effectiveness of Union’s values is 
jeopardised. This objective can arguably be achieved by establishing a structural 
connection between EU fundamental rights and EU citizenship rights, through the 
recently developed doctrine of the ‘substance of the rights doctrine’, which 
expands the scope of application of EU law further. 
If this connection had been established, the rulings of the Courts against austerity 
measures could differ. By establishing this structural connection between EU 
fundamental and EU citizenship rights, EU citizens would be able to invoke their 
EU fundamental rights when there is a full deprivation of their substance, even 
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outside the scope of EU law in the strict sense, namely under the ESM. In other 
words, the limitation of Article 51(1), which has constituted the primary obstacle 
to the application of the provisions of the Charter, would have been broadened to 
allow a more remoted connection with EU law, that of depriving the citizens of the 
very substance of EU fundamental rights provisions. 
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5 CHAPTER 5 - THE COURT’S ‘SUBSTANCE OF THE RIGHTS DOCTRINE’ AND 
ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH EU CITIZENSHIP 
5.1 Introduction 
The pluralistic fundamental rights protection system analysed and discussed, has 
proved to be largely ineffective in protecting EU citizens’ rights before the courts, 
especially during periods of crisis such as the financial crisis, where priority is 
given to the economic and financial needs of the Member States. This lack of 
protection is primarily associated with a series of inter-connected grounds, 
including the restricting provisions imposed by the Treaties and the Charter itself, 
as well as the unwillingness of the Court to engage in complex economic 
situations, with the danger of stepping beyond the Union’s vested powers. The 
Court has been consequently promoting a differentiated understanding of the 
Charter’s field of application, during the financial crisis, since the restricting 
provisions, allow it a considerable discretion to limit the personal and material 
scope of application of the Charter, in a range of strict ‘implementation’ as a 
requirement, up to a looser requirement of Åkerberg Fransson. 
Therefore, while the temporal and territorial scopes of EU are normally clear and 
explicitly defined in the Treaty,667 with the former’s general rule being that the 
Treaties apply to the Member States from the day of accession668 and the latter 
applying to the Member States and some, but not all, of the overseas 
territories,669 the remaining two aspects of scope seem to be relatively unclear 
and unpredictable,670 especially in relation to the Charter. Particularly, the 
personal scope of EU law, which identifies the persons that can invoke EU law 
and the material scope, which respectively defines the situations where EU law 
applies, created difficulties during the financial crisis cases, not only due to the 
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legal complexity of the mechanisms involved but also due to the unclear statuses 
of the personal and material scope, allowing the Court substantial discretion. As 
a result, this paradoxical structure, significantly rendered the disputed measures 
as falling outside the scope of EU law, preventing the application of EU 
fundamental rights under the Charter.671  
It is therefore argued that a broader scope of application of fundamental rights is 
needed, without however infringing the division of competences, through an 
instrument which is by its nature a ‘living instrument’ with transformative abilities 
and is not adversely delimiting the scope of EU law. EU citizenship, although 
containing a more limited list of fundamental rights than the Charter, arguably 
meets these criteria, owing to its constructivist nature and through the substance 
of the rights doctrine can achieve this aim. It has, to a great extent, managed to 
alleviate the arguably incompetent structure of the scope of application of EU law, 
by creating an independent, EU citizenship-based right,672 in a recent series of 
cases, which generates potential for an enhanced protection of rights. The 
established substance of the rights doctrine, shed some light on the long-debated 
issue of the legal and political nature of EU citizenship regarding its relations with 
national citizenship, but also with EU fundamental rights.  
Within this context, the chapter begins with an analysis of the nature of EU 
citizenship and the extent to which it can carry an autonomous or independent 
element to assist its evolvement and gradual development, towards a 
constitutional construction (5.2).  Subsequently, an in-depth assessment of the 
Court’s case law leading to the establishment of the recent development of the 
substance of the rights doctrine follows, which analyses its establishment, the 
Court’s current approach towards it and its main characteristics that render it an 
innovative development (5.3). More importantly, critical reflections on the 
doctrine’s implications on the EU and national level are given, emphasising its 
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importance, as well as reflections on its future potential use, as the key in 
enhancing the current fundamental rights protection system (5.4). 
5.2 EU citizenship as an autonomous concept  
When Union citizenship was formally established in primary law with the 
Maastricht Treaty, it attracted substantial attention from the judiciary, as well as, 
from academia, especially in relation to its potential development and in turn the 
extent to which EU citizenship, legally, carries an autonomous or independent 
element assisting its development. At first glance, EU citizenship matters seem 
to constitute an area where Member States have the primary competence to 
determine their own laws concerning access to and deprivation of national 
citizenship, while the so-called cross-border element constitutes the prerequisite 
for the application of EU law provisions.673 Yet, this competence is exercised 
subject to the principle that where there is an impact on EU law rights – since 
every national is a Union citizen – Member States must respect EU law and its 
rules and principles.674 It is thus clear that EU citizenship has played a vital role 
in delimiting the borderline between national and EU law and apparently 
continues to so, through the case law of the Court, sometimes granting more 
space to national and others to EU law. EU citizenship’s further political and legal 
potential, primarily depends on the extent to which the concept still persists when 
legal withdrawal of a Member State’s nationality occurs. The question thus 
touches upon the contrast between the dependency of EU citizenship on Member 
State nationality and its autonomous character stemming from the autonomy of 
the European legal order.675  
Article 20(1) TFEU and Article 9 TEU, both make clear that Union citizenship is 
an additional to the national one and does not replace it. It therefore works as an 
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accessory to national citizenship and its existence always depends on the 
national one, meaning that it is dependent on another legal system. On the other 
hand, according to established case law, EU law forms an autonomous legal 
order,676 suggesting that it can have a self-legislating character. Being an 
autonomous legal order means that even if Union citizenship is still interlinked 
with other legal systems, it can develop its own life, its own identity and thereby 
its own, independent normativity.677 EU citizenship can hardly be recognised as 
an independent concept, but the same does not apply in relation to the autonomy 
of the concept, since according to Article 20 TFEU, part of its legal order is also 
autonomous, without having a clear indication of the effects of this autonomy, 
especially in the light of the dependency of the concept.  
The fact that the Member States remain competent alone, to define the scope of 
their citizenship laws, was inter alia emphasised by the Court in Micheletti, even 
before the establishment of Union citizenship,678 which post-Maastricht meant the 
dependency of Union citizenship to the national one. However, this case further 
indicated that "it is for each Member State, having due regard to Community law, 
to lay down the conditions for the acquisition and loss of nationality”. Therefore, 
while Member States are competent to determine who their citizens are, when 
the host state is faced with a person who has the nationality of a Member State 
and also the nationality of a third state as in Micheletti, it is obliged to recognise 
that part of a person’s dual (or multiple) nationality which grants them access to 
non-discrimination and free movement rights.679 The ruling of the judgment can 
be interpreted as a general duty of the Member States to acknowledge the effects 
on EU law as well, when laying down the conditions for acquiring national 
citizenship. It has also been referred to as “administrivisation” of national law, so 
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that the effect of Union citizenship “might be to prevent Member States to apply 
blanket rules in relation to Union citizens”.680 
The crucial question of the interrelation of dependency and autonomy of the 
concept of EU citizenship was more recently dealt by the ECJ in Rottmann, the 
case that initially developed the new concept of the ‘substance of the rights’ 
doctrine, discussed in detail below. One of the fundamental questions in 
Rottmann was whether, and if so to what extent, the autonomy of Union 
citizenship affects its dependency on Member State nationality with regards to 
the withdrawal of EU citizenship. AG Maduro in his opinion on the case, indicated 
in an immensely persuasive manner, that EU citizenship and national citizenship 
are ‘inextricably linked but also autonomous’ and ‘all rights and obligations 
attached to Union citizenship cannot be unreasonably limited’ by the conditions 
imposed to access to Union citizenship.681 In addition, it was clearly pinpointed 
that national rules determining the acquisition and withdrawal of nationality need 
to be compatible with EU rules and respect the rights of EU citizens. The AG 
however, proceeded to demonstrate that it cannot be inferred that the withdrawal 
of nationality is always impossible, if it entails the loss of Union citizenship. Such 
a conclusion would affect the Member States’ autonomy in this area, in disregard 
of Article 20 TFEU, as well the EU’s obligation to respect the national identities 
of the Member States, now enshrined in Article 4(3) TEU.682    
The ECJ subsequently confirmed that the autonomy of Union citizenship may 
indeed affect its dependency. More specifically, the Court indicated the factors 
that need to be considered when examining the withdrawal of a nationality by a 
Member State, within the well-established proportionality test used until now. In 
particular, the Court established a three-step test to be conducted. Firstly, the 
respective authority of the Member State needs to test whether it needs to take 
EU law into account at all, depending on whether this is ‘appropriate’.683 
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Unfortunately, the Court did not provide any concrete definition or a general 
guidance of what it means by ‘appropriateness’ of applying EU law.684 It was 
merely indicated that the Rottmann case is an example of such an appropriate 
case, where the person in question may become stateless because of the 
withdrawal of nationality acquired through naturalization, with the definition of 
‘appropriateness’ still missing. After defining whether it is ‘appropriate’ to take EU 
law into account, the second step of the ‘Rottmann test’, is for national authorities 
to identify the consequences of the decision at issue,685 for the individual person 
and the affected family. Lastly, the authorities need to balance these 
consequences with the gravity of the reason for withdrawal.686    
There is thus no doubt as to the fact that the ECJ has intimated that there is at 
least a certain autonomous element in Union citizenship that might affect Member 
State nationality, based on the judicial test applied. Yet, since no guidance was 
given by the Court to the very question of how this alleged autonomy of Union 
citizenship may affect is dependency on the national citizenship, it remains 
subject to a proportionality test directed by the national authorities. As 
Kostakopoulou rightly puts it, given that Union citizenship is a dynamic concept 
and a fundamental status, a certain degree of autonomy is required in order to 
preserve the link between the citizen and the Union and their place in the 
European community of citizens.687 EU citizenship could otherwise fall short of 
realising its full potential, as a legal construction, genuinely independent of 
Member State nationality, or perhaps as a fundamental right equivalent to those 
                                                 
684 Dennis-Jonathan Mann and Kai P Purnhagen, ‘The Nature of Union Citizenship between Autonomy 
and Dependency on (Member) State Citizenship - A Comparative Analysis of the Rottmann Ruling, or: 
How to Avoid a European Dred Scott Decision?’ (2011) 29 Wisconsin International Law Journal 484, 501. 
685 Judgment of 2 March 2010, Rottmann, C-135/08, ECLI:EU:C:2010:104, para 55. 
686 Dennis-Jonathan Mann and Kai P Purnhagen, ‘The Nature of Union Citizenship between Autonomy 
and Dependency on (Member) State Citizenship - A Comparative Analysis of the Rottmann Ruling, or: 
How to Avoid a European Dred Scott Decision?’ (2011) 29 Wisconsin International Law Journal 500. 
687 Dora Kostakopoulou, ‘European Union citizenship and Member State nationality: updating or 
upgrading the link?’ in Jo Shaw (ed), ‘Has the European Court of Justice Challenged Member State 
Sovereignty in National Law?’ (2011) EUI Working Paper RSCAS 2011/62, 23 
<http://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/19654> accessed 10 May 2017. 
163 
 
protected in Article 6 TEU,688 obstructing in turn, the evolvement of the concept 
that had subsequently occurred.  
5.3 The judicial development of the ‘Substance of the Rights 
doctrine’ 
Besides the amount of autonomy recognised within EU citizenship which granted 
it great prospects for further development, the concept was arguably introduced 
within the ‘framework of the internal market thinking’ and still works within it to a 
great extent.689 It is also believed that the additional protection provided by Union 
citizenship is largely granted as compensation for taking part within a certain 
framework; that of the EU single market. In order to give meaning to EU 
citizenship both as a political and legal concept, it is necessary to use it to protect 
the dignity of the citizens within the Union and move away from the mere, 
traditional market-oriented dimension of it.  
Over the years, EU citizenship, through its vital role held, has substantially 
broadened the scope of the ratione materiae and ratione personae of EU law,690 
including the scope of the fundamental economic freedoms of the Treaty. More 
importantly, Union citizenship has driven the Courts to reappraise the concept of 
‘purely internal situations’, in a recent series of cases, by introducing a new 
doctrine for triggering EU law and allow more cases to fall within the scope of EU 
law. This double-element influence and development of the scope of application 
of EU law has given a newly discovered status to the concept of EU citizenship 
which is greatly characterised by autonomy and independence. These 
developments have arguably had profound consequences for the structure of EU 
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law, while they can conceivably result in a further change of the architecture of 
fundamental rights as well.  
5.3.1 The ‘substance of the rights’ as a proportionality element 
The concept of the substance of the rights was not an entirely unknown, judicial 
concept. The Court had made references to the substance of the rights at issue, 
in previous case law on EU citizenship and fundamental rights, yet primarily as 
part of the proportionality test and not within the meaning given to the doctrine in 
Ruiz Zambrano. To begin with, according to the CJEU, the referring Court in 
Martínez Sala, stated that “delays in granting [residence permits] for purely 
technical administrative reasons can materially affect the substance of the rights 
enjoyed by citizens of the European Union”.691 However, the referring Court in 
this case, namely the Higher Social Court of Bavaria in Germany, did not 
elaborate further in its objectives, when referring to a ‘substance of the rights’ of 
EU citizens and neither did the ECJ.    
With respect to general fundamental rights cases, the Court has used the 
substance of the rights concept as part of the proportionality test, examining 
whether national or EU legislation, interferes with the substance of a given 
fundamental right, namely whether the essence of a right is left intact. A 
representative case is that of Hauer,692 where the applicant submitted that a 
Regulation prohibiting the new planting of vines, inter alia, infringed her right to 
property and her right to freely pursue her trade.693 The Court concluded that the 
restriction was justified in the interest of the common organisation of the market, 
yet it proceeded to conduct a proportionality test for the decision. It firstly 
accepted the legitimate aim of the measure at issue, it secondly argued that the 
measures were suitable for achieving the purpose pursued, namely to contribute 
to the common organisation of the market and improve the wine-producing 
sector, and thirdly, it concluded that the measure was not an unnecessary and 
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strict limitation of the right.694 In the fourth and last stage the Court conducted an 
assessment, on whether the measure at issue respects the inviolable core 
substance of the fundamental right deciding that it did not ‘infringe the substance 
of the right to property’.695 
Similarly, in Commission v Belgium,696 the Court considered the automatic 
deportation served on Union citizens, who had not produced the documents 
required for the issuing of a residence permit within the time specified, as 
impairing the very substance of the right of residence directly conferred by 
Community law. Specifically, the court pointed out that even if a Member State 
may decide, where necessary, “to deport a national of another Member State 
where that person is unable to produce, within the required period, the documents 
proving that he fulfils the necessary financial conditions, where that deportation 
is automatic, as it is under the Belgian legislation, it is disproportionate”.697 
Moreover, according to Connolly, which concerned the right to freedom of 
expression under the Staff Regulations, fundamental rights can be subject to 
restrictions, “provided that the restrictions in fact correspond to objectives of 
general public interest pursued by the (then) Community and do not constitute, 
with regard to the objectives pursued, a disproportionate and intolerable 
interference which infringes upon the very substance of the rights protected”.698   
The concept of the substance of the rights was also repeatedly used by the CJEU 
in other cases relating to the right to property, the freedom to pursue a business 
and the rights of self-employed persons. In the case of Keller,699 the Court 
reiterated the application of the concept as the last stage of the proportionality 
test, indicating that the freedom to pursue one’s trade or profession is protected 
within the Community legal order “only subject to the limits justified by the general 
objectives pursued by the Community, on condition that the substance of the right 
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is left untouched”.700 Correspondingly, in Commission v Germany,701 the Court 
held that while fundamental rights could serve as a valid justification for national 
rules derogating from EU law, those fundamental rights can be subject to 
restrictions provided that they do not impinge upon the very substance of the 
rights guaranteed,702 even when fundamental rights extend to the Member States 
acting within the scope of EU law. 
The fact that fundamental rights within the EU legal order can be subject to certain 
limits justified by the overall objectives pursued by the Union, only when the 
‘substance of these rights’ is left untouched, was repeatedly ruled by the Court, 
not only regarding violations of EU institutions, but also when the scope of EU 
fundamental rights was extended to Member States when acting within the scope 
of Union law.703 It therefore seems that the ‘substance of the rights’ concept, had 
become an integral part of the proportionality analysis of the Court, constituting 
the fourth and last stage of the test, although the fourth stage is often conflated 
with the third. More importantly, it is evident that the CJEU has acknowledged the 
fact that rights have an impinge core component that cannot be restricted, in other 
words, the balancing of a right against a general objective, should not result in a 
violation of the substance of that right.704 This irreducible core component of the 
rights, has further developed, mainly through the Ruiz Zambrano case, giving a 
different judicial meaning, to the concept besides being part of the proportionality 
test.  
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5.3.2 The Rottmann case; Reassessing the ‘purely internal’ situation 
concept 
The Rottmann case,705 has been correctly described as the foundation which 
paved the way towards the emancipation of EU citizenship from the limits inherent 
in its free movement origins.706 It this case, the Court mostly focused on the 
‘status of Union citizenship’, rather than on establishing the existence of a cross-
border element. The case concerned Dr. Rottmann, an Austrian national, who 
while being subject to judicial investigations, moved to Germany, relying on this 
EU citizenship rights. He then acquired German nationality by naturalisation, in 
1999, triggering the loss of this Austrian nationality ex lege,707 while an arrest 
warrant had already been issued against him in 1997. When Austria informed 
Germany of the arrest warrant against him, they decided to revoke his nationality, 
based on the fact that he obtained the German nationality by deception, by 
withholding information on his prosecution. At the same time, the Austrian 
nationality was not recoverable by individuals who do not process a clean criminal 
record, leading to the situation of him becoming stateless. 
The questions of the referring court, as discussed above, included whether the 
withdrawal of the nationality of a citizen in a situation such as that of Dr Rottmann, 
was contrary to Article 20 TFEU and whether it deprived the person concerned, 
of the status of a Union citizen and the benefits emanating therefrom, if that 
withdrawal resulted in statelessness. Unsurprisingly, it was expressly posited by 
various Member States that the granting and withdrawing of a nationality falls 
outside the scope of EU law, as those rules remain within the ambit of national 
sovereignty.708  The Court rejected this argument, emphasising that even if the 
situation indeed falls within the competence of the Member States, this does not 
alter the fact that when exercising their powers in the sphere of nationality, the 
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national rules concerned must have due regard to EU law.709 More importantly 
however, the Court strongly held in the key passage of the judgment that “the 
situation of a citizen of the Union who [...] is faced with a decision of withdrawing 
his naturalisation, [...] and placing him [...] in a position capable of causing him to 
lose the status conferred by Article [20 TFEU] and the rights attaching therefore 
falls, by reason of its nature and its consequences, within the ambit of EU law”.710 
Therefore, in order to avoid statelessness, the Court strikingly emphasised the 
citizenship-specific rights which a person would lose, rather than a general 
human rights imperative, justifying it through the long established statement that 
Union citizenship is ‘intended to be the fundamental status of national of the 
Member States’.711   
Having decided that the issue fell within the ambit of EU law, the Court then 
considered what standard of review was to be applied and concluded that it is for 
the national court to apply a test of proportionality as discussed above,712 
balancing the national interest of the measure against the significance of revoking 
EU citizenship. Although, the Court could not rule on whether a decision not yet 
adopted could be contrary to EU law, namely the decision by Austria on the 
question of reacquisition, while the German decision on withdrawing 
naturalisation had not become definite either, it was indicated that the withdrawal 
of a national citizenship by naturalisation, obtained by deception, is not contrary 
to EU law, provided that it observes the principle of proportionality.713 The revised 
application and usage of the ‘substance of the rights’ concept, is evidently 
different from the pre-Rottmann period, since it clearly constituted the starting 
point of the ruling, while it was independently applied from the proportionality 
analysis. In a nutshell, Rottmann affirmed that EU law has to be considered when 
a decision on nationality is taken by a Member State, which has implications for 
the EU citizenship status of a person. Consequently, the case can be equally 
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regarded as an important step in the gradual absorption of national citizenship 
within Union citizenship, while the ‘final arbiter’ in disputes of the above questions 
is evidently the Court of Justice.714 
The finding in Rottmann was not utterly unexpected and surprising, for two main 
reasons. Firstly, because it has been long established that Member States have 
the obligation to act in due regard of EU law even when acting in areas where 
they have primary competence,715 such as nationality law, meaning that they 
cannot exercise these competences in a way that is contrary to Union law. 
Therefore, Declaration No.2 on Nationality of a Member State annexed to the 
then Maastricht Treaty, which stated that if an individual is a national of a Member 
State is “to be settled solely by reference to the national law of the Member State 
concerned”, did not grant Member States carte blanche. In the words of Davies, 
the choice for such a relatively weak legal form of a declaration, rather than a 
protocol, could almost be taken as a “concession that there is no serious intention 
to narrow the Treaty text, merely a half-hearted expression of national 
sentiment”.716 Indeed, the Declaration is no longer an integral part of the Treaty 
and was not incorporated in the Final Act, although it could serve as a source for 
a better understanding of the scope and contents of Article 20 TFEU.717 Secondly, 
in view of the fact that, as discussed above, EU citizenship cannot be an 
independent concept, but there is at least a certain autonomous element in it that 
might affect Member State nationality, which the Court was subsequently called 
to assess in Rottmann. 
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There is much from the Rottmann ruling that might be regarded as a substantial 
increase in the effect of EU citizenship on national citizenship, 718 while there is 
also much to consider therefrom, such as which aspects of national citizenship 
fall within EU law and the practical consequences of this kind of development. 
This ruling, opened the way for further appropriation of national sovereignty in 
regards to the nationality laws of the Member States. The Ruiz Zambrano case, 
offered further insights into this development, while extending the idea that 
Member States and the EU should leave the substantive core of rights to the EU 
citizenship case law intact.   
5.3.3 The Ruiz Zambrano Right; Another judicial meaning given to the 
‘substance of the rights’  
The Ruiz Zambrano case arguably constitutes a landmark and inspiring ruling of 
the Court, for two main reasons. Primarily, due to it marking a departure from the 
traditional cross-border concept and secondly, because of the differentiated use 
of the substance of the rights concept, outside the proportionality test, as a self-
standing test in EU citizenship law. In this case the referring Court asked whether 
Mr Ruiz Zambrano, a Colombian national and irregular migrant staying in 
Belgium, could rely on the Treaty provisions of EU citizenship with a view to 
obtaining a derivative right of residence as the father of two Belgian children that 
were born during the period of his irregular stay and were granted the Belgian 
nationality at birth.719 The children had never relied on their movement rights and 
thus no cross-border link existed. Through this derivative right, Mr Ruiz Zambrano 
also sought to obtain a work permit to which, he was not entitled under Belgian 
law, since he was an illegal immigrant. The Court reformulated the question in 
order to ask, whether Article 20 TFEU has an autonomous character and whether 
it serves as a sufficient connection, in order to trigger the scope of Union law.720  
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In her lengthy Opinion in Ruiz Zambrano, AG Sharpston, made three propositions 
to the Court. Firstly, she examined whether Art. 20 TFEU could be applied 
autonomously, irrespective of an actual cross-border link. In doing so, she 
disconnected the right to move from the right to reside and advised the ECJ to 
acknowledge the right to residency as a free-standing right for European citizens 
and therefore, to extend the existing case law to situations where no physical 
movement had been established.721 Secondly, she recommended that the Court 
should embrace another perspective towards EU citizenship and the protection 
of fundamental rights, enquiring whether Article 18 TFEU should be applied in 
order to “resolve instances of reverse discrimination created by the provisions of 
EU law relating to citizenship of the Union”.722 Thirdly, when dealing with the 
fundamental rights scope, she discussed the possibility of invoking fundamental 
rights, independently from any other EU law provision, regarding the areas in 
which the EU has competence to act, namely provided that the EU had 
competence in a particular area of law, EU fundamental rights should protect EU 
citizens, even if such competence has not yet been exercised.723  
The Court on its part, focused only on Article 20 TFEU, although without rejecting 
the arguments of the AG, totally omitting the Charter and leaving the question of 
whether it could have had an impact “through the backdoor”, unanswered.724 The 
first important aspect of the Court’s ruling, is the development of the traditional 
cross-border concept, whereby Article 20 TFEU was interpreted as an 
autonomous provision, without the establishment or even a barely discernible 
existence of a cross-border link. Therefore, while the cross-border element was 
at least merely present in Rottmann since the applicant had physically moved 
from Germany to Austria, holding the status of an EU citizen, in Ruiz Zambrano 
the link with EU law based on the cross-border dimension was completely 
missing.725 The ECJ made it clear for the first time, that in its view, Article 20 
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TFEU constitutes a sufficient link with Union law by itself, without the need of a 
cross-border element, consequently extending the scope of application of EU 
law. The connection with EU law is thus, no longer only constructed by the use 
of free movement, but it can be established, simply by the status of Union 
citizenship, creating an autonomous right enshrined in Article 20 TFEU.726 
However, the Court has not clearly indicated the circumstances under which 
Article 20 TFEU can be invoked, when the cross-border link is lacking, in order to 
claim a right of free movement and residency, nor which type of persons – EU 
citizens or third-country nationals – can invoke this derivative right. Although the 
circumstances for triggering the doctrine are still not crystal clear, important 
guidance was given in subsequent rulings, establishing a new citizenship-based 
right and moving away from the strict ‘market-oriented’ thinking. 
Apart from the development of the traditional cross-border element, Ruiz 
Zambrano also paved the way towards a new substance of the rights test, which 
creates potential for further improvement of the protection of EU fundamental 
rights. The Court had importantly indicated, without extensive argumentation, that 
“Article 20 TFEU precludes national measures which have the effect of depriving 
citizens of the Union, of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights 
conferred by virtue of their status” as EU citizens,727 without going into extensive 
argument. The substance of the rights test had hitherto been applied within the 
context of the proportionality test, yet in Ruiz Zambrano the prohibition against a 
violation of the substance of rights has been applied as a self-standing test in the 
EU case law. It therefore seems that the Court has gone even further than the 
AG in interpreting Article 20 TFEU and concluded that third-country nationals, 
obtain a derived right to reside in the Member State of their children’s nationality, 
when the factual conditions of the Ruiz Zambrano case are met.728 
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As van den Brink rightly argues, although the textual resemblance of the 
substance of the rights, in both Ruiz Zambrano and previous case law is striking, 
when it comes to EU citizenship, it works differently, with the main difference 
being the point of legal reasoning, where the test intervenes.729 In particular, the 
substance of the rights concept in EU citizenship case law, including in Ruiz 
Zambrano, is not essentially governing proportionality, but rather whether EU law 
applies. It is therefore used, as the driving force to bring the situation within the 
scope of EU law, when the cross-border element is lacking, primarily in the 
beginning of the legal analysis of the case. On the other hand, in the pre-Ruiz 
Zambrano case law, the Court applied the substance of the rights test, after 
already establishing that the measures at issue fell within the scope of EU law. 
Therefore, through the proportionality test, the Court was only assessing whether 
the substance of the rights at issue remained untouched, near the end of its 
decision, as the fourth and last step. 
It is evident that the case is of fundamental significance and it represents a 
permanent move beyond the confines of ‘market citizenship’, by building on the 
constitutional perspective of EU citizenship.730 The significance of the Zambrano 
ruling can also be distinguished from that of Rottmann, since it has not only 
reaffirmed the latter but also broadened it to a great degree. While in Rottmann, 
both the status of EU citizenship and the rights enshrined therein were contested 
and thus the situation fell within the scope of EU law, the Ruiz Zambrano case 
was decided merely on the illegality of depriving EU citizens of ‘the genuine 
enjoyment of the substance of the rights conferred’ by EU citizenship.731   
A new test was thus expressly adopted, to define the judicial jurisdiction for 
numerous disputed matters, which deems it unnecessary and “eschews border-
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sensitive thinking”,732 contrary to previous judicial approaches that employed 
actual or hypothetical cross-border link. It rather emphasises the intensity of the 
Member States' interference with the rights of EU citizens, in triggering the 
application of EU law in order to allocate the case at issue to a legal order.733 The 
requirement of a ‘deprivation’, rather than a mere impediment, of the genuine 
enjoyment of the substance of the rights attaching to the status of Union 
citizens,734 constitutes a sufficient link with EU law, even if an individual intending 
to rely on EU law finds himself in a purely internal situation.  
Besides the significant developments around the ‘purely internal situation’ 
concept and the expansion of EU citizenship’s scope of application, the 
Zambrano ruling can also, arguably have important consequences for the scope 
of fundamental rights in the EU. However, despite the potentially enormous 
implications of the judgment, and the condemnation of existing legal uncertainty 
in the application of the internal principle to EU citizenship provisions, the scope 
of the judgment and reasoning of the Court are frustratingly opaque.735  
Little clarity has been provided, with regards to the possible reach of this vision, 
and the Court has left various questions unanswered. For instance, the ECJ did 
not clarify the rules concerning the co-existence of the new doctrine with the 
traditional cross-border approach and neither did it specify the exact 
circumstances under which the newly developed doctrine could be invoked. Most 
importantly, the ECJ had to clarify whether fundamental rights, especially the right 
to respect for a person's private and family life, had to be considered for the 
purposes of determining the existence of a deprivation effect.736 Some of these 
unsolved questions, were given more clarity in future cases of the CJEU, paving 
the way for further developments of the concept of EU citizenship. 
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5.3.4 The judicial weight of EU citizenship 
Further insights on the doctrine were provided in subsequent caselaw, including 
the conditions under which the doctrine can be triggered, the personal and 
material scope of the doctrine, as well as further understanding on its future 
potential and development. These insights, mostly derived through stricter rulings 
of the ECJ, departing from Ruiz Zambrano, although different lines of arguments 
state that the departure from Zambrano is not by reason of a stricter judicial 
approach, but rather because of dissimilar facts under dispute. The chapter’s 
argument is somewhere in the middle, underpinning a clear differentiation on the 
facts from case to case, yet a closer scrutiny reveals a stricter application of the 
doctrine. The Court seems to have chosen the stricter route immediately after the 
Ruiz Zambrano ruling, probably to put a barrier to the new, innovative doctrine. 
On the other hand, more courageous rulings are subsequently observed, giving 
more weight to the status of EU citizenship, yet without necessarily applying the 
doctrine in an affirmative manner. Despite the interpretation adopted by the Court 
towards the doctrine, the ‘substance of the rights’ cases were and still remain 
‘intrinsically’ linked to the protection of future free movement rights as 
demonstrated in the analysis below. 
5.3.4.1 The narrowed interpretation of the ‘doctrine’ 
The Court had for the first time the opportunity to apply its new approach to EU 
citizenship in McCarthy,737 where it had adopted a strict viewpoint, trying to 
minimise any consequences that Ruiz Zambrano could have on the division of 
competences. Mrs McCarthy, a dual Irish and UK national, was born and lived in 
the UK, never exercising her free movement rights and she married a Jamaican 
national who according to the national immigration laws, was no longer permitted 
to remain in the UK. The referring court, inter alia, asked whether Article 3(1) of 
Directive 2004/38/EC or Article 21 TFEU, were applicable to the situation of a 
Union citizen where the cross-border is lacking.738 In its judgment, the Court did 
not limit its assessment to the applicability of Directive 2004/38, but went further 
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to examine whether a derivative right of residence could flow from primary law. 
The Court ruled that Mrs McCarthy could not rely on her dual nationality to 
establish a cross-border element, and thus be granted a right of residency under 
EU law, which would have allowed her husband a derivative right of residency. It 
was however pointed out that it does not emerge for that reason alone, to be 
considered as purely internal, and went on to assess the applicability of the 
substance of the rights test as well.739  
The right to move and reside freely within the Union, under Article 21 TFEU, is 
clearly included among the rights attached to the status of EU citizens. Yet, the 
ECJ observed that contrary to Ruiz Zambrano, the national measure at issue in 
the main proceedings of McCarthy, did not have the “effect of depriving her of the 
genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights associated with her status as a 
Union citizen, or of impeding the exercise of her right to move and reside freely 
within the territory of the Member States, in accordance with Article 21 TFEU”.740 
The distinguishment of the cases was based on the fact that the refusal of a 
residence document to Mr McCarthy, did not have the effect of obliging Mrs 
McCarthy to leave the territory of the Union, while there was no evidence that she 
was economically dependent upon her third country national spouse.741 She 
could thus exercise her rights as a Union citizen fully and effectively, without the 
presence of her husband. 
The Court therefore, evidently followed its new methodology and made a clear 
and important distinction between situations covered by the right to move and 
reside – where a cross-border element exists – and those, which could trigger the 
new substance of the rights. It can be subsequently argued that the criteria of the 
substance of the rights test to be applied, are not discriminatory, since they do 
not depend on an EU citizens’ age, but rather upon the seriousness of the 
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restraint to the substance of the rights normally conferred on EU citizens, which 
enables the doctrine to stay in compliance with the division of competences.742 
Not surprisingly, the ECJ had considerably narrowed its interpretation of the EU 
citizenship provisions further, by continuing to define the criteria of the 
‘deprivation of the substance of the rights’ test strictly, according to the facts of 
the cases examined. This is the case in Dereci,743 which concerned a third-
country national (TCN) residing illegally in a Member State of which, his minor 
children were nationals and had never exercised their right of free movement.744 
The ECJ clarified in this case that the ‘deprivation’ of the genuine enjoyment of 
the substance of the rights refers to situations in which the Union citizen not only 
has to leave the territory of the Member State, but Union territory as a whole.745 
Moreover, according to the Court, the mere fact that it might appear desirable to 
an EU national to have his TCN “family members be able to reside with him in 
the territory of the Union for economic reasons or to keep his family together, is 
not sufficient to successfully argue that he is forced to leave the territory of the 
Union if such a right is not granted”.746 The ECJ left the question of whether the 
internal situation in dispute falls within the scope of EU law to the national Courts 
to decide. The Federal Administrative Court of Austria on its side, held that it is 
unlikely that the refusal to grant a right of residence would deprive the spouse of 
Austrian citizenship, and consequently of EU citizenship, of the obligation to leave 
the territory of the European Union.747 As a result of the discretion given by the 
ECJ in Dereci, the Austrian Federal Administrative Court held in subsequent 
cases that if the third-country national is an asylum seeker with a temporary right 
to stay,748 or if a family life does not actually exist, including marriages of 
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convenience,749 then no denial of the rights conferred by virtue of EU citizenship 
to his/her Austrian family member, will occur.750 
The approach adopted by the Court seems at odds with the more decisive ruling 
in Zambrano, where the ECJ had itself decided that the children would be unable 
to exercise their EU citizenship rights if their TCN parents had to leave,751 without 
allowing discretion to the national courts to determine whether the internal 
situation dispute falls within the scope of EU law or not. The Dereci ruling also 
reinforced the argument that the ECJ’s decisive factor in Ruiz Zambrano was the 
minor status of the Union citizens concerned, as well as the fact that they were 
dependent upon two carer parents, both of whose continued residence in Belgium 
was in dispute.752 Unlike the previous rulings, the ECJ also addressed for the first 
time the need to consider the disputed matter under the provisions of the Charter 
and specifically by reference to Article 7, the right for private and family life. The 
Court, remarkably noted that there was still room for an assessment of the 
compliance with Article 7 of the Charter, after engaging EU law in the disputed 
matter, meaning, after it is decided that the question falls within the scope of EU 
law. This statement is rather unclear, since it would be sufficient for a finding in 
favour of a residence permit for the TCN, if the national court simply concluded 
that the ‘deprivation of the genuine enjoyment’ of the rights was satisfied.753 It is 
thus evident that a major part underlying the Court’s reasoning in Dereci, was 
based on the respect for the division and balance of competences as enshrined 
in Article 5 TEU. 
Moreover, in Yoshikazu lida,754 the ECJ continued defining the criteria of applying 
the ‘deprivation of the substance of the rights’ test, formed on a case-by-case 
basis, while preserving the methodology of the potential application of the Charter 
on EU citizenship when a link with EU law exists. After examining the applicability 
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of the Citizens’ Rights Directive (CRD), the Court went on to assess if the refusal 
to grant Mr Iida a residence permit could deny his spouse and child ‘the genuine 
enjoyment of the substance of the rights associated with their status of Union 
citizen, or to impede the exercise of their right to move and reside freely within 
the territory of the Member States’.755 In answering the question, the Court 
contrasted the facts with those of Mr Ruiz Zambrano, stating that Mr Iida did not 
seek to obtain a residence permit in the Member State where his spouse and 
daughter lived, while the refusal of the German authorities in granting a right of 
residence under EU law, did not affect in any way the right of his spouse or 
daughter from exercising their right to free movement (that in fact had been 
exercised).756 More importantly, the ECJ rightly recalled that “purely hypothetical 
prospects of exercising the right of freedom of movement”, do not establish a 
sufficient link with EU law to fall within its scope, while the “same applies to purely 
hypothetical prospects of that right being obstructed”.757 The Iida case thus 
confirmed the strict approach followed in Dereci, preserving at the same time the 
compatibility with the principle of conferral and the division of competences, and 
the idea that a deprivation of the substance of EU citizenship rights should be 
established as a last resort in cases of total and serious deprivations.    
Similarly, in the case of Ymeraga and others,758 the Court made clear that the EU 
right to stay, is only activated when expulsion from the Member State entails 
expulsion from the whole Union in a way which is materially reduced to situations 
where there is no room at all for individual choice.759 The case concerned the 
refusal by the Luxembourgish government, under a national law on freedom of 
movement, to grant a right of residence to a family member of an EU national. 
The ECJ indicated that a mere intention for reunification with his parents and 
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brothers was not sufficient enough to trigger the claim of a deprivation of the 
genuine enjoyment of the substance of his EU citizenship rights.760  
The delineation of the ‘Zambrano doctrine’ arguably culminated with Alokpa.761 
The Court in this case, found that because the conditions of Article 7(1)(b) of the 
CRD were not satisfied,762 it was unlikely that a refusal by the Luxembourg 
authorities to grant Mrs Alokpa a right of residence would have the effect of 
depriving the two minors of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights 
attaching to their status as EU citizens.763 The Court further indicated that such a 
refusal would not have the effect of obliging the children to leave the territory of 
the Union altogether, since the TCN, primary carer, is entitled to a residence an 
work permit in the Member State of which the EU citizen is a national.764 The 
Court had arguably reached its decision through a rational interpretation of 
previous rulings, yet it clearly lacked more guidance on issues regarding EU 
citizenship and fundamental rights. The Court thus, failed to grant fundamental 
rights the importance they should have in citizenship cases, as previously given.  
Moreover, in Dano, the Court was asked to determine the valid interpretation of 
EU rules on access to social welfare benefits by EU citizens in the host state. It 
held that competent national authorities should only look at the financial situation 
of the person concerned as indicated in the CRD,765 without considering the 
social benefits available, totally diverging from previous case law that allowed the 
consideration of “a range of factors” based on proportionality.766 Although this 
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ruling can be perfectly justified in light of the need to preserve the financial 
equilibrium and national solidarity collective of a Member State, the legal 
reasoning of the Court has not only showed a substantial shift to a narrow 
interpretation in EU citizenship cases, but has also intercepted the conceptual 
evolution of EU citizenship. According to Schrauwen, the Court could have 
assessed whether the disputed national legislation excludes nationals of other 
Member States from social assistance, using the ‘genuine link’ and proportionality 
test.767 For instance, those who never looked for a job nor were planning to do so 
are demonstrating the lack of a genuine link and is proportionate in order to 
protect the viability of the host state’s social assistance system.768 Although a 
different ruling for Ms Dano would not occur, applying the same test to all EU 
citizens, irrespective of their financial history, arguably preserves the fundamental 
status of EU citizenship. 
Although the departure of the subsequent case law, from the Zambrano ruling is 
obvious, it is not necessarily unacceptable. The main clarification that occurred, 
limiting the doctrine to a great extent, is the requirement for a deprivation to trigger 
the substance of the rights doctrine, which as explained below maintains the 
federal balance, while preventing conflicts with the division of competences 
between the Member States and the EU. However, the facts that the derivative 
right granted, is only valid for the Member States of which EU citizens are 
nationals and that discretion is granted to national courts to have the last say on 
whether the disputed matter falls within the scope of EU law, constitute 
departures that undermine the fundamental status of EU citizenship and the 
effectiveness of EU law. 
5.3.4.2 Re-confirming the importance of EU citizenship through the ‘doctrine’ 
Despite the case law clearly departing from the Ruiz Zambrano ruling, the ECJ 
also followed a more courageous approach in the same series of cases, towards 
acknowledging the importance of the concept of EU citizenship. In particular, the 
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Court has not tried to broaden the Ruiz Zambrano ruling or to overrule the stricter 
approach followed. It has rather remained on the same track of maintaining the 
federal balance but has at the same time attempted to engage the Charter and 
re-emphasised the importance of EU citizenship, in its case law. This category of 
rulings, on the recently developed doctrine, was manifested in Chavez-Vilchez 
and Others,769 where the referring court sought in its preliminary reference, to 
ascertain whether the individuals concerned may, as TCN mothers of children 
who are EU citizens, acquire a right of residence under Article 20 TFEU in the 
specific circumstances of each case.770 The ECJ departed once more, from the 
Ruiz Zambrano approach and indicated that it is for the national Court to assess 
whether the conditions laid down in the CRD were satisfied, and if not, whether 
the situation concerned fell in the light of Article 20 TFEU. In order to assess the 
application of the substance of the rights test, the Court emphasised the 
importance of determining the primary carer of the child and whether there is a 
relationship of dependency at the heart of the Zambrano right.771 The presence 
of an EU citizen parent, who is actually able and willing to assume sole 
responsibility for the primary care of the child is a relevant factor, but it is not itself 
sufficient to conclude that there was no such relationship of dependency between 
the TCN parent and the child, that the child would be compelled to leave the 
territory of the Union if a right of residence was refused to that TCN.772  
As part of this assessment, the Court very interestingly stated that the competent 
authorities must take account of the best interests of the child and the right to 
respect for family life under Article 7 of the Charter,773 even before determining 
whether the disputed issue actually falls under the scope of EU law. Particularly, 
account must be given to the “age of the child, the child’s physical and emotional 
development, the extent of his emotional ties both to the Union citizen parent and 
to the TCN parent, and the risks which separation from the latter might entail for 
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that child’s equilibrium”. This pioneering inclusion of the Court seems at odds with 
the Court’s ruling in Dereci, which indicated that there is room for assessment of 
the Charter provisions only when the case falls within the scope of EU law, 
towards a more citizen-friendly Union, through the constructivist nature of EU 
citizenship. 
Moreover, in the cases of Rendón Marín and CS,774 the ECJ once again affirmed, 
not only the capacity of EU citizenship to act as a source of derived rights even 
when the cross-border element is missing, but also the fact that the limits of this 
capacity are firmly defined by the so-called, concept of a ‘very specific situation’. 
The ECJ affirmed that Article 20 TFEU precludes national measures, which 
deprive EU citizens of the substance of their rights deriving from Union 
citizenship, only in exceptional, ‘very specific’ situations, while this derived right 
can only be refused “when the effectiveness of the citizenship of the Union is to 
be disregarded”.775 The question for the ECJ was whether a non-EU national 
parent who is the primary carer of an EU national child, could be deported or 
refused a residence permit, on the basis of a previous criminal conviction, if that 
deportation or refusal would result in the constructive expulsion of the minor child. 
In answering the questions the ECJ restated the ‘substance of rights’ doctrine 
under Article 20 TFEU, yet without ruling out the possibility of refusing a derived 
right of residence, on the grounds that the individual faced with expulsion poses 
a “genuine, present and sufficiently serious threat to a fundamental interest of 
society”, namely public policy or public security, but went on to say that this 
should be interpreted restrictively, balancing the interests of society and the rights 
of the EU national.776 Moreover, in both cases the Court ruled, in the manner 
stated under Article 7 of the CRD for EU citizens, that such a derogation for ‘Ruiz 
Zambrano carers’, cannot take place automatically. 
What is worth discussing from the cases of CS and Rendon Marin, is the way the 
ECJ has referred to situations in which the effectiveness of EU citizenship is 
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undermined or compromised, because of a refusal to grant a derived right of 
residence to a TCN family member, which would simultaneously force the EU 
citizen to leave the territory of the EU as a whole. It is therefore clear that in the 
Court’s view, any possible limitations on the substance of rights granted under 
EU citizenship, are regarded as undermining the effectiveness of EU 
citizenship.777 However, the exact meaning of effective citizenship within the 
framework of Article 20 TFEU was not defined in the case, raising further 
questions. Is citizenship ‘effectiveness’ connected to a transnational citizen within 
the broader integration process, or is it denoted by a need to prevent expulsion 
regimes that would deprive its status by ‘nullifying’ its substantive content?778 The 
present understanding in the case of the Court seems to underline the latter, while 
a closer, more faithful reasoning as discussed in Chapter 2 is arguably more 
positive, whereby effective citizenship is designated by the access to substantive 
rights for EU citizens enshrined in Article 20 TFEU, often supplemented by other 
rights outside the scope of the internal market, including the right to equal 
treatment. Therefore, these Court’s rulings demonstrated a picture of a ‘very 
specific’ citizenship, emphasising the prohibition of negating EU citizenship rather 
than focusing on the question of what it really means to make EU citizenship 
effective to its holders, when they are not under the threat of being removed from 
the EU, what rights are included therein and how these rights are protected.779 
Although the CS and Rendon Marin cases appear to diminish the scope of Ruiz 
Zambrano, at the same time, they restate its fundamental significance, since a 
Union citizen who falls within the scope of the ‘Ruiz Zambrano category’, is 
granted a very high level of protection. As a matter of fact, the substantive 
safeguarding against expulsion is actually equivalent to that of Union citizens, 
who move to another Member State, since the Court is referring to concepts 
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found under the CRD, as well as to relevant case law, although it is not clear if 
the same procedural protection applies.780  
Another interesting case which concerns, not the development of the substance 
of the rights doctrine, but rather the significant change and continuity in the nature 
of EU citizenship is Delvigne.781 Due to the ‘market-oriented’ character of EU 
citizenship, political rights have never been formally linked to EU citizenship. This 
case recognised a free-standing right to vote in the European Parliament 
elections, attached to EU citizenship, departing from the traditional transnational 
right or the general rights to non-discrimination. However, this was done by 
leaving the scope ratione personae of Article 20(2)(b) TFEU untouched and 
showed that the political dimension of EU citizenship is not limited to Articles 20 
to 25 TFEU, but also involves other provisions of EU law, notably Article 14(3) 
TFEU, Article 1(3) of the 1976 Act and Article 39(2) of the Charter.782 The right 
recognised in Delvigne, under Article 39(2) of the Charter, is a political right 
applicable directly even in one’s home Member State, unrelated to free 
movement or non-discrimination.783 It is thus a newly recognised right, linked to 
the status of EU citizenship and its affirmation by the ECJ reveals a certain 
continuity and the endurance of a core characteristic of Union citizenship; its 
multi-levelled character and the deep interconnection between the national and 
supranational, in determining and conditioning the status and rights of Union 
citizenship.784 
Based on the case law analysis conducted above, the constructivist nature of EU 
citizenship is clearly demonstrated, as well as its evolving potentials. It is now 
evident that, at least potentially, the EU is competent of restraining the national 
laws which “are capable of causing [Union citizens] to lose the status conferred 
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by Article [9 TEU] and the rights attaching thereto”, as well as the measures which 
“have the effect of depriving citizens of the Union of the genuine enjoyment of the 
substance of the rights” conferred on them by EU citizenship.785 EU citizenship 
can thus alone trigger the application of EU law in these cases and bring the 
matter by reason of its nature and its consequences within the ambit of Union 
law, provided that the prerequisite for a ‘deprivation’ of rights’ substance is 
satisfied, in order to trigger a claim using the new doctrine. The analysis of the 
doctrine, therefore, boils down to the question of what constitutes such a 
‘deprivation’ and to what extent a mere limitation of a disputed right would also 
qualify as a trigger.   
5.3.5 Impediment vs Deprivation tests 
According to the Court’s case law during the ‘post-Ruiz Zambrano era’, it is 
evident that not every limitation of a right will trigger the application of the recently 
developed doctrine, since an infringement of the substance of an EU citizenship 
right is always needed. Yet, no clear indication is given by the Court as to what 
degree of infringement of the substance of the rights at issue is needed, to trigger 
the test. In the non-EU citizenship case law referring to this test, the Court has 
held that such an infringement is only established if the exercise of the right is 
made ‘impossible or excessively difficult’.786 
Based on the Court’s rulings in EU citizenship case law and more specifically in 
McCarthy, it was clarified that Article 21 TFEU is applicable to situations that 
“have the effect of depriving [a Union citizen] of the genuine enjoyment of the 
substance of the rights conferred by virtue of his status as a Union citizen or of 
impeding the exercise of his right of free movement and residence within the 
territory of the Member States”.787 According to Lenaerts, the ‘impeding effect’ 
refers to the traditional line of case-law, based on which the application of the 
Treaty provisions on EU citizenship requires the existence of a cross-border line, 
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but without requiring the national measures at issue to cause the loss of the status 
of Union citizens, in practice.788 This was illustrated in García Avello, where it was 
adequate for the national measure at issue to be liable to cause ‘serious 
inconveniences’ to a right attached to the status Union citizenship.789 
On the contrary, if an EU citizen has not exercised his/her right to move and 
reside and no movement has occurred at all, only a deprivation of the substance 
of the rights will trigger EU law,790 requiring the national measure to create more 
than a ‘serious inconvenience’. A de facto loss of one of the rights attached to the 
status of an EU citizen, is rather required. Therefore, the so-called ‘deprivation 
effect’ as demonstrated in Ruiz Zambrano, primarily focuses on the rights 
attached to the status of EU citizens. Despite the different requirements subject 
to the two contexts, they are not mutually exclusive since it is still possible for a 
national measure to cause the loss of the rights under EU citizenship status, while 
the cross-border situation exists, thus producing both types of effect.791 
Therefore, before the test is applied, there is initially a need for a severe 
infringement of an EU citizenship right, which would lead to a total deprivation for 
an immobile citizen and a mere impediment for a mobile EU citizen, in order for 
the substance of the rights test to be triggered.792 
In general, an intrusive approach to EU citizenship rights protection can 
undermine the shared competence between EU and Member States, potentially 
placing every Member State action under the scrutiny of the ECJ. On the one 
side of the coin, the requirement for a de facto absolute deprivation of one of the 
rights listed under Article 20(2) TFEU, delimits the test to minor consequences 
and acts within the proper delimitation of EU competences, without being too 
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intrusive. Specifically, this extremely limited test does not leave room to scrutinize 
the different circumstances in which this genuine enjoyment could be negatively 
affected, but only enables review in those cases where citizenship rights are 
absolutely stripped.793 In the words of Wiesbrock, the recent judgments on 
citizenship have touched upon “the essence of the two core questions underlying 
the whole body of citizenship case law: the proper division of competences 
between the Union and the Member States on the one hand, and the division of 
tasks between the judiciary and the legislator.”794 Accordingly, the extension of 
citizenship right to non-movers, let alone with a mere impediment triggering the 
infringement of the substance of the rights, should arguably be decided by the 
legislator rather than the courts. In addition, as Ritter explains, extending the 
application of the fundamental freedoms to purely internal situations would result 
in a new incursion into national competences, which would deprive the Member 
States of the power to regulate the factors of production by reference to policy 
objectives other than those recognised as legitimate by EU law.795 
Nevertheless, on the other side of the coin, besides preserving the division of 
competences to an extent, the delimitation merely to a ‘deprivation effect’ test 
within the sphere of the rights listed in Article 20(2) TFEU, can also have adverse 
effects.  Although EU citizenship seems strongly protected against losing its 
effectiveness, the rights granted under the status of EU citizenship are still not 
available to most of those EU citizens, who have not exercised the right to free 
movement and residence – unless they happen to be in a “very specific” situation, 
namely the risk of being removed from the territory of the Union as a whole, 
amounting to a total deprivation of citizenship rights.796 The character of the 
‘substance of the rights’ test results in a ‘very specific citizenship’, regarding the 
rights that can be protected and how these rights can be protected, contesting 
the ability of EU citizenship of becoming, in the Court’s own words, a ‘fundamental 
                                                 
793 Sara Iglesias Sanchez, ‘Fundamental Rights and Citizenship of the Union at a Crossroads: A Promising 
Alliance or a Dangerous Liaison?’ (2014) 20 European Law Journal 464, 478. 
794 Anja Wiesbrock, ‘Disentangling the ‘Union Citizenship Puzzle’? The McCarthy Case’ (2012) 36 
European Law Review 861, 873. 
795 Clemens Ritter, ‘Purely internal situations, reverse discrimination, Guimont, Dzodzi and Article 234’ 
(2006) 31 European Law Review 690. 
796 Päivi Johanna Neuvonen, ‘EU citizenship and its “very specific” essence: Rendón Marin and CS’ (2017) 
54 Common Market Law Review 1201, 1214. 
189 
 
status of nationals of the Member States’ and at the same time undermining the 
effectiveness of EU citizenship as a whole. 
According to van den Brink, it could even lead to the paradoxical situation where, 
due to the character of the substance of rights test, some of those rights would 
actually be undermined.797 In particular, the significance of the right to move and 
reside enshrined under Article 20(2) TFEU has long been established, since the 
free movement provisions have always been broadly interpreted, while the 
respective derogations have always been interpreted strictly.798 Therefore, the 
fact that the ‘substance of the rights’ doctrine has introduced the impediment-
deprivation scenarios, led to diminishing the importance of situations with an 
‘artificial cross-border element’, from falling within the scope of EU law because 
they ‘just’ failed to qualify.799 Article 21 TFEU does not apply to an EU citizen 
“who has always resided in a Member State of which he is a national and who is 
also a national of another Member State”, unless there is an impediment to the 
right to move and reside or an infringement of the substance of EU citizenship 
rights.800 
The truth is that the designation of the presence or absence of a link with EU law, 
whether this is a ‘deprivation’ or a mere ‘impediment’ of the rights attached to 
citizenship, can have significant repercussions for the vertical allocation of 
powers. The more broadly the ‘link’ with EU law is interpreted, the wider the 
material scope of the substantive law of the Union becomes, and the fewer 
situations there are where reverse discrimination may arise.801 
From a federal point of view, a broader use of the substance of the rights doctrine, 
such as triggering its application with a mere impediment of the citizenship rights, 
in a situation lacking a cross-border element, would lead to a significant restriction 
in the exercise of competences pertaining to the Member States. In other words, 
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a flexible interpretation of the Ruiz Zambrano test that national measures cannot 
undermine, and not necessarily deprive, the genuine enjoyment of EU citizenship 
rights, could significantly affect the regulatory autonomy of the Member States.802 
Therefore, in order for the doctrine to prevent an ultra vires situation of the part 
of the Union and remain in the spectrum of EU Courts as an alternative, granting 
the opportunity of intervening in cases where the effectiveness of EU law is 
jeopardised, it should persist on being applied strictly. Even if it currently remains 
limited, it must be used as a ‘last resort’ approach, when a total deprivation of EU 
citizenship rights exists and cannot be remedied at the national level or by the 
national authorities. A more liberal application of the doctrine would lead to 
conflicts with the principles of conferral and division of competence and would 
likely urge the Member States to resolve against it. If the test is therefore kept 
within the limits of an acceptable federal and legal balance within the EU, it would 
be feasible to change the EU fundamental rights architecture, by placing the 
doctrine into a new, proposed jurisdictional test, as discussed in Chapter 6. 
5.4 Implications and impact of the substance of the rights doctrine 
Despite the initial intervention by various Member States, the constructivist nature 
of EU citizenship and its ability to evolve as a legal and political concept, was 
further affirmed, through the judicially developed doctrine of the ‘substance of the 
rights’ and in particular, the capacity of Union citizenship to form a source of 
derived rights, even in the absence of a cross-border element, changing the way 
citizens invoke EU law. The judicial establishment of the said doctrine, is of great 
significance, not only concerning its numerous implications, but also in relation to 
its prospects for further progress and development, towards a more 
constitutionalised Union. Taken together, the recent cases mark a decisive move 
towards a very significant extension of the scope of application of EU law, 
opening up new vistas for drawing the line dividing the two legal orders in the 
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Union, while at the same time detaching the concept of Union citizenship from 
the ‘vestiges of the internal market’ framework.803  
5.4.1 Delimiting the scope of the laws 
The judicial activism of the CJEU has undoubtedly marked a process of re-
delimiting the scope of EU law, through the development of the constructivist 
nature of EU citizenship. The delimitation of the scope of laws has started long 
before the Rottmann case and has culminated with Ruiz Zambrano. Particularly, 
the Court has shown a concurrent movement away from a cross-border approach 
and from wholly internal situations, towards new jurisdictional tests that delimit 
further the scope of the two legal orders, the national and the European one, 
practically granting the Union the power to intervene in cases where the rights of 
EU citizens are disregarded.804  
The ‘substance of the rights’ doctrine has arguably added more consistency to 
the demarcation of the scope of EU law, regarding EU citizenship provisions, a 
previously vague part of the Treaty, whose exercise has been characterised as 
‘a game of chance’805 and ‘lottery rather than logic’.806 EU citizens now have two 
clearer ways of recalling EU law legally in their disposal. Particularly, whenever 
there is an actual cross-border link, the CRD applies as usual, granting the right 
to reside in other Member States, subject to certain conditions.807 On the other 
hand, when the cross-border element is lacking and the fundamental status of 
Union citizenship is endangered, Article 20 TFEU still applies, provided the EU 
citizen is being completely precluded from enjoying this status.808 With the new 
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approach therefore, the blurred distinction between the cross-border element and 
wholly internal situations, disappears and ceases to be a defining factor in setting 
jurisdiction.809 Although, this more intrusive approach has created some 
uncertainty concerning the future, particularly on the part of the Member States, 
it is also pushing towards a more social and political construction of European 
integration, which has positive impact on the citizens. 
Moreover, the fact that through the new approach, EU citizens are granted an 
abundance of rights associated with the ‘fundamental status of all nationals of the 
Member States’,810 not only abroad but also at home, has resulted in the 
emergence of a new, functional notion of EU territory. In this new vision of 
territory, no distinction is made at all, between the territories of the particular 
Member States and EU citizenship rights do not stop at the doorstep of those 
who never ‘moved’.811 Although the exact scope of this ‘new territory’ is yet to be 
seen, it can potentially capture a variety of national measures that interfere with 
the exercise of EU citizenship rights and it can bring EU citizens, anywhere in the 
Union, within the scope of the general principle of non-discrimination, which 
constitutes the cornerstone of Article 20 TFEU. This change in construction of the 
notion of territory, has been characterised as a positive one, since it has for the 
first time started to deliver its promise of offering ‘EU citizens an area of freedom, 
security and justice without internal frontiers’.812 Consequently, the modern idea 
of EU citizenship constitutes a concept which, through the judicial practice, can 
play a significant role in delimiting, or more specifically in broadening, the scope 
of application of EU law.  
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5.4.2 Enhancing the current list of EU citizenship rights 
Besides the delimitation of the scope of EU law, the evolved concept of EU 
citizenship, through the newly developed doctrine, has also strengthened the 
protection of EU rights and reinforced the principle of equality within the EU. It 
has granted the general possibility to EU citizens to be defended by the Union 
against their own national Member State, in a number of cases that were 
previously deemed as wholly internal, lacking any cross-border element and/or a 
factor linking them with EU law. EU citizenship is thus used, as a federalising 
device, increasing the level of protection offered at the federal, Union level, 
thereby reinforcing the vertical dimension of EU citizenship and creating a 
connection between the Union citizen and the EU institutions.813 In other words, 
as the vertical dimension of EU citizenship is strengthened, the more rights Union 
citizens acquire independently of the right to move to another state and the right 
to non-discrimination. The rights of EU citizens and their relatives’ have been 
strengthened, in situations where the very essence of their Member State 
nationalities and EU citizenship statuses, as well as the rights enshrined therein, 
are profoundly undermined.814 More importantly, as assessed above, ‘Ruiz 
Zambrano carers’, are safeguarded with, at least, equivalent substantive 
protection against expulsion to that of Union citizens, who exercise their rights of 
free movement.  
Despite the enhancement of the written rights under Article 20(2) TFEU, the 
‘substance of the rights’ doctrine, as developed by the Courts, has also expanded 
the non-exhaustive list, towards including new rights.815 In other words, EU 
citizens have arguably benefited from rights other than those explicitly mentioned 
in Article 20(2) TFEU, rebutting the suggestion of McCarthy that the substance of 
the right test put forward by the CJEU in Ruiz Zambrano, was only applicable to 
the ‘rights listed in Article 20(2) TFEU’.816 This consideration is arguably rather 
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unexpected and inaccurate since, as discussed earlier,817 the recent series of 
case law protected EU citizens against forced removal from EU territory 
altogether818 and granted the ability to benefit from equality in a wholly internal 
situation, rights that are not expressly listed under Article 20(2) TFEU.819 The 
essence of EU citizenship is therefore much broader than the list provided under 
Article 20(2) TFEU and besides the textual and judicial arguments, this legal 
reasoning is also widely accepted by scholars, even those who stand against 
such a development.820 As Kochenov rightly argues, having the supranational-
level status of citizenship as such, is undeniably protected by Union law and 
unequivocally connected to an undisclosed set of rights, which is a construct not 
necessarily originating in Article 20 TFEU, but in the general broader 
understanding of what citizenship entails.821  
The new judicially developed doctrine has therefore affirmed, that the precise 
extent of Union citizenship rights, cannot be clearly defined in a strictly textual 
sense, although it is greatly believed to be a ‘much roomier’ category compared 
to the list of Article 20 TFEU.822 As a result, the opportunity to examine a potential, 
further, extension of the scope of application of EU fundamental rights is given, 
considering that the overall effects of the test in the context of EU citizenship, 
depend on the rights considered to be EU citizens’ rights.823  
5.4.3 Adding value to EU citizenship 
The last main implication of the new doctrine at EU level, relates to the meaning 
and value that the concept of Union citizenship has been granted. EU citizenship 
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has proved to be something more than a parasitic upon exercising free movement 
between Member States and more than another gear within the internal market 
framework. It actually has some autonomous content and the Treaty provisions 
establishing it, are more than a ‘fifth freedom’ which protects economically 
inactive free movers.824 Specifically, by promising in Rottmann and Ruiz 
Zambrano to turn EU citizenship rights into the fundamental lens, through which 
to consider fundamental rights and the essence of EU federalism, the Court had 
moved from the “purely market-oriented, cross-border logic to a citizenship and 
rights-based constitution of the vertical delimitation of the national and EU-level 
competences”.825  
Although the Court, appeared to be taking back its own word in the subsequent 
cases of McCarthy and Dereci, “triggering vagueness and doctrinal 
inconsistency”,826 the significance of the doctrine cannot be dismissed, especially 
since it is still developing through the Court’s case law. Thus, it would not be 
utopian to say, that it can truly change the boundaries between national and EU 
legal orders further, inter alia, by making more rights available to EU citizens, 
regardless of their cross-border activity within the internal market. In the words of 
Kochenov, EU citizenship is not only turning the EU into a mature legal system, 
but it has now “demonstrated its readiness to protect individuals in their capacities 
as EU citizens from the unjust claims of competing authorities”.827   
The added value of EU citizenship after the Zambrano ruling is also clearly 
demonstrated within the sphere of Brexit. In particular, the District Court decided 
to make a reference to the ECJ on the issue of EU citizenship rights of UK 
nationals after Brexit. By referring to previous case law of the ECJ, including 
Grzelczyck and Rottmann, and based on Article 20 TFEU, the applicants argued 
that citizens currently holding the status of EU citizenship, cannot be deprived en 
masse of the rights enshrined therein, because their national state is leaving the 
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EU.828 The Amsterdam District Court was convinced, on this basis, to send a 
preliminary reference to the ECJ stating that “it is reasonable to doubt the 
correctness of the interpretation of Article 20 [TFEU] that the loss of the status of 
citizen of an EU member state also leads to loss of EU citizenship”.829 
Accordingly, two questions have been included in the reference; the first asks the 
Court whether the UK’s withdrawal means that UK nationals will automatically 
lose EU citizenship and the rights enshrined therein. If the answer to the first 
question is negative, then the national court asks the Court to determine what 
conditions should apply to the maintenance or limitation of those rights.830 Despite 
the fact that the request for a preliminary reference to the ECJ was initially 
approved, emphasising the fundamental status of Union citizenship, the 
arguments put forward in the claim seem quite weak. This weakness primarily 
owes to the fact that no Brexit deal has been concluded yet, which increases the 
possibilities of rendering the reference premature.831 
The Dutch state and the city of Amsterdam appealed against the ruling of the 
lower court arguing that they have “serious doubts over the admissibility of the 
planned questions”, because the dispute is clearly hypothetical. Although the 
Appeal Court agreed with the District Court that the position of British nationals 
post-Brexit, is a matter of EU law, it focused on the fact that the actual claims and 
the group of claimants are ‘insufficiently concrete’ to be referred to the ECJ in this 
way, dismissing the case on procedural grounds.832 It specifically established that 
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the claims under dispute are too vague and indeterminate in order to be granted 
a preliminary reference.833 Notwithstanding the eventual rejection of the request, 
the claim itself constitutes compelling evidence of the value afforded to EU 
citizenship post-Ruiz Zambrano, as well as of the autonomous element it holds. 
By assessing the potentially expansive effects of Ruiz Zambrano, on the scope 
of EU fundamental rights protection, it is argued that the ECJ can employ EU 
citizenship, as a device for further centralisation of rights by protecting the 
substance of the rights attached to this status.834 The extent to which EU 
citizenship can serve as a federalising device and create a link between EU 
citizenship and fundamental rights, to enhance the protection of EU citizens, is 
discussed in detail in Chapter 6. 
5.4.4 National implications of the doctrine 
The recent case law, especially Ruiz Zambrano, has also resulted in implications 
on the national citizenship legal regimes. While Rottmann did not attract 
widespread attention due to the sui generis nature of its facts, Ruiz Zambrano 
has driven the Member States to intervene in the case arguing that the matter did 
not fall within the scope of EU law. Yet, the Court ignored this intervention, forcing 
the Member States to comply with the ruling. One element of the national 
response, both by national authorities and courts, was to limit Zambrano as much 
as possible to its facts. One way of doing this is through the interrelation between 
immigration and naturalization policies. In particular, Member States may seek to 
compensate for their loss of sovereignty in migration issues with a tightening-up 
of their policies of naturalization, which still remains under their competence, in 
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particular by departing from, or restricting the ius soli birth right citizenship 
approach.835  
Of all the Member States, Ireland was the one affected the most by the Zambrano 
ruling, since it had granted unrestricted ius soli rights until 2004. Particularly, in 
Ireland, the Minister had inter alia, refused to extend the right to work aspect of 
Zambrano to Romanian and Bulgarian parents of Irish citizen children, who did 
not have an unrestricted access to the labour market and the right to work in 
Ireland, under the transitional rules in place, since the 2007 accession of 
Romania and Bulgaria, until the end of 2013.836 Within the transitional regime, 
Member States can maintain measures restricting access to the labour market in 
case of ‘serious disturbances of its labour market or threat’, until the end of the 
seven-year period since the date of accession.837  
The German courts had quickly responded to the Ruiz Zambrano ruling and tried 
to identify its possible consequences, by testing the limits of the new 
development, as the Iida case shows,838 while the narrow interpretation of the 
doctrine by the ECJ in Dereci and the flexibility in O&S, were accordingly adopted 
by the Federal Constitutional Court. More importantly, the substance of the rights 
doctrine has been classified as a subsidiary category, which can only be 
examined after analysing the special provisions of German and European law. 
According to Schonberger and Thym, this has the advantage that national Courts 
of First Instance, will interpret the national law in light of the ECHR standards, 
before responding to the often vague ECJ criteria in the wake of the Ruiz 
Zambrano ruling.839 The German courts have therefore tried to delineate the 
consequences of the doctrine, but their approach seems to have undermined the 
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EU legal order as a whole, by classifying it as the last legal standard for 
assessment, subsequent to the ECHR and national law.  
Moreover, in the UK the Border Agency (UKBA), has been anxious to ensure that 
there is a nexus of dependency before the Zambrano approach can be applied 
and have also introduced new regulations to amend legislation, in order to 
preclude ‘Zambrano carers’ from claiming various income-related benefits. In 
particular, the Social Security (Habitual Residence) (Amendment) Regulations 
2012, the Child Benefit and Child Tax Credit (Miscellaneous Amendments) 
Regulations 2012 and the Allocation of Housing and Homelessness (Eligibility) 
(England) (Amendment) Regulations 2012. The legality of these Regulations was 
challenged by Mrs HC, arguing that the denial of mainstream welfare and housing 
provision to a ‘Zambrano-carer’ and her child is unlawful, amounting to unlawful 
discrimination under Article 21 of the Charter.840 It was a common ground that the 
applicant is entitled to reside in the UK as the carer of her children, due to the 
ruling in Ruiz Zambrano. Therefore, the question of EU law arose, on whether the 
EU Charter applies and if so, if it would make any difference. The Court agreed 
with the approach that it is not enough that Mrs HC is personally within the scope 
of the Treaty by virtue of her derivative right of residence. The issue must be 
judged by reference to the test set by Article 51, assessing whether there is a 
direct link between the Regulations in dispute and the implementation of that 
law.841 The Supreme Court held that Mrs HC cannot rely on the Charter to 
establish a right to further financial assistance and that EU law requires no more 
for the children of a ‘Zambrano carer’, than the practical support necessary for 
them to remain in the EU. Thus, the Supreme Court made clear that the Ruiz 
Zambrano ruling is saying nothing about entitlements to benefits and interpreted 
it, as falling outside the EU legislation on access to social security and other 
welfare benefits.842 It should be rather sufficient to ensure that their rights as EU 
citizens (the right to reside), are not effectively deprived. In the words of Lady 
Hale, the change to the 2006 Immigration Regulations, allowing Zambrano-carers 
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to live and work there, was of course implementing Union law. Even though the 
changes to the Regulations at issue, were a consequence of the development of 
Union law, they could not be regarded as implementing it. Various questions are 
arguably left unsolved from the judgment of the Supreme Court. What if the 
submissions to the Court had referred to the more general ‘fundamental principle 
of equal treatment that is part of the EU’ or to Article 18 TFEU rather than the EU 
Charter? Would there be any possibility for the case to fall within the scope of EU 
law? In other words, would the amendments of the regulations denying a 
Zambrano-carer and her child, mainstream welfare and housing provision, be 
rendered incompatible with EU law? 
Similarly, in the Netherlands, the government took a very restrictive approach in 
implementing the consequences of the Zambrano ruling, including arguing that it 
would suffice for grandparents to take care of the child, which the domestic court 
rejected. The judicial division of the Council of State passed two judgments in 
March 2012, defining guidelines on how the ‘genuine enjoyment’ of EU citizenship 
can be safeguarded, holding that it is sufficient for one parent to be present.843 
Moreover, based on the court’s ruling, even if the parent has problems caring for 
the child due to a medical or a psychological condition, there is no reason to grant 
residence to the TCN parent, since public assistance can be sought.844 
Although Member States, through the judicial and the legislative branches, have 
tried to minimise the effects of the recently developed doctrine, it can be 
concluded that national courts have, in their majority, responded to the ECJ’s 
case law with contained compliance beyond expectations; on the one hand 
complying with individual judgments, but on the other, maintaining the restrictive 
practices, while avoiding systematic reforms on the disputed issues.845 
Contained-compliance measures also remain vulnerable to future challenges, 
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inviting further Union judicial interference in domestic affairs,846 contrary to the 
discretion allowed to national courts in the case law succeeding Ruiz Zambrano, 
as discussed above. It is thus more effective to proceed with enhancing the 
current fundamental rights system through the judicial doctrine, on the EU level 
according to a federal logic, rather than on the national.  
5.5 Future potential of the ‘doctrine’ for fundamental rights 
Although the substance of the rights test is not an entirely new concept for the 
ECJ, its most recent application in the EU citizenship case law is markedly 
different, achieving constitutional objectives, that ten or even five years 
previously, could only be attainable in theory. The substance of the rights doctrine 
has served as a tool for claiming jurisdiction and has undoubtedly endorsed the 
constructivist potential of the concept of EU citizenship, which is now closer than 
ever in becoming part of the ‘fundamental status of nationals of the Member 
States’.847 It has also added more consistency on the demarcation of the scope 
of EU law and strengthened the protection of EU rights for ‘Ruiz Zambrano 
carers’. The role of the CJEU has been paramount in the development of the 
doctrine, primarily due to its role as a ‘maker’ of EU law and has arguably started 
a new period of judicial activism, in relation to the scope and character of EU 
citizenship. In other words, the Court has endowed itself with a novel instrument, 
which may potentially be directed against a variety of national measures.848  
Despite the evident benefits gained by the doctrine, the perpetuation of it is rightly 
questioned and doubted, since the route offered by the Court has become narrow 
and full of obstacles, especially after the Dereci and McCarthy cases, as 
discussed above. The rulings of the Court in Dereci and Iida are however not 
necessarily conclusive or condemnatory, for a possible further expansion of the 
substance of the rights doctrine. The criteria of the recently developed doctrine 
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are defined on a case-by-case basis, which allows wide margin of application in 
future cases – where the facts of the case under consideration are comparable – 
rather than limiting the doctrine’s use. Moreover, the doctrine has been correctly 
applied strictly by the Courts, since as explained above, it should only be used 
when a deprivation of EU citizenship rights’ substance occurs and EU intervention 
is necessary to observe the effectiveness of EU law. With the strict application of 
the doctrine, the conflicts with the principles of conferral and the division of 
powers between the supranational and national levels, are prevented.   
Even though the impact of the substance of the rights doctrine is currently likely 
to remain limited, its significance should not be disregarded, as it constitutes a 
major step towards a more coherent and citizen-friendly Union. In addition, 
despite how fast a transformation can actually occur, the recent case law 
definitely enables a fairly accurate prediction, of where the development of EU 
citizenship will be going in the near future.849 As will be assessed in Chapter 6, 
there are arguments to support that the substance of the rights doctrine is not 
constrained to its current ‘free movement rights’ form,850 but can be rather 
extended towards protecting more rights, largely filling the gaps of the current 
fundamental rights protection system. The doctrine can particularly go beyond 
the free movement link, towards a connection to effective judicial protection that 
could constitute a ‘gateway’ to the protection of substantive rights.  
The expansion and potential of the doctrine, largely depends on the rights that 
are regarded as being part of the EU citizenship rights package, thus establishing 
a link between EU fundamental and citizenship rights is the key to broaden the 
scope of EU citizenship rights and in turn to reinforce the system. Moreover, it is 
argued that there are general principles, such as the principle of effective judicial 
protection that also have the potential of been further expanded through the lens 
of the judicially developed doctrine. New cases will undoubtedly continue to arrive 
in Luxembourg, offering the Court the opportunity to provide further insights into 
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the complex status of EU citizenship and the even more complex relationship with 
EU fundamental rights.851 
  
                                                 
851 Hanneke van Eijken and Sybe A. de Vries, ‘A New Route into the Promised Land? Being a European 
Citizen after Ruiz Zambrano’ (2011) 36 European Law Review 704, 721. 
204 
 
6 CHAPTER 6 – ESTABLISHING A LINK BETWEEN EU FUNDAMENTAL AND 
CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS 
6.1 Introduction 
The legal scope of EU citizenship has expanded significantly since its 
establishment in the Treaty of Maastricht. That, in turn, paved the way for an 
ongoing increase in the number of cases which now fall within the legal scope of 
EU citizenship and consequently within the ambit of EU law. The preceding 
chapters have argued that its constructivist character has culminated with the 
recent judicial development of the substance of the rights doctrine, which has not 
only overcome the limits faced by the cross-border requirement but has also 
paved the way for using the substance of the rights doctrine as an EU self-
standing test, based wholly in the EU’s internal ambit. A certain degree of 
autonomy of EU citizenship has been also identified. These developments, 
arguably have led to a more citizen-friendly and constitutionalised Union.852 As a 
result, the rationale behind the recently developed doctrine can be seen as the 
key in broadening the scope of EU citizenship rights, so as to allow a citizen to 
rely on additional rights in purely internal situations, when an infringement occurs 
that deprives EU citizens of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of their 
rights. 
In order to expand the scope of application of EU citizenship it is necessary to 
examine whether other rights can be regarded as being part of its rights package, 
inter alia, by establishing a link between EU citizenship rights – already falling 
within the ambit of the doctrine – and EU fundamental rights. The first prospect 
to be assessed is whether all EU fundamental rights can be considered as EU 
citizenship rights, which would arguably imply a significant extension to the EU 
fundamental rights’ scope. Such a prospect would allow citizens to rely on EU 
fundamental rights in wholly internal situations, if a violation occurs which would 
deprive them of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of their rights, bringing 
the case ‘within the scope of EU law’. The second prospect that will be examined, 
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is the extent to which the substance of the rights doctrine can work as a protype 
for further enhancement of a specific group of rights (other than EU citizenship 
rights), that necessitate further protection. This proposal ultimately aims to 
broaden the legal jurisdiction of the CJEU and strengthen its impact in situations 
that jeopardise the effectiveness of EU law. 
In light of the above, the Chapter starts by examining the traditional relationship 
between EU fundamental and citizenship rights, namely if a converging point 
exists between them or to what extent they are rather divergent. At the same 
time, the historical archives of the negotiations during the adoption of EU 
citizenship, are examined to determine whether the current relationship is the 
desired one or whether it got lost on the way and the role this can play in the 
protection of fundamental rights (6.2). After the current relationship is analysed 
and the link between the two concepts is determined as the next logical step to 
take, the Chapter will conduct a detailed analysis of previous attempts which have 
been made to expand the traditional scope of EU citizenship towards fundamental 
rights (6.3). Although none of them has adequately affected the structure of 
protection for EU citizens, they provide support for the viability of the pathway to 
enhance fundamental rights protection through the substance of the rights 
doctrine (6.4). A detailed legal analysis of a judicial incorporation proposal is 
made using a three-stage jurisdictional test, to include exceptional internal 
situations, within the scope of EU law. Lastly, the Chapter discusses possible 
objections, legal or non-legal that are likely to arise against the judicial 
incorporation proposed and through counterarguments will attempt to 
convincingly refute them (6.5).   
6.2 The relationship between EU fundamental and EU citizenship 
rights 
With the establishment of Union citizenship, a list of rights was agreed to be 
enshrined therein, providing some protection to EU citizens. The main debate 
evolved around the kind of rights to be incorporated in the list and consequently, 
whether a connection should be established with fundamental rights, formerly 
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recognised as general principles of EU law by the CJEU.853 Eventually, the will to 
achieve such a legal connection was lacking, although it is widely argued that the 
reinforcement of the protection of fundamental rights at the Union level and the 
status of EU citizenship are closely connected.854 Despite the fact that no link 
between EU fundamental and citizenship rights was formally established, this 
possibility became more attainable with the development of the substance of the 
rights doctrine discussed in Chapter 5, which has clearly broadened the ambit of 
EU citizenship rights. Therefore, the promising judicial doctrine, combined with 
the initial desire for a more expanded list of EU citizenship rights and the deep-
seated opinion that the missing connection between the legal status of EU 
citizenship and the principle of equality in EU law, undermine the essence of EU 
citizenship, can arguably lead to a structural change in the protection of EU 
citizens.855 
6.2.1 The intended connection between fundamental and citizenship 
rights 
Although initial desire for a structural connection between EU citizenship and EU 
fundamental rights has never materialised or formally achieved until today, it is 
important to consider the arguments surrounding this intention even before the 
introduction of citizenship, which are arguably relevant to the recent 
developments as well. During the negotiations of the Maastricht Treaty for the 
adoption of EU citizenship, numerous attempts were made by the Member States 
and EU institutions, to include fundamental rights among the list of EU citizenship 
rights and to make Union citizenship a genuine part of the constitutional order of 
EU law.856 In particular, to render all or a significant number of fundamental rights, 
as EU citizenship rights.  
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The European Parliament in an interim Report of the Committee on Constitutional 
Affairs, gave some insights as to how the formation of a Community citizenship 
should have taken place and the value to be given to such a concept.857 It 
specifically destined Union citizenship for a constitutional development that would 
make EU citizens and the respect for their rights, the central concern of the Union. 
The importance of including fundamental rights within the concept of Union 
citizenship, seemed to be drawn from two main factors.858 First of all, the 
establishment of such a link, was necessary on part of the Union, if it wished to 
endow itself with an ‘original’ constitutional order.859 Particularly, the Parliament 
rightly argued that a Union with a constitutional order, must itself guarantee the 
respect of fundamental rights and draw up a broad list of rights, even if an 
incomplete one and accede to those international conventions which provide 
external guarantees of compliance with these rights.860 As it is seen further, this 
factor is still relevant to the current debate, since the Union has arguably not 
achieved the necessary constitutionality yet. 
The second factor for promoting the inclusion of fundamental rights in the concept 
of EU citizenship, relates to the rapid developments, at the time, of 
intergovernmental networks at Community level. For instance, specific reference 
is made to the Trevi Group and associated initiatives that were created to counter 
terrorism and to coordinate policing in the Community.861 The so-called Trevi 
Group,862 existed outside of the formal institutional structure of the EU, though it 
included all of the Community’s members and mirrored its Council of Ministers 
and presidency.863 It was thus a highly intergovernmental organisation, where the 
Community’s Court and the Parliament played no role. Although the Trevi Group 
has ceased to exist, after the entry into force of the Treaty of Maastricht, since it 
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was integrated into the then Justice and Home Affairs pillar, such initiatives are 
generally escaping political and jurisdictional control at European level and purely 
national controls had proven to be inadequate.864 The situation thus called for 
further protection, which at that time seemed suitable and efficient to be coming 
from the establishment of a connection between fundamental rights and 
citizenship, as argued by the European Parliament. Special reference was also 
interestingly made to the right to family life on the ground that fundamental rights 
linked to the status of citizens, must not be limited to the individual sphere and 
must protect the citizen, in his or her social setting and provide the essential 
guarantees of an individual’s complete self-development, which certainly includes 
the family.865 
The institutional contribution on the part of the European Commission largely 
shared the ideas of the European Parliament on the content of EU citizenship 
proposed, indicating that the basic human rights were an essential element, for 
that purpose.866 The Commission accordingly, suggested a specific reference to 
the ECHR and was in favour of writing into the Treaty rights linked specifically to 
the status of European citizens, including freedom of movement, freedom of 
residence, voting rights, and civic, economic and social rights and obligations to 
be decided at a later stage.867 The Commission therefore promoted an evolving 
character of the concept of citizenship, dependent on the development of the 
Union itself, which is evident today as well considering the consistent judicial 
developments.868 
The Member States also forwarded various ideas and positions during the 
Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) in 1990. Specifically, the Spanish 
contribution was the most forthright proponent of citizenship, identifying it as the 
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foundation of the Union’s democratic legitimacy.869 In particular, Felipe González 
advocated the creation of a ‘common citizenship’ which would make citizens the 
protagonists in the integration process870 in addition to setting out the legal and 
operational aspects of a European Ombudsman in more detail.871 Article 9 of the 
Spanish Proposal specifically implied an extension or implicit recognition of the 
capacity of the Ombudsman to monitor the respect for fundamental rights in 
Community administrative acts, while no precise relationship with fundamental 
rights for EU citizens was made.872 Above all, by indicating that the proposal’s 
mission would be to help Union citizens defend their rights under the Treaty, this 
provided “direct authorisation not only to deal with the rights granted specifically 
in the various Treaty provisions, but also to safeguard the fundamental rights 
generally granted under Article 2 of the Proposal” that being the fundamental 
rights recognised by the Member States’ constitutional traditions and the 
ECHR.873 The model contained in the Spanish proposal was eventually rejected 
by the European Parliament and the Commission, as lacking precision and 
because of an alleged erosion caused to the Parliament’s powers.874 However, it 
constitutes a remarkable contribution to observe in respect to a future possibility 
of establishing a link between EU citizenship and fundamental rights. 
Lastly, the Belgian memorandum, although not specifically mentioning the 
concept of citizenship, concentrated on the need to reduce the ‘democratic 
shortfall’ and argued that a ‘Peoples’ Europe’ and the protection of fundamental 
rights, was one way of doing this.875 The content within the list of rights was 
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ultimately a political decision, driven by fears of creating an unwanted and 
threatening federalising tool, as well as a premature common standard of 
protection.    
6.2.2 The initial plans for EU citizenship; still relevant and pertinent?  
The initial propositions and intentions put forward, on the model and the content 
of EU citizenship to be adopted, included some very constructive ones that if 
adopted, might have created a much more effective system in protecting the 
fundamental rights of citizens. This is of course only an assumption, based on 
propositions and arguments dating back to the 1990s, when no specific or 
dedicated, Union instrument existed to particularly protect fundamental rights. 
The question is thus to what extent the inclusion of fundamental rights in EU 
citizenship is still desired nowadays and whether the reasons submitted almost 
three decades ago, constitute valid arguments, justifying the desire for the same 
expansion now. The European Parliament, very clearly indicated that such a 
development was necessary in order to include an ‘original’ constitutional order 
in the Union and secondly, in order to protect citizens from structures outside the 
formal institutional structure of the EU.876 Both these factors initially pointed out 
in 1991, are arguably still relevant in the need to establish a link between EU 
fundamental rights and Union citizenship. Although the structure of protecting 
fundamental rights has substantially changed and the EU Charter currently 
exists, the present fundamental rights protection system has proven largely 
incompetent in protecting EU citizens, as seen in Chapter 3, while the list of EU 
citizenship rights has not been adequately extended.    
Starting with the first, the internal market is a vitally important means; through 
which the aims and ideas of the EU are realised, including the encouragement 
and development of intensive forms of transnational cooperation, the dissolving 
of internal borders and hardening of the external ones.877 Therefore, the EU exists 
to a great extent, to deliver a market, without however entailing that the EU is 
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nothing more than its internal market. The Union is characterised by its political 
constitutional nature, as discussed in Chapter 2. It is a polity based on a 
constitutional framework underpinned by the rule of law, respect for fundamental 
rights and principles of accountability.878 Its constitutional character was intended 
to be further embraced, by the introduction of the concept of citizenship, whose 
essence was and still remains the constitutional arrangement made for 
participation, by a defined category of individuals, in the life of the State.879 
Moreover, according to Harden, ‘economic relationships are important, but 
cannot provide the sole foundation of a constitution’.880 However, despite the 
symbolic power of the membership concept, it is argued that Union citizenship 
has not yet completely emerged as the basis for effective and coherent political 
action,881 mainly in the sector of effectively protecting the rights of Union 
citizens.882 It is thus evident that the first argument put forward by the European 
Parliament in 1991, is still valid and applicable today, in order for the Union to 
really enrich itself with an ‘original’ constitutional order.883 
The second argument put forward by the European Parliament in promoting the 
inclusion of fundamental rights in Union citizenship rights, relates to the protection 
against initiatives that generally escape political and jurisdictional control at EU 
level, since they fall outside the scope of EU law.884 The Trevi Group at that time 
constituted such an initiative, while the ESM seems to currently fall in a relatively 
similar category. As has been extensively discussed in Chapter 4, the ESM is 
formed as an intergovernmental Treaty, beyond the rules of the EMU, 
consequently falling outside the scope of the Charter. Although there has been 
some development in closing the ‘accountability gaps’ left by the financial 
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crisis,885 more specifically by the financial assistance mechanisms, the gaps in 
effective judicial protection still exist and the expansion of citizenship rights 
through the recent ‘substance of the rights doctrine’, would arguably fill some of 
them. It therefore seems that even decades later, the rights of citizens are 
threatened and left exposed to infringements by the actions of intergovernmental 
organisations and/or Treaties, which cannot be scrutinised under EU law, and 
neither can sufficiently be scrutinised under national law.886 The inclusion of 
fundamental rights within Union citizenship, in order to provide protection against 
actions of intergovernmental networks at the Union level, as put forward by the 
European Parliament, is still a valid argument, especially in relation to the 
protection against actions of the financial assistance mechanisms. The rights 
included in the concept of citizenship must not be limited to the individual sphere 
but should rather protect the citizen, where fundamental rights are concerned, in 
his social setting and actual mode of existence in society.887   
Despite the direct relevance of the arguments put forward by the European 
Parliament towards the current situation, a substantial development occurred in 
the field, which differentiated the situation to a great extent, namely the adoption 
of the Charter of fundamental rights. Such an instrument was absent during the 
negotiations of establishing the Union citizenship and as a result the inclusion of 
fundamental rights therein, was even more desired. The fact that a Union ‘bill of 
rights’ currently exists does not eliminate the desire for establishing such a link, 
since as discussed in Chapter 3, the EU Charter has been largely inefficient in 
protecting citizens’ rights, especially during the financial crisis. Therefore, the 
establishment of a link between EU fundamental and EU citizenship rights can 
arguably occur through the so-called ‘substance of the rights doctrine’. According 
to the recent judicial developments of EU citizenship and the establishment of the 
‘substance of the rights’ doctrine, discussed earlier, any fundamental right falling 
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within the list of EU citizenship rights, could be relied upon by an EU citizen 
against the state in a purely internal situation.888 
6.2.3 The establishment of a link as the next logical step 
In the analysis above, the arguments supporting the establishment of a link 
between EU citizenship and EU fundamental rights during the Maastricht Treaty 
negotiations were found to be relevant to the current state of affairs as well, 
despite the fact that almost 30 years have passed since then. However, those 
propositions alone are not sufficient to justify the necessity of this desired link as 
the next logical step. This part will therefore set out the three main reasons that 
verify the fact that the establishment of the said link constitutes the next logical 
step. 
The first reason lies on the fact that EU fundamental and citizenship rights are 
very closely connected concepts, sharing correlative aims and characteristics. 
They have a notable historical and teleological connection since both concepts 
developed around the same period of time as a result of the pressing legitimacy 
question.889 Particularly, throughout the integration process, the reinforcement of 
the protection of fundamental rights at the European level and the empowerment 
of Union citizenship as a fundamental status, have been two closely connected 
phenomena.890 The rights of Article 20 TFEU, have been accordingly 
incorporated in the Charter and are therefore part of the EU fundamental rights.891 
The interconnection between them, is also evident from the initial desire of 
articulating a legal connection between these two concepts as discussed above, 
which was eventually not embraced; not because of a conflicting nature not 
allowing for such a development, but rather due to fears that it was premature to 
consider citizenship as a constitutive element of political union.892 On the 
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contrary, citizenship and fundamental rights are closely connected and share the 
same ultimate objective, namely to put the individual at the centre of the 
constitutional construction of an integrated Europe.893    
The mutual strength and nature shared by the two concepts, was also reflected 
in the Constitutional Treaty, which placed them together, under Part I of the basic 
provisions on ‘Fundamental Rights and Citizenship of the Union’.894 Even though 
this clearly visible link created by the Constitutional Treaty had disappeared in 
the Treaty of Lisbon, the Preamble of the EU Charter emphasises it again, by 
stating that the Union “places the individual at the heart of its activities, by 
establishing the citizenship of the Union and by creating an area of freedom, 
security and justice”.895 This close inter-relation and the heavy dependence on 
each other is often reflected in case law of the Court as well, since in many of its 
citizenship rulings the ECJ seemed to be guided by a fundamental rights 
discourse in all but the name.896 Therefore, due to the allegedly closed inter-
connection of the two concepts, the Charter itself or the fundamental rights as 
general principles of EU law could constitute the ideal means for giving further 
substance to the citizen concept.897 
Secondly, besides the close relationship between the two concepts, it is well-
established that the concept of Union citizenship as it currently stands, lacks 
substance898 and in order to be taken seriously it should not be completely 
separated from fundamental rights.899 As discussed earlier, the Union has been 
largely preserving excessive focus on economic freedoms and is mostly hanging 
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upon market-oriented criteria, to the detriment of other forms of citizenship and 
of the objectives of a genuine constitutionalised entity.900 Since the enforcement 
the Treaty of Maastricht, a dramatic increase in the number of persons who could 
potentially benefit from EU law has occurred,901 while the Treaty has provided an 
alternative to a largely market-oriented Union, towards a more political one.902 
Although the CJEU has also taken significant steps towards a more meaningful 
citizenship, a substantive citizenship, legally and politically, within a 
constitutionalised Union, must clearly signal its preparedness to protect 
individuals in their capacities as EU citizens.903  This is predominantly the case 
when situations arise that require urgent action to prevent EU citizens’ rights from 
being rapidly affected across the Union. Therefore, a concrete link between EU 
citizenship and fundamental rights would clearly mark the departure from the 
‘impasse’, to eventually generate a real and substantive EU citizenship as 
intended, after a wait of almost three decades.904  
Lastly, due to the evolving character of EU citizenship it should normally be 
subjected to constant evolution and progress, contrary to the current stagnation 
of the list of rights attached to it, especially before Ruiz Zambrano. As seen in 
Chapter 2, Article 20(2) unequivocally states that EU citizens “shall enjoy the 
rights and be subject to the duties provided for in the Treaties…inter alia” the 
rights under paragraph 2, suggesting that the citizens can also have other rights 
beyond those expressly stated there. Additionally, the Treaty of Maastricht 
contained a procedure for further development of citizenship, if existing rights 
needed to be strengthened or new ones to be added,905 indicating that the 
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catalogue of rights enshrined by the Treaty is not intended to be a definitive one. 
Based on this provision, the Council was allowed to exercise positive integration, 
while the future provisions would not be automatically binding, but would rather 
be left to the discretion of the Member States.906 Moreover, the Commission had 
been entrusted with guiding the evolution of citizenship and its parallel 
development alongside the Union, through its reporting duties under the 
Treaty.907  
This notable procedure for further development of citizenship, is currently 
enshrined in Article 25 TFEU in a slightly different wording,908 yet still giving the 
possibility to enlarge the EU citizenship rights’ list, as well as to formulate new 
rights hitherto unknown to Union law.  It accordingly follows that Article 25(2) 
incorporates a double “political safeguard of federalism”.909 It firstly safeguards 
Member States as a whole, since unanimous voting is required within the Council 
and secondly, it also protects national parliaments as well as the citizens 
themselves, where their consent is required by the national constitutions to such 
measures.910 Moreover, Article 25(2) TFEU is acting “without prejudice to other 
provisions of the Treaties”, including Article 6(1) TEU which indicates that the 
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“provisions of the Charter shall not extend in any way the competences of the 
Union as defined in the Treaties”. Consequently, an expansion of EU citizenship 
rights through Article 25(2) TFEU, must also comply with the limitation enshrined 
in Article 6(1) TEU. 
These citizenship rights’ provisions, included in the EU Treaties since the 
enforcement of the Maastricht Treaty, were meant not only to reflect economic 
reality, but also to extend the goal of political co-operation among the Member 
States.911 At the same time, the procedure enshrined in Article 25 TFEU has 
provided a solid basis for further enlargement of the catalogue of rights attached 
to citizenship, confirming the dynamic and evolving nature of citizenship. The 
constructivist nature of citizenship, is of its most significant characteristics,912 
which was developed, as a channel for incorporating controversial socio-
economic rights and consequently, as a prerequisite for a ‘real Union’ which 
through the promotion of economic and social cohesion, would aim to overcome 
the inequalities between citizens.913 Although this mechanism has been left on 
the side, it clearly gives teeth to the arguments in favour of extending the list of 
EU citizenship rights, by confirming the constructivist nature of citizenship and its 
ability to be further evolved. It is in addition affirming the fact that moving EU 
citizens at some point need, at least, effective judicial protection or the right to 
property just as much as they need the rest of EU citizenship rights. 
To sum up, in view of the evolving character of EU citizenship and the efforts 
made for a substantive EU citizenship, it would be unthinkable for the Court to 
interpret the scope and content of the citizenship provisions in the Treaty, without 
referring to fundamental rights.914 In the words of Kochenov, fundamental rights 
should not be ruled out based on a narrow reading of the text of the Treaties, in 
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the name of a vague goal of protecting the delimitation of powers in a Union.915 
A citizenship without fundamental rights cannot be viable in a constitutional 
system, which is properly operating.  
6.3 Expanding the traditional scope of EU citizenship towards 
fundamental rights 
The concept of EU citizenship has constantly proved its significance in expanding 
and reinforcing the scope of protection under EU law, primarily due to its 
constructive nature. The desire and the necessity for further improvement 
however remains, so as to overcome the deficiencies faced during periods of 
crises, in protecting EU citizens’ rights. Such a margin for improvement exists 
and can be achieved through the establishment of a link between the 
jurisprudential doctrines of EU citizenship and EU fundamental rights, which has 
arguably been determined as the ‘next logical step’ to the evolvement of Union 
citizenship. These two concepts have only rarely crossed paths in an explicit way, 
despite the initial intention before establishing EU citizenship, and their 
connection remains greatly complex to articulate.916 The Union citizenship on the 
one hand, is the result of the initiatives of the Council and the Commission in 
accordance with set political objectives, while EU fundamental rights owe their 
creation to “a correction the EC law’s claim to supremacy”917 and their scope of 
application is thus strict, based on the principle of attribution of competences.  
The judicial developments discussed,918 have largely overturned the structure of 
fundamental rights protection and the allocation of competences, primarily after 
the establishment of the ‘substance of the rights’ doctrine as a stand-alone test 
of jurisdiction. According to Sanchez, these developments signal a change in the 
perception of the protective roles of the Union and the Member States, which also 
legitimate the attempts made, towards evolving the constitutional structure of the 
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Union.919 Throughout the years, numerous proposals were made, to strengthen 
the relationship between Union citizenship and EU fundamental rights, even 
before the Ruiz Zambrano developments. In particular, they were mostly based 
on the EU Charter, to extend the scope of application of fundamental rights and 
thus the protection of EU citizens. This section examines three different proposals 
made, and although none of them has sufficiently benefited the structure of EU 
citizens’ protection, all three constitute a significant starting point for further 
analysis in the Chapter.   
6.3.1 Extending Charter rights to the moving citizens 
The idea of linking Union citizenship with EU fundamental rights was famously 
voiced within the Court by AG Jacobs in his Opinion in Konstantinidis, arguing 
that an EU citizen who exercises the freedom to move and reside within the 
Union, should also be entitled “to say ‘civis europaeus sum’ and invoke that status 
in order to oppose any violation of his fundamental rights”.920 In other words, he 
proposed to extend the application of EU fundamental rights in cases where an 
EU citizen moves from one Member State to another.921 Such an extension would 
however generate serious consequences, since movement would merely 
become a trigger for activating the Charter. Specifically, extending all the Charter 
rights to the moving citizens, would be in accordance with the competences of 
the EU, but would clearly create further problems in relation to reverse 
discrimination,922 which has already been recognised as a significant barrier to a 
‘real citizenship’.923 This proposition is rightly criticised by Sanchez as leading to 
a dead end, since it widens the gap between the protection offered to movers and 
non-movers, and a “corrective mechanism potentially entails a complete 
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generalisation of the scope of application of EU fundamental rights that is in 
conflict with primary law in force”.924 Following this expansive approach and 
advancing unilaterally in the protection of free movers, would thus worsen rather 
than solve, one of the major incongruities that affect the construction of the status 
of citizen of the Union.925 
More importantly, such an expansion would arguably diminish the constructive 
nature of the concept of EU citizenship as a fundamental status, since it would 
only focus on the market-oriented protection rather than the political aspect of it. 
If the moving European citizen can invoke the Charter, simply on the basis of 
moving or having moved across borders, many of the fundamental rights matters 
that would arise, if not the majority, would still have a weak or inexistent link with 
the movement factor.926 It would consequently broaden the lacuna between EU 
citizenship rights and EU fundamental rights, by generalising a different treatment 
in protection provided only to the moving citizens, diminishing the whole rationale 
of the fundamental rights protection system. This approach not only works 
contrary to the encompassing scope of the material scope of EU law as 
developed, but also against the aims and objectives of this thesis, which is 
primarily promoting a constructive character of EU citizenship, as well as a 
constitutionalised Union. 
6.3.2 Equating the ‘scope of EU law’ with the competences of the Union 
Among the various propositions made, AG Sharpston specifically proposed to 
extend the realm of EU fundamental rights to the fields covered by EU 
competences, namely to the Union’s exclusive or shared competences. 
Particularly, to equate the ‘scope of EU law’ for fundamental rights protection 
purposes, with the realm covered by the legislative competences of the Union 
regardless of whether such competences have been exercised or not.927 Such an 
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extension would prima facie increase the legal certainty by evenly aligning the 
functions of the Union with its material area of competences, which is of itself a 
citizen-friendly attribute, within the complex and pluralistic system of individual 
rights protection.928 At the same time, it would ensure uniform protection of 
fundamental rights and create a level-playing field in the application of 
fundamental rights, consequently creating the bases for a federal fundamental 
rights system.929  
On the other hand, it is rightly argued by von Bogdandy that equating the ‘scope 
of EU law’ with the Union’s competences is unlikely to lead to more consistency 
and clarity in the scope of fundamental rights, considering that the case law on 
EU competences is a largely complex issue and the object of critique in itself.930 
As a result, a lot of difficulties would possibly arise out of such a competence-
based system, although, the current ‘implementation of EU law’ notion is also 
ambiguous to a great extent, as previously discussed. Besides the argued high 
complexity, the system based on competences would keep the EU acting strictly 
within its legal powers or in the words of AG Sharpston, ‘within the four corners 
of its powers’,931 to the extent that this would not be prevented by the existing 
flexibility of the system, especially outside the sphere of exclusive competences. 
Such a proposal would in practice expose the gaps of EU law to conflicting 
national interpretations and would prevent the EU from being involved in cases 
‘potentially’ falling within its scope as it current works. Particularly, the current 
system of division of competences is not based on a catalogue, neither is 
structured on the basis of a strict division of competences ratione materiae.932 It 
is rather characterised by a flexible and dynamic essence, resting on explicit and 
implicit empowerments to complete various tasks and promote broader aims, “the 
pre-eminence of which makes necessary an opening clause to remediate the lack 
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of foresight in the letter of the Treaties”.933 Lastly, this approach can hardly fit 
within the meaning of Article 51(1) of the Charter and thus cannot be unilaterally 
decided by the Court, but it rather requires both the evolution of the case law, as 
well as an unequivocal political statement from the Member States, granting a 
new role for fundamental rights in the EU.934 
It is therefore argued that a different route must be followed, which enhances the 
protection of fundamental rights and overcomes the numerous deficiencies of the 
current system, while respecting the national identities of the Member States.935  
What needs to be kept by the competences-based approach, is a federal-like 
fundamental rights system, promoting the uniform application of fundamental 
rights in the EU, but with less implications on the division of competences, 
focusing only on the critical issues, where it is necessary.  
6.3.3 Reverse Solange doctrine 
A further idea was put forward by von Bogdandy, suggesting the exceptional 
involvement of the EU. Specifically, according to a ‘reverse Solange doctrine’, 
national measures that do not implement EU law, fall outside the scope of that 
law, as long as they do not constitute systemic violations of fundamental rights.936 
In other words, outside the Charter’s scope of application, a Union citizen cannot 
rely on EU fundamental rights, as long as it can be presumed that their respective 
essence, as set out in Article 2 TEU, is safeguarded in the Member State 
concerned.937 On the contrary, where national measures give rise to such 
systemic violations, EU citizens would enjoy a judicially enforceable EU law right 
of protection from these violations, by virtue of the Treaty provisions on EU 
citizenship, regardless of whether they move or remain in their Member State of 
origin.938 
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This proposal is based on the idea that beyond the scope of Article 51(1) of the 
Charter, the Member States normally stay autonomous in fundamental rights 
protection, provided that they safeguard the essence of fundamental rights as 
enshrined under Article 2 TEU. The substance of the rights doctrine also 
constitutes part of the theoretical background of the proposal, which according to 
von Bogdandy should be defined by the essence of fundamental rights enshrined 
in Article 2 TEU and be framed in a reverse Solange doctrine.939 Therefore, in the 
case of the systemic, exceptional violation of the essence of fundamental rights, 
the ‘substance of the rights’ of EU citizenship would be triggered as a basis of 
redress. 
The reverse Solange doctrine undoubtedly constitutes a significant attempt to 
connect EU citizenship and fundamental rights and is of great importance for the 
research. In particular, it would significantly create a “common minimum level of 
fundamental rights protection throughout the EU”, which would protect not only 
individuals but also the ‘constitutional core’ of the EU which comprises, at the 
very least, of the values set out in Article 2 TEU.940 The idea of protecting the 
constitutional core of the EU through safeguarding the values of Article 2 TEU is 
also embraced in the thesis’ ‘internal applicability of EU law test’, but for a 
different purpose. It will be particularly used in the first step of the test to clarify 
the fact that not all rights can be added in the list of Article 20 TFEU and set the 
boundaries of the test’s application. Further than that though, the reverse Solange 
doctrine is not seemingly suitable for the legal gaps left unresolved, during the 
financial crisis.941  
In particular, this proposal is likely to be dysfunctional in practice since in the 
majority of cases, it will be up to the national courts to decide if the presumption 
of equal rights is indeed rebutted, consequently disqualifying the CJEU from 
intervening.942 It is therefore questionable whether it would solve the deficiencies 
                                                 
939 ibid 518. 
940 Koen Lenaerts, ‘Linking EU Citizenship to Democracy’ (2015) Croatian Yearbook of European Law and 
Policy Editorial to Volume 11. 
941 For a detailed analysis of the financial crisis case study, see Chapter 4. 
942 Dimitry Kochenov, ‘On Policing Article 2 TEU Compliance – Reverse Solange And Systemic 
Infringements Analyzed’ (2013) 33 Polish Yearbook of International Law 145, 159; Dimitry Kochenov, ‘On 
Policing Article 2 TEU Compliance – Reverse Solange And Systemic Infringements Analyzed’ (2015) 
224 
 
and infringements identified during the financial crisis since they mostly derived 
from the EU’s own inability to effectively protect EU citizens’ rights, rather than 
from the national level, although the lack of meaningful judicial dialogue also 
played an important role.943 Such an example is the idleness of EU courts in 
taking up cases into their jurisdiction, especially the questions submitted by the 
national courts, where at least a remote connection with EU law exists.944 
What is arguably needed besides the concrete and purposeful judicial dialogue, 
is a broader interpretation of the scope of EU law to widen the jurisdiction of EU 
Courts within the context of consequential deprivation of rights, rather than the 
options of national courts.945 The proposal to be made, needs to balance the 
creation of a level playing field for protection in all EU Member States, while at 
the same time stay within the delimitations of the division of competences as 
established in the Treaties. Unfortunately, notwithstanding the enduring attempts 
to give more meaning to EU citizenship, both through Treaty reforms and through 
the various proposals put forward, the strict separation between EU citizenship 
and fundamental rights and the complex legal design of citizenship, has 
prevented the desired link from being achieved. However, recent case law of the 
Court, has opened up the “possibility for a radically new approach to the rationale 
behind the Union”946 and can arguably constitute the key towards a ‘more citizens’ 
Union’. 
6.4 The pathway forward: Taking the ‘doctrine’ a step further 
Although some of the propositions put forward, seemed promising, it is argued 
that a different approach is needed to directly fill the gaps created by the Charter 
and the largely underdeveloped EU citizenship. The objective is to effectively 
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protect EU citizens’ rights as embodied within the EU legal order, especially 
during periods of crisis, while respecting the national identities, according to 
Article 4(2) TEU.947 As discussed in Chapter 5, the recently developed doctrine 
of the substance of the rights, has the potential to change the architecture of the 
fundamental rights protection, so as enhancing the protection of EU citizens’ 
rights, by reading it as granting EU citizens a core of rights other than those listed 
in Article 20(2). This can arguably be done by establishing a connection of the 
substance of the rights doctrine with the Charter rights and/or the fundamental 
rights as general principles of EU law. Such a connection would imply a significant 
extension to the EU fundamental rights’ scope, allowing a citizen to rely on EU 
fundamental rights in a wholly internal situation, when an infringement occurs that 
deprives EU citizens of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of their rights.948    
The proposed way forward, namely the ‘internal applicability of EU law’ test will 
be built on two main starting points. It will be firstly based on the idea that the 
non-exhaustive list under Article 20(2) TFEU, should always be interpreted in 
compliance with Article 2 TEU which the Member States are also obliged to 
comply with. In particular, under the ‘inter alia’ clause of Article 20(2) TFEU, 
individuals should be able to enjoy to their fullest potential the foundational values 
of the Union by using their capacity as EU citizens. The second starting point of 
the proposal is the fact that beyond the scope of Article 51(1) of the Charter and 
the general framework of EU law, fundamental rights issues are left to the national 
legislation and judiciary. The recent judicial developments, however, have 
allowed some room for EU intervention in cases that normally are normally 
considered as wholly internal and/or as falling outside the scope of EU law. 
According to the classic ‘substance of the rights’ doctrine, an internal violation of 
fundamental rights can possibly fall within the scope of the ‘substance’ and 
consequently within the scope of EU law, if it amounts to detaching Union 
citizenship of its substantive meaning.949 The thesis’ proposal, will bring the 
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classic doctrine a step further, towards enhancing fundamental rights protection 
by proposing a three-step jurisdictional test that will allow EU fundamental rights, 
besides the ones under the list of Article 20 TFEU, to be specifically used in purely 
internal situations. The test will accordingly involve a judicial incorporation 
combining a dynamic reading of Article 2 TEU, Article 20 TFEU and the general 
principles of EU law. 
Sharing the thoughts of Bosniak, from the individual perspective it is “indisputably 
good that the kind of rights traditionally associated with citizenship are 
increasingly being guaranteed”, in order to allow more people to enjoy as much 
protection as possible.950 However, as will be discussed below, it is impossible to 
merely extend the current list of EU citizenship rights, already falling within the 
sphere of the substance of the rights doctrine, to include all EU fundamental 
rights. Such an extension would be illegitimate and would severely be 
contradicting with the principle of conferral and the division of competences.951 It 
is thus necessary, to only focus on cases that demand EU intervention and 
cannot be remedied by an adequate response from the national system, such as 
the prevention of a crisis from spreading across the Union as a spill-over effect.   
The first step of the test consists in the delimitation of the scope of application of 
the proposal using Article 2 TEU, in a different way from von Bogdandy’s use. It 
will essentially embody an assessment of the exact content of the values of Article 
2 TEU that are regarded as common standards for all the Member States, the so-
called essence of fundamental rights, which shares the same rationale with the 
‘substance’ in the doctrine. The second step is the determination of the scope of 
application of the infringed general principle and/or Charter provision, which is 
also recognised as a fundamental right or foundational value of the Union under 
Article 2 TEU, to verify that it is broad enough to trigger the substance of the rights 
doctrine. In particular, in order to achieve the constitutional legitimacy necessary 
for a judicial incorporation the second step will be either satisfied through the use 
of the Charter, when interpreting its scope in the broader sense or through the 
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general principles of EU law such as the principle of effective judicial 
protection.952 If for example the plurality of fundamental rights sources under 
Article 6 TEU, allows the general principles of law to still apply where the Charter 
does not, and citizenship rationae personae entitles the individual to fundamental 
rights protection, the second will be satisfied.953 The last step of the test is the 
triggering of EU law with the manifestation of a deprivation and not a mere 
impediment, of the substance of the fundamental right under examination, which 
will allow for EU intervention and the invocation of the infringed EU right in an 
otherwise purely internal situation.954 
6.4.1 First Step: Delimiting the test based on Article 2 TEU 
According to Article 2 TEU, the EU is founded on values such as respect for 
human rights, equality and the rule of law, which are common to all the Member 
States in a society in which justice must prevail.955 In other words, Article 2 TEU 
constitutionalises the Copenhagen criteria,956 namely the preconditions for a 
State to accede to the Union, but also constitutes a guideline for assessing the 
performance of Member States after their accession, to continue being members 
of the EU.957 Therefore, beyond the scope of the Charter, Member States remain 
competent in fundamental rights and the rule of law, provided that they safeguard 
the values enshrined under Article 2 TEU, including the essence of fundamental 
rights and the rule of law. It thus works as a legal standard, for both the EU and 
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the Member States.958 It is therefore legitimate to argue that the ‘inter alia’ clause 
under Article 20(2) TFEU, should include the general foundational values of the 
Union that also work as a general legal standard of protection for EU citizens. For 
this reason, it is necessary to define the exact subject-matter of these values and 
the essence of their content.  
Although Article 2 TEU works as a legal standard of assessment, it cannot be 
interpreted as meaning that the Member States are fully bound by the entire 
fundamental rights acquis, since this is expressly prevented by the Charter and 
the Treaty itself.959 According to von Bogdandy, while the pluralistic fundamental 
rights protection system is dependent upon different legal and cultural national 
characteristics, Article 2 TEU aims to safeguard the essentials which are common 
to the Member States.960 The essence of fundamental rights, is rightly defined as 
covering long standing traditions, laid down in national constitutions,961 used by 
several constitutional courts and certain infringements upon certain rights that 
cannot be justified in accordance with the CJEU.962 Therefore, Article 2 TEU is 
contested when a violation occurs which has the effect of totally depriving the 
content of an ‘essential’ right. For instance, in Tele2 Sverige,963 the CJEU ruled 
that the right to freedom of expression guaranteed in Article 11 of the Charter, 
constitutes one of the values on which the EU is founded under Article 2 TEU and 
it is an essential foundation, of a pluralist, democratic society.964 
                                                 
958 Amaryllis Verhoeven, ‘How democratic need European Union members be?: some thoughts after 
Amsterdam’ (1998) 23 European Law Review 217. 
959 In particular, Article 51(1) of the Charter and Article 6 TEU. 
960 Armin von Bogdandy, ‘Reverse Solange – Protecting the Essence of Fundamental Rights against EU 
Member States’ (2012) 49 Common Market Law Review 489, 510. 
961 The need to protect the essence of fundamental rights and not impose any unjust limitations is 
expressly enshrined in most of the national Constitutions or Charters of the EU: Article 19(2) German 
Basic Law, Article 4(2) Czech Fundamental Rights Charter, Article 8(2) Hungarian Constitution, Article 
30(3) Polish Constitution, Article 18(3) Portuguese Constitution, Article 49(2) Rumanian Constitution, 
Article 13(4) Slovakian Constitution, Article 53(1) Spanish Constitution. 
962 Armin von Bogdandy, ‘Reverse Solange – Protecting the Essence of Fundamental Rights against EU 
Member States’ (2012) 49 Common Market Law Review 489, 510. 
963 Judgment of 21 December 2016, Tele2 Sverige AB, C-203/15 and C-698/15, ECLI:EU:C:2016:970; The 
ECHR has for example repeatedly held that “there is little scope…for restrictions on political speech or 
on debate on questions of public interest”; Wingrove v the United Kingdom App no 17419/90 (ECtHR, 25 
November 1996) para 58. 
964 Yumiko Nakanishi, ‘The EU’s Rule of Law and the Judicial Protection of Rights’ (2018) 46 Hitotsubashi 
Journal of Law and Politics 1, 6. 
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Another paradigm to assess, is that of effective judicial protection, which 
according to the findings in Chapter 4 it has been left largely unprotected and 
exposed during the financial crisis. The right to effective judicial protection falls 
under Article 2 TEU not only because it constitutes a component of the ‘rule of 
law’, but also because it is undoubtedly connected to the ‘respect for human 
rights’. Relatively early in case law, the Court insisted that the Union is based on 
the rule of law and clarified that the Treaty has established a comprehensive 
system of legal remedies and procedures designed to permit the CJEU to review 
the legality of EU acts.965 More specifically, the CJEU has built up in its case law 
a catalogue of elements constituting the modern application of the rule of law 
principle within the meaning of Article 2 TEU,966 such as the principle of 
separation of powers,967 the principle of effective judicial protection968 and 
effective application of EU law.969  
In the ruling of Schrems,970 the Court emphasised that the existence of an 
effective judicial review, designed to ensure compliance with the provisions of EU 
law, is inherent in the rule of law.971 Similar conclusions were also made in 
Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, further adding that within this 
Union, every individual has the right to challenge before the courts, the legality of 
any decision or other national measure relating to the application to them of an 
EU act.972 Consequently, a violation of the rule of law principle under Article 2 
would likely aggravate the fundamental rights infringement. Nakanishi 
interestingly argued that the combination of the rule of law, which evidently 
incorporates effective judicial protection, as one of the EU’s values under Article 
2 TEU, with the right of effective judicial remedy of the Charter, provides grounds 
                                                 
965 Judgment of 23 April 1986, Les Verts v Parliament, C-294/83, ECLI:EU:C:1986:166. 
966 The word ‘rule of law’ was enshrined in Article 6 TEU by the Treaty of Amsterdam of 1997. 
967 Judgment of 10 November 2016, Kovalkovas, C-477/16 PPU, ECLI:EU:C:2016:861. 
968 Judgment of 28 March 2017, C-72/15, Rosneft, ECLI:EU:C:2017:236. 
969 Judgment of 20 November 2017, Commission v Poland, ECLI:EU:C:2017:877. 
970 Judgment of 6 October 2015, Schrems, C-362/14, ECLI:EU:C:2015:650. 
971 Yumiko Nakanishi, ‘The EU’s Rule of Law and the Judicial Protection of Rights’ (2018) 46 Hitotsubashi 
Journal of Law and Politics 1, 8. 
972 Judgment of 27 February 2018, Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, C-64/16, 
ECLI:EU:C:2018:117, para 31. 
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for extending the jurisdiction of the CJEU and enable it to protect fundamental 
rights effectively.973  
 
Figure 1: The proposed ‘internal applicability of EU law’ test 
 
Such violations of the essence of fundamental rights as laid down in Article 2 
TEU, undermine the basic foundations of the EU legal order and the substantive 
meaning of Union citizenship.974 Consequently, the infringements of this extent 
and seriousness accounting to systemic failures, would not be adequately 
remedied within the respective Member State, but rather on the Union level, 
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through the use of a federalising tool, preserving the effectiveness of EU law and 
creating a level-playing field between the Member States.975 Nevertheless, it is 
important to recall the fact that in order for the thesis’ proposal to reinforce the 
system by expanding its scope of application, it cannot rely upon the full Union 
fundamental rights legal order to remedy infringements on the EU level; it should 
be delimited to violations of the essence of fundamental rights as enshrined in 
Article 2 TEU. 
6.4.2 Second and Third Step: Another use of rights 
As previously examined, Article 6(1) TEU and Article 51 of the Charter, are 
designed to prevent the Charter from extending the scope of application of Union 
law, as well as the competences of the EU and they have been successful 
towards their goal.976 However, the wording of Article 51(1) is not entirely 
unambiguous, inter alia, due to the divergence of its wording, with the 
explanations relating to this provision.977 For this reason, there have been 
attempts to restrain the impact of the Charter as much as possible, both at EU 
and national levels. The question is thus to what extent the CJEU, could interpret 
the scope of the Charter so as to apply to the substance of the rights doctrine.  
In the case of Ivanna Scattolon,978 the question was whether the Charter can be 
applied against the Member States when acting within the scope of EU law. AG 
Bot in his opinion on the case, justly argued in favour of a broad interpretation of 
Article 51(1), where the Member States are bound by the requirement to respect 
fundamental rights, when they act within the scope of Union law, namely “where 
there is a connection between national legislation and EU law”.979 He further 
argued that a restrictive interpretation of Article 51(1), would “create two separate 
systems of protections of fundamental rights within the Union, according to 
                                                 
975 Armin von Bogdandy, ‘Reverse Solange – Protecting the Essence of Fundamental Rights against EU 
Member States’ (2012) 49 Common Market Law Review 489, 513. 
976 This is specifically the case during the financial crisis claims, where the applicants could hardly invoke 
the Charter provisions for infringements of their rights. See Chapter 4, section 4.3. 
977 The explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights [2007] OJ C 303/02, state that the 
Charter ‘is only binding of the Member States when they act in the scope of Union law’; For detailed 
analysis on the legal and judicial use of Article 51(1) of the Charter, see Chapter 3, section 3.4.2. 
978 Judgment of 6 September 2011, Scattolon, C-108/10, ECLI:EU:C:2011:542. 
979 Opinion of AG Bot in Scattolon, C-108/10, ECLI:EU:C:2011:211, paras 117-119. 
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whether they stem from the Charter or from general principle of law”.980 To the 
contrary, the ECJ held that the rights of transferred workers could be adequately 
protected by relying on Directive 77/187,981 and thus did not go further to examine 
whether the Charter provisions could be also invoked.982 Similarly, in Åkerberg 
Fransson analysed above,983 the term ‘implementation’ was broadly interpreted 
to make the Charter applicable, when Member States are acting within the scope 
of EU law, apart from when being ‘agents’ of EU law.984 Emphasising both the 
wording of the explanation accompanying Article 51 of the Charter and the 
clarification given by the CJEU in Åkerberg Fransson, it has been further stated 
that the field of application of the Charter and general principles shall be 
considered as a “unitary concept, at most being the former calibrated on the 
latter”.985  
Therefore, when a Charter provision is interpreted by the Court as being 
applicable in situations ‘falling within the scope of EU law’, thus sharing the same 
level of applicability used for the substance of the rights doctrine, it can be 
possibly invoked in a purely internal situation provided that it satisfies the first 
step of the proposed test to be added in the list of Article 20(1) TFEU 
beforehand.986 On this assumption, after a case satisfies the steps of the ‘internal 
applicability of EU law’ test, it would fall by its nature within the scope of EU law 
and thus all the relevant EU legislation could be invoked, including the EU 
Charter. Nevertheless, even with a broad interpretation of Article 51(1) it seems 
unbearable for a Charter provision to satisfy the steps of the test and gain a place 
under the citizenship’s list of rights through a judicial incorporation. Although one 
                                                 
980 ibid para 120. 
981 Council Directive 77/187/EEC of 14 February 1977 on the approximation of the laws of the Member 
States relating to the safeguarding of employees' rights in the event of transfers of undertakings, 
businesses or parts of businesses. 
982 Judgment of 6 September 2011, Scattolon, C-108/10, ECLI:EU:C:2011:542, paras 83-84; Same 
approach was followed by the ECJ even earlier in: Judgment of 5 October 2010, MCB., C-400/10 PPU, 
ECLI:EU:C:2010:582, paras 51-53. 
983 Judgment of 26 February 2013, Åkerberg Fransson, C-617/10, ECLI:EU:C:2013:105. 
984 For further details on this case, see Chapter 3 section 3.4.2. 
985 Elena Gualco, ‘General principles of EU law as a passe-partout key within the constitutional edifice of 
the European Union: are the benefits worth the side effects?’ (2016) Institute of European Law Working 
Papers 5/2016, 4 <http://epapers.bham.ac.uk/2188/> accessed 2 May 2018.  
986 Martin J van den Brink, ‘EU Citizenship and EU Fundamental Rights: Taking EU Citizenship Rights 
Seriously?’ (2012) 39 Legal Issues of Economic Integration 273, 283. 
233 
 
can argue that the notions of the ‘scope of EU law’ or ‘implementation of EU law’ 
are still subject to further development and flexible interpretation, stretching 
Article 51 of the Charter to the extent required by the test, is likely to constitute 
ultra vires on the Court’s part.987 Particularly, in order for this approach to work, 
the scope of the Charter provisions must be interpreted as having at least the 
same or broader scope of application, than that of EU citizenship rights which the 
Court managed to eliminate through the substance of the rights doctrine.988 
Consequently, in order to achieve a direct addition of a Charter right in the list, 
while avoiding an ultra vires action that would threaten the legitimacy of the Court, 
a legislative procedure under Article 25 TFEU must take place. 
Despite the fact that the Charter provisions can hardly fall under the list of Article 
20(2) TFEU to subsequently trigger EU law, they can still offer enhanced 
protection within the context of the new test when broadly interpreted by the 
Court, in an alternative way. In particular, the Charter provisions can protect EU 
citizens’ rights by supplementing the legal arguments of a ‘Zambrano-style’ case 
after it is rendered as an EU law matter, adding weight to the claim as a whole. 
This approach, however, would not expand the scope of application of EU 
fundamental rights as intended, so as allow more internal situations to fall by their 
nature within the scope of EU law. It would rather enhance the sustainability of a 
claim made, based on the substance of the rights approach, which is already 
falling within the scope of EU law.  
The theoretical development above can only materialise, provided that the Court 
adopts a broad interpretation of Article 51(1) under the Charter. However, if the 
Court holds strictly on to its narrow interpretation instead, contrary to the 
explanations relating to the Charter,989 it does not necessarily prevent the 
application of EU fundamental rights to EU citizens in purely internal situations. 
This is because the majority of the Charter rights, had been judicially recognised 
                                                 
987 Carlos Closa, Dimitry Kochenov and Joseph H H Weiler, ‘Reinforcing Rule of Law Oversight in the 
European Union’ (2014) EUI Working Paper RSCAS 2014/25, 12 
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988 ibid 12. 
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as general principles of EU law earlier in the case law, that have in turn always 
been applicable to cases falling within the scope of EU law.990 As indicated, the 
recognition of fundamental rights in the EU legal order, was further consolidated 
by the Treaty of Maastricht, under Article 6(3) TEU, which granted fundamental 
rights as general principles, a direct foundation in the Treaty, enhancing their 
authority and standing.991 The use of general principles however, depends on the 
extent to which the narrow scope of the Charter can restrain the scope of those 
general principles as well.992 This is a relatively controversial issue, due to the 
fact that fundamental rights conflicts involve particular complexity and difficulty 
and the traditional norms theories of lex specialis, lex posterior, and lex superior 
may not provide a clear solution, especially in catalogues of rights with 
ambiguous statements of applicability and minimal internal hierarchy.993  
The principle of lex specialis has been adopted to a substantial extent in drafting 
the Charter, since within the EU context the specificationism of rights is more 
suitable, considering the pre-existing national protection of rights and the already 
agreed ECHR level of protection.994 However, as it is seen the Charter remains 
ambiguous on how rights relate to the general interests and objectives of the 
Union, resulting in a quite uncertain, general scope of rights in EU law.995 On the 
contrary, generalisation and the exalting of lex generalis, based on overall Treaty 
objectives of enhanced integration, can be used in legal reasonings to extend 
competence to some degree, especially the negative.996 Within the EU context, it 
is believed that specificationism and originalism as the sole or dominant 
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approaches to legal interpretation, cannot capture the range of values that now 
constitute the self-articulated normative basis of the EU legal system, including 
democracy, the rule of law, subsidiarity, human rights, accountability, 
transparency, as well as integration.997 Based on a constitutionalist approach, 
which privileges the values of democracy, fundamental rights and the rule of law, 
it is argued that the scope of application of the Charter is narrower than that of 
general principles of EU law and the narrow scope of the former cannot affect 
that of the latter.998 In particular, a constitutionalist approach should arguably 
support a teleological interpretation over originalism and allow the Court to treat 
general principles of EU law as living instruments. Greater emphasis is thus given 
on preserving the public good and filling the legal gaps that occur.999  
According to AG Bot in his Opinion in Scattolon, the limited scope of the Charter 
did not have the intention of restricting the scope of the fundamental rights 
recognised as general principles of EU law.1000 Similarly, in the case of Yoshikazu 
Iida, the Court had the chance to clarify the relationship between the Charter and 
general principles of EU law, since one of the questions of the referring court was 
to what extent “the ‘unwritten’ fundamental rights of the EU…can be applied in 
full even if the Charter is not applicable in the specific case”.1001 However, the 
CJEU limited itself in examining the situations governed by Directive 2004/38 and 
the restrictive application of the Charter in accordance with Article 51. Further, in 
the case of Kaltoft,1002 the Court extended the field of application of EU law 
through general principles. The Court clarified that, although under precise 
conditions,1003 dismissal on the grounds of extreme obesity might constitute 
                                                 
997 In favour of this argument see: Jo Shaw, ‘European Union Legal Studies in Crisis? Towards a New 
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disability discrimination within the meaning of Directive 2000/78.1004 Therefore, 
through the Court’s ruling, the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of 
disability, has been entitled to cover obesity, leading to a real judicial participation 
in law-making.1005 
Fortunately, the question was considered more clearly by the Court in Associação 
Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, in a far-reaching demonstration of the Court’s 
judicial activism, in favour of European integration. Specifically, the Court 
indicated that regarding “the material scope of the second subparagraph of Article 
19(1) TEU, that provision relates to ‘the fields covered by Union law’, irrespective 
of whether the Member States are implementing Union law, within the meaning 
of Article 51(1) of the Charter.”1006 It is thus safe to say with certainty, at least in 
the case of effective judicial protection that general principles of EU law have 
broader scope of application than the Charter rights, with the latter not affecting 
the former’s application in any way.  
General principles of EU law are also used as grounds for judicial review, where, 
primarily due to the Court’s recognition that they are admissible in horizontal 
disputes as well,1007 the protection of fundamental rights has been spread to 
situations other than those expressly conceived within EU law. Particularly, in the 
case of Mangold,1008 the Court evidently intended to enhance the effectiveness 
of fundamental rights, by employing general principles as a means of enforcing 
the EU standards of protection of fundamental rights in circumstances that are 
otherwise excluded from the field of application of EU law.1009 
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Apart from the case law, according to Eeckhout in order to verify that the Union 
takes fundamental rights seriously they should all be considered as unwritten 
rules “all-pervasive in EU law”.1010 Therefore, even if Article 51(1) is narrowly 
interpreted, the scope of application of general principles must not be negatively 
affected but rather allow more room for them to apply either as interpretative tool 
or as grounds for review, even where the scope of application of the Charter 
ends.1011 It can thus be concluded that general principles have particularly 
enhanced the protection of fundamental rights within the EU and have been 
characterised as an unlimited source of protection of fundamental rights.1012 
The opposite view, suggesting that the scope of general principles is not broader 
than that of the Charter, would not be easily justified. Case law on the general 
principles is ﬂexible and its delimitations are not always clear, while at the same 
time Article 6(3), as amended by the Lisbon Treaty, keeps general principles as 
a source of fundamental rights in Union law and this constitutes a dynamic 
element in the system.1013 Therefore, according to the finding that the Charter 
does not limit the scope of the general principles of EU law, the argument put 
forward by AG Mengozzi indicating that the Charter prevents the inclusion of EU 
fundamental rights in the substance of the rights doctrine is not entirely 
correct,1014 or at least not the only possible explanation. In contrast, based on the 
findings above and the proposed jurisdictional test developed, there is nothing 
that obstructs the inclusion of EU fundamental rights in the substance of the rights 
doctrine, apart from an unwilling Court.1015  
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That being the case, fundamental rights as general principles are seemingly more 
eligible to be included in the substance of the rights doctrine as part of the ‘internal 
applicability of EU law’ test, primarily due to their expanded scope of application, 
although as will be seen below, some general principles are more suitable than 
others depending on their degree of development. On the contrary, Charter 
provisions do not constitute a suitable candidate, since the Charter lacks precise 
delimitations on its application due to the various interpretations of Article 51(1) 
and makes the desired link even harder to be achieved. Therefore, in the best-
case scenario the Charter might apply after the jurisdictional test takes place, 
namely when the situation under examination is decided as falling within the 
scope of EU law.  
The third and last step of the proposed test is the requirement of a deprivation of 
the essence of the disputed right under Article 20 TFEU in order to satisfy the 
jurisdictional test and trigger EU law using the substance of the rights doctrine 
rationale. The third step can thus be equated with the logic and effect of the 
substance of the rights doctrine to trigger the application of EU law in a purely 
internal situation. Accordingly, the first and second steps constructed above are 
primarily directed to the inclusion and determination of the unwritten rights into 
the non-exhaustive list of Article 20(2) TFEU. The ‘deprivation’ effect was 
examined in detail earlier in the research and was defined as a de facto loss of 
one of the rights attached to the status of an EU citizen. Therefore, a ‘serious 
inconvenience’ of the particular EU citizenship right would clearly not suffice the 
test.1016 The importance of this specific threshold was also discussed concluding 
that a ‘deprivation’ effect would not contravene the division of competences, nor 
it would create unexpected obligations. 
6.4.3 The paradigm of effective judicial protection 
According to the assessment above, a link between fundamental rights as 
general principles of EU law that also constitute part of the ‘essentials’ under 
Article 2 TEU, with the substance of the rights doctrine, is attainable. Although 
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this possibility is arguably achievable with several principles, the principle of 
effective judicial protection is legally the most suitable to be utilised as a first step 
towards reinforcement. It has in particular, been identified as a vulnerable and 
constantly-violated right during the recent financial crisis, especially regarding the 
access to justice and has also been the focus of recent judicial developments, 
adding to its significance.1017  Moreover, judicial protection in the case of 
individuals is an important, even foundational, dimension of an effective human 
rights regime, since it incorporates the procedural expression of the protection of 
rights and it is directly connected with the rule of law and democracy.1018 In order 
to ensure that fundamental rights protection become more proactive, a written 
Charter is not enough, but it rather needs to be combined with a dynamic principle 
of effective judicial protection and a judicial authority safeguarding it. This 
combination is all the more necessary within the EU context, where binding laws 
and policies are developed and an effective judicial protection, requires 
numerous policies that empower individuals to vindicate the judicially enforceable 
rights given to them.1019  
Despite its importance, access to justice as part of effective judicial protection, 
does not constitute an absolute right but its limitations must not restrict access, 
to such an extent that the very substance of the right is impaired.1020 Therefore, 
limitations such as acts of ignorance, lack of resources, ineffective 
representation, inadequate legal standing and deficient remedies do constitute 
violations and have the ability to render judicially enforceable rights illusory.1021 
Among others, deficient remedies, lack of resources and unwillingness of the 
Courts have been identified during the claims against austerity measures, as 
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240 
 
discussed in Chapter 4. It is thus evident that there is inadequacy in the right of 
effective judicial protection, which arguably lies in the hands of the Court to 
remedy, possibly through the substance of the rights doctrine which is also 
judicially constructed.  
More importantly, the concept of ‘effective judicial protection’ is dual-faced, 
occasionally referred to by the Courts as a self-standing ‘principle’ of EU law,1022 
or even as a ‘fundamental right’.1023 According to Leczykiewicz, it forms the basis 
for imposing general obligations on national courts, to ensure judicial protection 
of an individual’s rights under Union law, which restricts national procedural 
autonomy1024 or as an independent consideration,1025 which justifies the creation 
of EU remedies, including damages liability of Member States or of a private 
party.1026 The Court’s case law on the principle of effective judicial protection has 
been made subject to two provisions of the Treaties, complementing each other. 
Firstly, Article 47 of the Charter addresses the right to an effective remedy and to 
a fair trial, which remarkably works as a shield in safeguarding the respect of the 
rest of the Charter rights, across the EU legal order.1027 It also has a more 
extended scope and content in comparison to Articles 6 and 13 of the ECHR.1028  
On the other hand, Article 19 TEU demonstrates the Member States’ duty to 
provide remedies sufficient to ensure effective legal protection within the ‘fields 
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covered by Union law’,1029 while at a more conceptual level, it suggests that all of 
the courts that comprise the CJEU have equal authority to safeguard that ‘the law 
is observed’ when applying and interpreting the EU Treaties.1030 The principle of 
effective judicial protection through the lens of Article 19 TEU has also been 
characterised as a “concrete expression of the value of the rule of law as 
enshrined under Article 2 TEU”, entrusting the responsibility for ensuring judicial 
review in the EU legal order both to the ECJ and to the national courts and 
tribunals.1031 Consequently, the right to effective judicial protection, as well as 
non-discrimination rights among others, constitute examples of rights whose 
scope of application goes beyond the letter of Article 51(1), through their general 
principle formation and this can result in positive developments for the protection 
of fundamental rights in the EU as will be further seen. 
The question of the scope of application of Article 19 TEU and Article 47 of the 
Charter was partially discussed in the case of Associação Sindical dos Juízes 
Portugueses,1032 specifically in relation to their compatibility with the austerity 
measures in question.  The case concerned a preliminary ruling by the 
Portuguese Supreme Administrative Court, asking whether temporary reductions 
introduced in the remunerations of persons working in the Portuguese public 
administration, including the judges, would infringe ‘the principle of judicial 
independence’ under Article 19(1) TEU and Article 47 of the Charter. The Court 
rightly concluded that the austerity measures imposed and challenged in the main 
proceedings,1033 cannot be regarded as impairing the independence of the 
members of the Tribunal de Contas.1034 The principle of judicial independence 
under Article 19(1) TEU, “does not preclude general salary-reduction measures, 
linked to requirements to eliminate an excessive budget deficit and to an EU 
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financial assistance programme, from being applied to the members of the 
Tribunal de Contas”.1035 
Although the outcome of the case was expected, the legal approach followed by 
the Court is of particular interest and can be related to the reinforcement of 
protecting EU fundamental rights. Firstly, the reasoning given by the Court is 
interestingly built on the ‘operationalising’ of Article 2 TEU, with a joint reading of 
Articles 4(3)1036 and 19(1) TEU,1037 by stating that Article 19 TEU, gives concrete 
expression to the value of the rule of law under Article 2 TEU, while the mutual 
trust between the Member States depends on this set of common values under 
Article 2 TEU, on which the EU is founded.1038 More importantly, the Court has 
emphasised that Article 19(1) TEU, can be exclusively relied upon in internal 
situations, irrespective of whether the Member States are implementing EU law 
within the meaning of Article 51(1) of the Charter.1039 It is therefore evident, as 
mentioned above, that the scope of application of the principle of effective judicial 
protection under Article 19(1) TEU is much broader and can be invoked in many 
more national situations, than under Article 47 of the Charter, whose scope of 
application is relatively narrower. This disparity in evaluating the scope of 
application of Article 19(1) TEU and Article 47 of the Charter is owed to the fact 
that the former also covers areas in which national courts may potentially apply 
EU law, whereas Article 47, pertains only to cases of actual application of EU 
law.1040  
Moreover, the Court notably did not proceed to the assessment of whether the 
austerity measures under examination indeed fall within the scope of EU law or 
merely constitute a purely internal situation. When taking into consideration the 
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reluctant approach previously adopted by the Court, in claiming jurisdiction for 
austerity measures cases and the absence of EU laws governing the 
remuneration of national judges, one could argue that the ECJ normally lacked 
jurisdiction or was expected to declare so. On the other hand, based on the earlier 
case of Florescu,1041 one could argue that the temporary reductions in the public 
sector’s remunerations could trigger the application of EU law and be reviewed 
under the Charter, since the mandatory requirements were imposed on the 
government by the EU with the aim of reducing the state’s excessive budget and 
be granted financial assistance.1042 In that case it could be probably feasible to 
trigger Article 47 of the Charter as well. Yet, the Court without giving further 
explanation on a possible application of the Charter provisions, followed another 
direction exclusively relying on Article 19(1) TEU by broadly interpreting the 
notion of ‘fields covered by Union law’ therein and thus enabling for the first time 
natural and legal persons to challenge a broader set of national measures 
including austerity measures, using this route.1043  
The judicial approach adopted by the Court in Juízes Portugueses, demonstrates 
some resemblance with the approach in the Delvigne case discussed above.1044 
Particularly, the Court in Delvigne, had similarly constructed a protective 
framework, without engaging the Treaty provisions on citizenship but rather by 
drawing together Treaty provisions on representative democracy (Article 14(3) 
TFEU) and the right to vote under the Charter (Article 39(2)). The case thus 
recognised a free-standing right to vote in the European Parliament elections 
attached to EU citizenship, unrelated to free movement or non-discrimination. On 
the contrary, the judgment in Juízes Portugueses seems to have moved a step 
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further, beyond affirming the multi-levelled character of EU citizenship, towards 
operationalising Article 2 TEU when there is a need to protect the foundational 
values of the Union such as the rule of law.  
Consequently, the judgment is likely to have far-reaching consequences for 
effective judicial protection and the rule of law within the EU, while it can arguably 
constitute a potentially decisive shot in taking the substance of the rights doctrine 
a step further namely, to include the effective judicial protection rights in the ‘inter 
alia’ list using the ‘internal applicability of EU law’ test proposed. What remains to 
be determined is how much broader is the scope of Article 19(1) TEU in 
comparison to that of Article 47 of the Charter. At the moment it is arguably safe 
to say that citizens can rely on the principle of judicial independence by invoking 
Article 19 TEU, even when the Charter cannot be applied. Moreover, it is argued 
that this ruling has created a general legal obligation for Member States to 
guarantee and safeguard judicial independence based on a combined reading of 
Articles 2, 4(3) and 19(1) TEU, regardless of whether the situation falls within the 
scope of EU law.1045 Therefore, Article 19(1) TEU can be invoked to challenge 
any national measure, which compromises the judicial independence of any court 
that may rule on ‘questions concerning the application or interpretation of EU 
law’.1046 Most of the national courts do belong to this category of judicial bodies, 
which justifiably makes this ruling a ground-breaking development.  
In a nutshell, the Court’s innovative approach in this ruling, focuses on the notion 
of ‘fields covered by EU law’ under Article 19(1) TEU, confirming its broader 
scope of application compared to the ‘implementation’ concept under the Charter. 
It has further overcome the barrier in Article 51(1), by using the respective general 
principle under Article 19(1) in internal situations, rather than Article 47 of the 
Charter, merely requiring the existence of a virtual link between relevant national 
measures and EU law. Lastly, failure by the Member States to guarantee and 
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respect the fundamental principle of judicial independence as defined by EU law 
and the ECJ itself, can be directly challenged on the basis of Article 19(1) 
TEU.1047  In order to derive to these ground-breaking conclusions, the Court has 
exercised its judicial activism and has gone beyond the minimum effective 
necessity of national remedies needed to ensure the application of EU law,1048 
towards the stage where Member States are required to safeguard judicial 
independence as provided and defined by EU law. It can be argued that the 
approach followed has a great resemblance with the substance of the rights 
doctrine as used previously in the case law but only regarding a specific 
component of the effective judicial protection principle, that of judicial 
independence. 
It is thus an extremely positive judicial development since the Court has basically 
given the green light to proceed with the proposed three-stage jurisdictional test. 
Both the development of the scope of Article 19 TEU and the substance of the 
rights doctrine were created by the ECJ as the main actor, through the exercise 
of judicial activism. Moreover, they both aimed at overcoming the barrier created 
by the narrow scope of application of the Charter, while at the same time both 
approaches resulted in the enhancement of citizens’ rights protection each in its 
own way. On the other hand, there are numerous significant dissimilarities 
between the two ground-breaking judicial developments, which are the key to 
what will be proposed. Particularly, the substance of the right doctrine constitutes 
a new judicial jurisdictional test, which determines a category of previously wholly 
internal situations, as now falling within the scope of EU law. It is therefore a tool 
for claiming jurisdiction, which is only triggered when there is a deprivation of the 
genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights conferred, to EU citizens under 
Article 20 TFEU, caused by a national measure.1049 It is thus characterised as a 
moderately invasive approach, which must be used as a last resort to preserve 
the effectiveness of EU law in the field of EU citizenship rights protection. In 
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contrast, the development of Article 19(1) TEU in the ruling of Associação 
Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses,1050 works as a new general obligation of EU 
Member States, to safeguard and respect judicial independence, in accordance 
with Articles 2, 4(3) and 19(1) TEU, regardless of whether the matter falls within 
the scope of EU law. It is therefore invasive to a greater extent than the substance 
of the rights doctrine, since it basically created a federal standard of review for 
the principle of judicial independence that can now be directly invoked, before 
national courts. Considering this ruling, the CJEU apparently does not hesitate to 
issue courageous decisions to secure the effectiveness of EU law.1051 
The first and second stages of the proposal are thus based on the presumption 
that the substance of the rights doctrine, expanded the list of rights under Article 
20 TFEU beyond the expressed rights enshrined therein and the idea that EU 
citizenship is not only protected by Union law, but it is also unequivocally 
connected to an undisclosed set of rights.1052 Based on the same rationale the 
‘internal applicability of EU law’ test, suggested that the effects of the ‘substance 
of the rights’ doctrine can be extended to the rest of the components of effective 
judicial protection besides judicial independence,1053 since it also constitutes an 
expression of a foundational value under Article 2 TEU, that of the rule of law.1054  
6.5 The possible objections to the proposal 
In essence, the thesis is proposing a test for claiming jurisdiction under EU law, 
rather than a general obligation, to enable the review of national breaches of the 
rule of law occurring beyond the areas covered by the EU’s acquis. Beyond the 
scope of the Charter, an applicant cannot invoke EU fundamental rights or rely 
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on EU citizenship rights to claim for a violation, unless the substance of the rights 
doctrine is triggered, and the matter reaches the scope of EU law. If the infringed 
right, whose substance has been deprived by a national measure, is not 
expressly written within the list of Article 20(2), the ‘inter alia’ clause applies 
suggesting that the citizens can also enjoy other rights.1055 In order to safeguard 
the constitutional legitimacy and the principle of conferral, it was highlighted that 
not every single EU fundamental right can be included in the ‘inter alia’ clause. 
According to the thesis’ proposal, a delimitation of the rights that can be possibly 
included therein, is best achieved with Article 2 TEU which aims at safeguarding 
the essentials which are ‘common to the Member States’ and are undoubtedly 
rights that ‘shall be enjoyed by the citizens of the Union’, since they already 
constitute the foundations of the Union. Therefore, the aim is not to establish an 
infringement of Article 2 TEU, but it is rather used as a safety valve to set the 
boundaries of the test towards including in Article 20(2) only the ‘essentials’ as 
discussed above. Subsequently, the scope of application of the respective 
Charter right or general principle needs to be assessed to determine its 
compatibility with the doctrine.  
For instance, if a purely internal violation of the right to effective judicial protection 
occurs, within the context of the financial crisis or possibly the rule of law crisis, it 
would not be possible to assess the matter under EU law. Although examination 
of the disputed national measure or action under EU law might be considered 
undesirable or unnecessary by some, it would in fact be beneficial to the applicant 
due to the variety and degree of protection to be granted, as well as to the Union 
as a whole, since a supranational decision would more effectively prevent a 
possible spillover of the violation. Likewise, according to the ECJ the right to 
effective judicial protection is a solid articulation of the rule of law under Article 2 
TEU,1056 which makes it an ‘essential’ right under the first step of the test. If the 
scope of application of the right under scrutiny is not narrower than that of Article 
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20 TFEU, namely the scope of application of the Charter provision (Article 47) or 
the general principle (Article 19 TEU), it becomes eligible for the ‘inter alia’ clause 
and in turn for EU law examination, provided the infringement resulted in a 
deprivation of its substance. 
In spite of the fact that such a development would undoubtedly allow for 
enhanced safeguarding of EU citizens’ rights within the context of effective 
judicial protection, strong arguments can easily be raised against it, which are 
however refuted. One of the most important objections to such a development 
would firstly derive from the constitutional structure of the Union, namely the 
division of competences and the principle of conferral. The demarcation of EU 
and national competences has been the focus since the Treaty of Nice, largely 
out of concern over the perceived expansion of the EU’s powers.1057 Therefore, 
the expansion of the substance of the rights doctrine towards fundamental rights 
as discussed above, can be easily perceived as a threat to the current system of 
allocation of competences as well as to the preservation and respect of national 
identities by the Union as enshrined in Article 4(2) TEU. These objections are 
however defeated, from the use of Article 2 TEU as the safety valve to confine 
the expansion of the doctrine only to ‘essential’ values that operate as EU 
obligations for the Member States in any case. Furthermore, the requirement of 
a ‘deprivation’ effect of the substance of the rights is an ideal element for the 
proposal. In particular, it safeguards the proposal’s compliance with Article 4(2) 
TEU, by respecting the national identities beyond the scope of the Charter, until 
the point where Member States actually must preserve the foundations and the 
effectiveness of EU law, without adding to the competences of the Union or 
altering the meaning of Article 51(1).1058 
It is also argued that EU citizenship cannot include rights which are unconnected 
to the free movement principle, such as a fair hearing or just satisfaction rights, 
while non-discrimination on grounds of nationality is seen as the corollary of the 
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free movement principle.1059 At the same time, the recent case law has greatly 
weakened the link between non-discrimination on grounds of nationality and the 
free movement principle, making this argument somewhat unconvincing. 
Needless to mention the desire to promote an evolving character for EU 
citizenship since the day of its establishment, which definitely aims at the exact 
opposite and not the strict constraints supported in the said objection. 
Additionally, objections to the proposal could arise, based on alleged conflicts 
with other Treaty provisions. In particular, it is argued that Article 25(2) TFEU 
allegedly prevents the desired judicial incorporation of fundamental rights into the 
citizenship status.1060 However, this does not constitute an absolute obstacle to 
a judicial incorporation, since the procedural limitations are read as applying to 
legislature only,1061 thus the constitutional legitimacy of a judicial incorporation 
can be ensured. The use of Article 2 TEU could also raise concerns arguing that 
the “values on which the Union is built are illusory” in a number of respects.1062 
Although an acquis on values would give more weight to Article 2 TEU, the 
increasing use of the provision in the Court’s case law proves the opposite.1063 At 
the same time, it could be argued that Article 7 TEU must be the only way to 
enforce Article 2 TEU, while turning Article 2 TEU into enforceable law, is likely 
to ‘invite ever more adventurous challenges to different national rules’,1064 by 
‘diminishing’ national democratic space. Although this is not necessarily a bad 
thing, but rather the natural flow and purpose of EU integration, this proposal is 
not intending to turn Article 2 TEU into black-letter law, but rather to shape the 
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essence of the values expressed therein that can also constitute basic rights to 
be enjoyed by an EU citizen.1065 It is thus intending to ‘operationalise’ Article 2 
TEU, rather than enforce it;1066 although the Lisbon Treaty has expressly 
subjected the provision to the Court’s jurisdiction to ensure that ‘the law is 
observed’,1067 contrary to older Treaties, which have kept the foundational 
principles out of the Court’s realm.  
6.6 Conclusion 
The relationship and intersection between EU citizenship and fundamental rights 
has been in the foreground for decades and even more intensively after the 
various judicial developments that took place. Surprisingly, the arguments put 
forward almost three decades ago, are not only relevant to the current situation 
but quite similar as well. Despite however this persistence, the link between the 
two concepts has not been achieved yet, although recent judicial developments 
arguably came closer than ever in achieving it. Without insinuating that no 
development has taken place since then, the similarity of the arguments posed, 
is indeed concerning, not only for the citizens but for the Union project as a whole. 
The establishment of the Charter had provided some relief, yet the Union is still 
not as constitutionalised as it declares to be.  
As discussed above, various attempts took place to establish a link between EU 
citizenship and fundamental rights, either through legal Treaty amendments or 
via judicial incorporations, that constituted significant considerations for the 
thesis’ proposal. This has been the case especially with ‘Reverse Solange’ which 
inter alia, emphasised the importance of protecting the essence of fundamental 
rights enshrined in Article 2 TEU and was partly incorporated in the thesis’ test 
as well.1068 In particular, it was selected because the fact that the values’ acquis 
under Article 2 TEU is not predetermined by the Commission, is believed to 
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constitute a way of adapting to the needs of the society, since the CJEU is 
currently to shaping its content and specific values. 
It has been argued throughout the Chapter that EU citizenship represents a lot 
more than an internal market tool and a limited list of rights established under 
Article 20(2) TFEU. The concept of EU citizenship should reflect a concrete 
constitutional expression for the Union; it holds a constructivist nature and should 
evolve concurrently with the Union’s policies and the society’s needs. This is 
exactly what the thesis’ test proposed and attempted to provide, by establishing 
a tool for the CJEU to claim judicial jurisdiction, for cases that demand EU 
intervention. The proposal is legitimate and entirely in line with the doctrinal and 
jurisprudential approaches towards Union citizenship. It will arguably allow 
citizens who have faced effective judicial protection violations during the financial 
crisis, to render their case as falling within the scope of EU law, provided that the 
requirements above are satisfied. Although its application is still quite limited, in 
order to protect the division of competences, it would definitely overcome the 
barriers created by Article 51(1) of the Charter and safeguard the ‘substance’ of 
the ‘essential’ rights that must be included in the list of EU citizenship. It is also 
believed that such an incorporation in practice would persuade the Court to be 
more willing to claim legal jurisdiction, without being afraid of hostile reactions for 
alleged violations of the division of competences. When it comes to securing the 
effectiveness of EU law, the CJEU apparently reacts with more courageous 
rulings.1069  
  
                                                 
1069 Judgment of 27 February 2018, Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, C-64/16, 
ECLI:EU:C:2018:117. 
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7 CHAPTER 7 – CONCLUDING CHAPTER 
EU law is a field with an ever-increasing pace of changes where new proposals 
are constantly sought, to cope with the needs of an enlarged Union and provide 
solutions to the problems encountered. The central problem addressed in the 
thesis was the largely ineffective protection granted to EU citizens’ rights and, in 
particular, the ambiguous scope of application of the Charter provisions coupled 
with the underdevelopment of the list of rights under Article 20 TFEU. An attempt 
was made in the preceding chapters to put forward ideas that reinforce the 
application of EU fundamental rights primarily within the financial crisis case law, 
where their limited scope of application combined with the structural complexity 
of the financial assistance mechanisms created serious barriers in invoking 
fundamental rights protection. The proposal given was built around the idea of 
achieving a broader scope of application of fundamental rights which would 
arguably allow for effective exercise of both the rights under the Charter and the 
list attached to the status of EU citizenship. In the current Chapter the main 
findings regarding the research questions will be summarised and the general 
conclusions of the thesis will be presented, namely the ‘internal applicability of 
EU law’ test formed. Furthermore, the strengths and limitations of the research 
will be discussed as well as the suggestion for further research. 
7.1 Summary of findings / Overview of the thesis 
The structure of the thesis as well as the construction of a logical and consistent 
argument were guided by the research questions of the study which summarised 
the issues under examination. The first research question on the effectiveness of 
the current system and the approach of the CJEU towards its application was 
assessed in two parts, namely Chapters 3 and 4.  Chapter 3 provided a detailed 
analysis of the current EU fundamental rights protection system which is 
perceived as a ‘triangular’ one, formed by three different but interconnected 
elements including the Charter provisions, the list of rights attached to EU 
citizenship and fundamental rights as general principles of EU law. The analysis 
focused around the legal nature, content and scope of application for each of the 
elements with the aim of providing a rather unusual appraisal. It had accordingly 
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emphasised the dynamism and future potential of the elements under 
consideration, rather than their current deficiencies commonly discussed in the 
academia.  
The analysis in Chapter 3 led to the conclusion that the concept of EU citizenship 
has the greatest capacities to overcome limitations, including its restricted scope 
of application, in order to strengthen the protection of citizens’ rights. The most 
striking example of this capacity is the requirement of a cross-border element, 
which was entirely diminished in the series of cases that established the 
‘substance of the rights’ doctrine. Consequently, EU citizenship can be more 
effectively modified to keep pace with the needs of an ever-changing society than 
the EU Charter, due to its constructivist nature clearly demonstrated by the 
Court’s case law. Likewise, the application of EU citizenship provisions without 
the existence of a cross-border link verified the validity of the modern idea that 
excluding purely internal situations from the protection of EU citizenship and 
resulting in ‘reverse discrimination’, directly contradicts the aims and values of 
Union.1070  
Furthermore, Chapter 4 had conducted a more practical analysis of the findings 
of the previous Chapter using the case study of the recent financial crisis. The 
application of the ‘triangular’ system of protection was thus considered with 
regards to the infringements of fundamental rights caused by the austerity 
measures imposed as conditionality for the financial assistance provided, mainly 
from the ESM.1071 The assessment in Chapter 4 suggested that the ‘triangular’ 
protection system had been largely incapable in protecting the Union citizens’ 
rights including the limited access to justice provided, resulting in a gap in 
effective judicial protection.1072 Moreover, the obvious reluctance on the part of 
the ECJ was identified as a contributory factor to the gap in effective judicial 
                                                 
1070 Niamh Nic Shuibhne, ‘Free Movement of Persons and The Wholly Internal Rule: Time to Move On?’ 
(2002) 39 Common Market Law Review 731, 757. 
1071 Cases of fundamental rights infringements caused by the austerity measures under the ESFS and the 
ESFM were also considered. 
1072 Jonathan Tomkin, ‘Contradiction, Circumvention and Conceptual Gymnastics: The Impact of the 
Adoption of the ESM Treaty on the State of European Democracy’ (2013) 14 German Law Journal 169. 
254 
 
protection,1073 as well as the fact that the rulings of the courts in general (national 
and supranational), were affected by non-legal reasons such as economic 
pressure. For the most part, this gap was a result of the restricted and unstable 
scope of application of fundamental rights under the Charter coupled with its 
inconsistent judicial interpretation and the inability of the Court to rule on complex 
financial cases. Additionally, the citizenship of the Union had not played any 
substantial role within the financial crisis, especially with regards to the protection 
of citizens’ rights. Chapters 3 and 4 clearly demonstrated the need to strengthen 
the ‘triangular’ system by wisely utilising the legal capabilities of the instruments 
involved for further development namely, to achieve a reinforcement in the form 
of a judicial incorporation rather than a legislative proposal. It was also confirmed 
that the idea of strengthening the system by firstly broadening the scope of 
application of fundamental rights was accurate, since the scope of EU law in this 
field constituted the main barrier in protecting EU citizens’ rights. 
The second research question regarding the extent to which EU citizenship can 
form the core element to improve the system was assessed in Chapter 5. In 
particular, this Chapter conducted an extensive appraisal of the ‘substance of the 
rights’ doctrine which was recently developed in a series of ECJ’s rulings within 
the sphere of EU citizenship case law. More specifically, the ECJ established the 
judicially-developed doctrine in Ruiz Zambrano, according to which EU law could 
be triggered as a result of an infringement that deprived EU citizens of the 
genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights enshrined in Article 20 
TFEU.1074 In other words, EU citizenship became a source of derived rights with 
the cross-border dimension completely inexistent, while the doctrine served as 
the tool for claiming this jurisdiction under EU law, when a deprivation of the 
substance of the rights attached to EU citizenship occurred.  
The thesis has been greatly supportive of the development of the new doctrine, 
not solely because it has expanded the scope of application of EU law towards 
purely internal situations, but also because its establishment has opened up new 
                                                 
1073 Rene Repasi, ‘Judicial protection against austerity measures in the euro area: Ledra and Mallis’ 
(2017) 54 Common Market Law Review 1123, 1123. 
1074 Judgment 8 March 2011, Ruiz Zambrano, C-34/09, ECLI:EU:C:2011:124, para 42. 
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vistas for a strengthened protection. According to Chapter 5, the doctrine has 
indeed strengthened the substance of Article 20 TFEU, by increasing the 
protection offered at the Union level and managing to expand the non-exhaustive 
list towards new ‘unwritten’ rights.1075 More importantly, it was concluded that the 
substance of the rights doctrine has added value and meaning to EU citizenship 
by acknowledging its autonomous nature and shifting the focus to a rights-based 
concept, beyond the merely internal market thinking. In brief, Chapter 5 
affirmatively responded to the second research question and presented EU 
citizenship and the substance of the rights doctrine as a useful instrument to build 
on, in order to achieve the objectives of the research.  
Finally, the third research question which examined the different legal methods 
to utilise EU citizenship and the judicial doctrine to strengthen the system, was 
discussed in Chapter 6. The analysis in this Chapter made clear that the 
expansion of the doctrine depends on the rights that are included in the list under 
Article 20 TFEU. Therefore, by establishing a connection between EU citizenship 
rights already falling within the scope of the doctrine and other EU fundamental 
rights, a significant extension to the EU fundamental rights scope would be 
implied. The first route examined the extent to which all EU fundamental rights 
(Charter provisions or general principles of EU law) could constitute EU 
citizenship rights and the second, the prospect of applying the merits of the 
doctrine to another general principle in a similar way, such as the effective judicial 
protection. 
Prior to the assessment of the two routes, Chapter 6 performed a comprehensive 
review of three former attempts made to establish the said link and set out their 
main disadvantages that were arguably avoided in the proposed ‘internal 
applicability of EU law’ test. On the other hand, the Chapter also recognised and 
embraced the positive aspects within these attempts that would accordingly 
constitute beneficial incorporations in the thesis’ proposal as well. In particular, 
the emphasis given to the importance of protecting the essence of fundamental 
                                                 
1075 Martinj van den Brink, ‘The origins and the Potential Federalising Effects of the Substance of Rights 
Test’ in Dimitry Kochenov (ed), EU Citizenship and Federalism: The Role of Rights (OUP 2017) 96. 
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rights enshrined in Article 2 TEU in the ‘reverse Solange’, was also partly added 
in the first step of the thesis’ ‘internal applicability of EU law’ test.1076 In essence, 
Chapter 6 had firstly set the two starting points of the new judicial incorporation, 
namely the view that the list of rights under Article 20 TFEU is a non-exhaustive 
one and can be clearly expanded and the rule that beyond Article 51 of the 
Charter and the scope of EU law in general, fundamental rights policies are left 
to the national Member States, provided that they safeguard the essence of rights 
protected under Article 2 TEU.1077 Secondly, the Chapter had moved to the 
factual assessment of the proposed routes above and ended up building a new 
jurisdictional test based on these two starting points.  
Since not every single right can be added to the ‘inter alia’ list attached to EU 
citizenship, the first step of the test is the separation of the rights that are eligible 
to do so and those that would violate core principles of EU law such as the division 
of competences if added. This separation is conducted in accordance with Article 
2 TEU, which is protecting the essence of fundamental rights common to the 
Member States and under which the Court has the capacity to recognise 
fundamental rights as general principles of EU law. As discussed in Chapter 6, 
general principles are by their nature sufficiently flexible so as to continue to 
expand in content, according to the rulings of the Court. The subsequent step 
was to assess the scope of application of the infringed right either as a Charter 
provision or as a general principle, in order to determine its compatibility with the 
‘internal applicability of EU law’ test. More specifically, the cross-border element 
traditionally required to trigger the citizenship provisions under EU law, was 
replaced by the ‘substance of the rights’ doctrine where Article 20 TFEU was 
sufficient on its own to trigger EU law, if the infringement under consideration was 
of a specific degree and formation. It cannot thus be implied that the substance 
of the rights doctrine can trigger EU law for infringements of ‘essential’ rights 
regardless of their actual scope of application. As a result, Chapter 6 concluded 
that any ‘essential’ right eligible to be regarded as part of EU citizenship must 
                                                 
1076 Armin von Bogdandy, ‘Reverse Solange – Protecting the Essence of Fundamental Rights against EU 
Member States’ (2012) 49 Common Market Law Review 489, 515. 
1077 Amaryllis Verhoeven, ‘How democratic need European Union members be?: some thoughts after 
Amsterdam’ (1998) 23 European Law Review 217. 
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possess at least the same or broader scope of application than the one replaced, 
namely the cross-border dimension. Accordingly, with regard to the principle of 
effective judicial protection which constitutes a concrete expression of the values 
under Article 2 TEU,1078 the corresponding Article 47 of the Charter would not be 
appropriate having the scope of the Charter being strictly interpreted, since the 
‘implementation of EU law’ concept discussed is narrower than the replaced 
‘cross-border’ requirement. The narrow interpretation of Article 51 of the Chapter 
automatically causes the Charter provisions to be too distant from purely internal 
situations, which in turn are likely to presage a contradiction with the principle of 
referral and the respect for Member States identity, if they were added. 
Consequently, only rights with the same or boarder scope of application than the 
‘cross-border’ element, can be said to satisfy the second step.  
The final step discussed in Chapter 6 consists in the need for a deprivation of the 
substance of the rights under Article 20 TFEU (including the ‘essential’ unwritten 
ones) and not a mere impediment to trigger EU law using the substance of the 
rights doctrine rationale. The analysis around the doctrine’s deprivation 
requirement in the research, concluded that the national measure must lead to a 
de facto loss of the right under dispute. Therefore, the genuine part of the 
proposed jurisdictional test is to place additional rights in the ‘inter alia’ list under 
Article 20 TFEU and then use the rationale of the classic substance of the rights 
doctrine to invoke the rights in purely internal situations if necessary. 
7.2 Main conclusions 
The inability of the system to protect the rights of citizens in the course of one of 
the most severe crises in the Union’s history since its establishment, was not only 
damaging to the long-term legitimacy of the Union as whole, but it also 
undermined the commitment to human rights and effective judicial protection, 
developed by the Courts and the EU institutions throughout the years.1079 The 
                                                 
1078 Judgment of 27 February 2018, Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, C-64/16, 
ECLI:EU:C:2018:117, para 30. 
1079 Catherine Barnard, ‘The Charter, the Court – and the Crisis’ (2013) University of Cambridge Faculty 
of Law Research Paper No. 18/2013 <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2306957> 
accessed 14 June 2017. 
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general aim of the study, as discussed in the Introductory Chapter, was to 
reinforce the system of EU fundamental rights protection currently in force, by 
giving more value and meaning to the concept of Union citizenship which 
according to the thesis enjoys a considerable flexibility, allowing it to overcome 
structural restrictions and difficulties. In other words, from the thesis’ perspective 
EU citizenship must be viewed as a living instrument of a constructivist nature.  
The thesis managed to substantially achieve the objectives set through the 
formation of a new jurisdictional test which is primarily responsible to add new 
rights in the ‘inter alia’ list of rights under Article 20 TFEU and in turn to enable 
the unwritten rights to be invoked in purely internal situations using the rationale 
of the classic substance of the rights doctrine. As discussed above the ‘internal 
applicability of EU law’ test, is formed on three different steps consisting of the 
delimitation of the test under Article 2 TEU, the clarification of the violated 
‘essential’ right’s scope of application and finally the emergence of a ‘deprivation 
effect’ of the substance of the ‘essential’ right, in accordance to the initial doctrine.  
In particular, in the context of the financial crisis a gap in the effective judicial 
protection of citizens’ rights was identified, inter alia caused by the structural 
difficulty in rendering the issue under dispute as falling within the scope of EU 
law, even where such a connection was explicit.1080 With the application of the 
‘internal applicability of EU law’ test, the alleged gap in effective judicial protection 
can be assessed under EU law and give the opportunity to EU citizens to have 
their case factually examined by the ECJ. More specifically, Chapter 6 concluded 
that the right to effective judicial protection satisfies all the three steps of the test 
making it part of the list of rights under Article 20 TFEU, which will then be used 
to examine a purely internal situation in the logic of the substance of the right 
doctrine. In other words, the new test facilitates the invocation of the deprived 
rights within the context of the financial crisis, in purely internal situations 
requiring the EU intervention and then the Court is called upon to assess whether 
the threshold for obtaining damages is satisfied. Although the test could give the 
                                                 
1080 Judgment of 14 December May 2011, Corpul Naţional al Poliţiştilor, C-434/11, ECLI:EU:C:2011:830; 
Judgment of 26 June 2014, Sindicato Nacional dos Profissionais de Seguros e Afins, C-264/12, 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:2036. 
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impression of being a thoughtless step forward that could easily generate 
contradictions, it is in line with the relevant doctrinal and jurisprudential 
approaches towards EU citizenship, as well as with the objectives and values of 
the Union.  
A number of researchers are expected to be in opposition to the proposed test or 
generally to any kind of judicial incorporation. However, the fact that EU 
citizenship was formally incorporated in the Treaty with a non-exhaustive list of 
rights attached to it along the possibility of expanding, demonstrates the idea that 
at least textually speaking, the concept of EU citizenship is not a fixed one but it 
is rather understood as a living instrument. According to the research and the 
theoretical approaches used, citizenship as a general global concept should be 
based on a persistent progression, as the citizenship of the Union has 
significantly done. This is by reason of the fact that it is highly important and 
indispensable for the instruments governing a supranational Union of 28 Member 
States to constantly evolve so as to keep up with the social, financial, economic 
and even technological changes within the EU legal order. Therefore, despite the 
conclusions of the thesis around the formation of a new test, important 
conclusions were also drawn with regard to the purposeful operation of EU 
citizenship and the role of the ECJ towards this direction. 
In particular, the research provided an in-depth analysis on the constructivist 
approach towards EU citizenship, namely the characteristics of the approach and 
the benefits deriving therefrom including the citizens’ rights protection, the 
enhanced legitimacy of the Union and the prevention of adverse effects caused 
by the gaps of the legislation, usually burdening the citizenship. Above all, the 
research has extensively discussed the future potential that constructivism 
provides, especially in solving severe drawbacks lastingly on the EU level, without 
complicated legal procedures. In order however for constructivism and its 
interests to materialise, the activist role and support of the ECJ is undoubtedly 
necessary. Likewise, the importance of the ECJ’s role in the judicial 
developments in the field of EU citizenship and fundamental rights was clearly 
demonstrated in the research. Under its current jurisprudence, the ECJ is in fact 
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granted the power to check the legality of the Member States’ actions against the 
letter of EU law and defend EU citizens’ rights against all the Member State 
including their own.1081 It has thus evidently turned into an adjudicator of almost 
last resort within the context of disputes on EU citizenship which could have 
already been denied, protecting individuals’ rights put in jeopardy by state 
actions.1082 According to the conclusions of the current research, the ECJ is 
rightly placed at the centre of this narrative, as the heroic and solitary actor which 
through its pioneering series of cases and admirable will, managed to turn into 
reality conceptions not even imaginable some years ago.1083  
7.3 Limitations of the research 
The current research has arguably managed to achieve the objectives set in the 
beginning, while fully complying with the necessary set of rules under EU law, as 
well as with the procedural steps safeguarding the legitimacy of the proposal. 
Although the conformity with the laws and principles and the adherence to 
doctrinal validity was perceived as the hardest barrier to overcome in achieving 
the set goals, further limitations arose that moderately affected the research. First 
of all, the analysis of the main concepts used and the final proposal of a judicial 
incorporation were almost entirely depended on the jurisprudence of the ECJ. 
Therefore, the ideas and strategies towards achieving the objectives of the 
research were constantly altering depending on the rulings of the ECJ, especially 
on the application of EU fundamental rights in the ongoing claims against 
austerity measures and the use of the substance of the rights doctrine. It can be 
concluded that the case law in the field of the financial crisis and the use of 
fundamental rights had been slowly progressing, while the rulings concerning the 
                                                 
1081 Dimitry Kochenov, ‘New European Citizenship: A move beyond the market bias’ in Richard Bellamy 
and Uta Staiger (eds), EU Citizenship and the Market (UCL European Institute 2011).  
1082 Francesca Strumia, ‘Ruiz Zambrano’s Quiet Revolution’ in Fernanda Nicola and Bill Davies (eds), EU 
Law Stories (CUP Press 2017) 236; Gareth Davies, ‘The Entirely Conventional Supremacy of Union 
citizenship and Rights’ in ‘Has the European Court of Justice Challenged Member State Sovereignty in 
National Law?’ (2011) EUI Working Paper RSCAS 2011/62, 9 
<http://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/19654> accessed 10 May 2017. 
1083 Dimitry Kochenov, ‘Real European Citizenship: A New Jurisdiction Test: A Novel Chapter in The 
Development of The Union in Europe’ (2011) 18 Columbia Journal of European Law 56, 93; Henri de 
Waele, ‘The role of the Court of Justice in the Integration Process: A contemporary and Normative 
assessment’ (2010) 6 Hanse Law Review 3. 
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judicial doctrine of EU citizenship made it more limited and exceptional in use. 
Besides some unexpected rulings of the Court’s case law, the most important 
development during the researching period is the case of Associação Sindical 
dos Juízes Portugueses.1084 The decision was issued earlier this year and 
provided the glue to bind together the elements of the new test, since it concerned 
the compatibility of austerity measures with specific general principles of EU law 
and resulted in a remarkable extension to the scope of application of EU law.  
Besides the ongoing judicial developments of the ECJ which moderately affected 
the progress of the research, numerous objections to the proposal were also 
raised which the thesis rejected in Chapter 6. These objections included core 
principles of the EU that were seemingly in contrast with the aim of the research, 
as well as specific Treaty provisions that have been occasionally characterised 
as inappropriate for a use such as the recommended one. The said limitations 
were however expected to arise, which is why great attention has been paid 
throughout the thesis, on safeguarding the legitimacy of the proposal and 
carefully construct a constitutionalised test.  
Nevertheless, although the ‘internal applicability of EU law’ test, is evidently 
promising at least in the framework that was developed, its application remains 
quite limited for three main reasons, although additional research on the topic can 
largely evolve it. The first reason is related to the objectives discussed above, 
namely in order to stay in compliance with the division of competences and other 
core principles of EU law it is necessary to restrain the application of the test to 
the cases where there is a real need for EU intervention. Contrary to the first 
reason which is not necessarily a negative approach, the second reason 
concerns the fact that the ‘internal applicability of EU law’ test has only been 
examined in the context of the right to effective judicial protection. In spite of the 
fact that the proposal is supposed to represent a test for general application, a 
complete examination including the preliminary stages of the analysis is 
necessary to verify its general application. Therefore, the list under Article 20 
                                                 
1084 Judgment of 27 February 2018, Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, C-64/16, 
ECLI:EU:C:2018:117. 
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TFEU is for the moment solely expanded towards the principle of effective judicial 
protection. 
Along the same lines, the current proposal remains limited for a third reason, 
concerning its advancement specifically through the case study of the financial 
crisis. Although the financial crisis appears to be an exceptional situation, its 
characteristics and the Court’s approach towards its claims depict a rather 
frequent scenario. As clarified in Chapter 4, the financial assistance packages 
provided to the Member States in financial difficulties accompanied by the 
required conditionality, were divided into different categories whereby some 
Member States were granted assistance through mechanisms established 
beyond the scope of EU law, while others through EU-based instruments.1085 The 
principal matter was thus to correctly distinguish between the cases that had to 
be assessed under EU law if a connecting factor existed and those where the link 
was missing but a direct involvement of EU institutions existed, calling upon EU 
action as earlier explained. Therefore, the disputed matters within this specific 
case study, were largely concerned with the determination of competent 
jurisdiction. In a nutshell, the most rigorous limitation that could have severely 
affected the progression and the completion of the research was successfully 
overcome, while the doubts and limitations that are still pending must be subject 
to additional research beyond the current one to be settled. 
7.4 Future research recommendations 
The research around the dynamism of EU citizenship and its connection with EU 
fundamental rights is still in its initial stages, considering that a formal relationship 
has not yet been achieved and Union citizenship’s scope of application is not yet 
clear-cut. The current study has managed to form a new jurisdictional test to give 
the flexibility and instability identified, a degree of legal consistency for relevant 
claims. However, due to the limitations and barriers discussed above, in order to 
ensure the legitimacy of the proposal, the research has only examined the 
compatibility of the principle of effective protection to be incorporated in the 
                                                 
1085 Paul Craig, ‘Pringle and the Nature of Legal Reasoning’ (2014) 21 Maastricht Journal of European and 
Comparative Law 205. 
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proposed jurisdictional test and has only done so within the context of the 
financial crisis case study.   
As a result, further research would evidently provide a clearer picture on the 
application of the test. In particular, the thesis suggests two different routes for 
additional research on the topic. The first recommendation concerns the 
assessment of the jurisdictional test as it has been formed, towards its application 
in the case study of the rule of law crisis that has recently emerged. Although the 
context of the rule of law crisis is entirely different from that of the financial crisis, 
their principal similarity lies in the fact that they both require a degree of EU 
intervention to be sorted out. In particular, a supranational action on the Union 
level would ensure that the values of the EU are adhered to and especially the 
rule of law which is severely contested at the moment. Secondly, it would prevent 
the consolidation of undemocratic measures all over the Union at once. In line 
with this background, further research can be conducted on the jurisdictional test 
of the thesis to determine whether, within the context of the rule of law crisis, 
purely internal situations can also be assessed under EU law, such as the 
impartiality of national courts and judges.1086  
Finally, it would be interesting to assess the suitability of other fundamental rights 
as general principles of EU law, to be added within the ‘inter alia’ list under Article 
20 TFEU and in turn to be invoked in purely internal situations. As discussed in 
Chapter 2 the eligible fundamental rights for this purpose, which at the same time 
safeguard the Union’s legitimacy, are primarily the ones with values of objective 
nature, such as equal treatment and non-discrimination. Although the 
jurisdictional test proposed has arguably managed to achieve a substantial 
reinforcement in the system as intended, both subject matters recommended for 
further research would mark a new phase in this remarkable expansion of EU 
fundamental rights protection.   
                                                 
1086 Judgment of 25 July 2018, Case C-216/18 PPU, Minister for Justice and Equality, ECLI:EU:C:2018:586; 
Action brought on 15 March 2018, Case C-192/18, European Commission v Republic of Poland, Case in 
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